



FOREWORD BY ROBIN D. G. KELLEY

WITH A NEW PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

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CONTENTS

Foreword by Robin D. G. Kelley xi Preface to the 2000 Edition xxvii Preface xxxv Acknowledgments xxxvii Introduction 1

Part I The Emergence and Limitations of European Radicalism

■ Racial Capitalism:

The Nonobjective Character of Capitalist Development 9
Europe's Formation 10
The First Bourgeoisie 13
The Modern World Bourgeoisie 18
The Lower Orders 21
The Effects of Western Civilization on Capitalism 24

- 2 The English Working Class as the Mirror of Production 29 Poverty and Industrial Capitalism 31 The Reaction of English Labor 33 The Colonization of Ireland 36 English Working-Class Consciousness and the Irish Worker 39 The Proletariat and the English Working Class 41
- 3 Socialist Theory and Nationalism 45
 Socialist Thought: Negation of Feudalism or Capitalism? 46
 From Babeuf to Marx: A Curious Historiography 49
 Marx, Engels, and Nationalism 52
 Marxism and Nationalism 62
 Conclusion 65

Part 2 The Roots of Black Radicalism

4 The Process and Consequences of Africa's Transmutation 71 The Diminution of the Diaspora 72 The Primary Colors of American Historical Thought 74 The Destruction of the African Past 81

Premodern Relations between Africa and Europe 82

The Mediterranean: Egypt, Greece, and Rome 83

The Dark Ages: Europe and Africa 85 Islam, Africa, and Europe 87 Europe and the Eastern Trade 89 Islam and the Making of Portugal 91 Islam and Eurocentrism 97

5 The Atlantic Slave Trade and African Labor 101

The Genoese Bourgeoisie and the Age of Discovery 103 Genoese Capital, the Atlantic, and a Legend 106 African Labor as Capital 109 The Ledgers of a World System 111 The Column Marked "British Capitalism" 116

6 The Historical Archaeology of the Black Radical Tradition 121

History and the Mere Slave 123
Reds, Whites, and Blacks 125
Black for Red 128
Black Resistance: The Sixteenth Century 130
Palmares and Seventeenth-Century Marronage 132
Black Resistance in North America 140
The Haitian Revolution 144
Black Brazil and Resistance 149
Resistance in the British West Indies 155
Africa: Revolt at the Source 164

7 The Nature of the Black Radical Tradition 167

Part 3 Black Radicalism and Marxist Theory

8 The Formation of an Intelligentsia 175
Capitalism, Imperialism, and the Black Middle Classes 177
Western Civilization and the Renegade Black Intelligentsia 181

9 Historiography and the Black Radical Tradition 185

Du Bois and the Myths of National History 185 Du Bois and the Reconstruction of History and American Political Thought 195 Slavery and Capitalism 199

Labor, Capitalism, and Slavery 200
Slavery and Democracy 203
Reconstruction and the Black Elite 205
Du Bois, Marx, and Marxism 207
Bolshevism and American Communism 208
Black Nationalism 212
Blacks and Communism 218

Du Bois and Radical Theory 228

- Black Labor and the Black Radical Tradition 241
 Black Labor and the Black Middle Classes in Trinidad 241
 The Black Victorian Becomes a Black Jacobin 251
 British Socialism 257
 Black Radicals in the Metropole 260
 The Theory of the Black Jacobin 270
 Coming to Terms with the Marxist Tradition 278
- Richard Wright and the Critique of Class Theory 287 Marxist Theory and the Black Radical Intellectual 287 The Novel as Politics 291 Wright's Social Theory 293 Blacks as the Negation of Capitalism 299 The Outsider as a Critique of Christianity and Marxism 301

12 An Ending 307

Notes 319 Bibliography 409 Index 431

PREFACE

It is always necessary to know what a book is about, not just what has been written in it but what was intended when it was written.

This work is about our people's struggle, the historical Black struggle. It takes as a first premise that for a people to survive in struggle it must be on its own terms: the collective wisdom which is a synthesis of culture and the experience of that struggle. The shared past is precious, not for itself, but because it is the basis of consciousness, of knowing, of being. It cannot be traded in exchange for expedient alliances or traduced by convenient abstractions or dogma. It contains philosophy, theories of history, and social prescriptions native to it. It is a construct possessing its own terms, exacting its own truths. I have attempted here to demonstrate its authority. More particularly, I have investigated the failed efforts to render the historical being of Black peoples into a construct of historical materialism, to signify our existence as merely an opposition to capitalist organization. We are that (because we must be) but much more. For the younger brothers and sisters, and for those who identify with the Black struggle who are tempted by the transubstantiation of Black history to European radical theory, this book is a challenge. I humbly submit this work to you—and to the others with whom the project had its beginnings: Mary Agnes Lewis, Margot Dashiell, Frederick Douglas Lewis, Welton Smith, Sherman Williams, Nebby-Lou Crawford, Jim Lacy, Gopalan Shyamala, Jay Wright, J. Herman Blake, Don Hopkins, Henry Ramsey, Donald Warden . . . and the others I met along the way.

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This work was begun while I was teaching in Binghamton, New York. By the time it was finished, my family and I had moved to the Santa Barbara region of California. In between we had spent a year in the small English village of Radwinter, south of Cambridge. In sum this covered a period of almost six years. During this time support for the research and writing was extended to me by the SUNY-Binghamton Foundation, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the National Research Council and Ford Foundation program of Post-Doctoral Fellowships for Minorities.

Such support was important. But even more important was that extended by the staff at the Center for Black Studies at uc—Santa Barbara, headed by Alyce Whitted, its administrative assistant and heart. They constituted a second family within which it was possible to work on matters of seriousness and purpose. In England, this support was augmented by my friends at the Institute of Race Relations, A. Sivanandan, Jenny Bourne, Colin Prescod, Hazel Walters, Paul Gilroy, Lou Kushnick, Danny Reilly, Harsh Punja, and Tony Bunyan. I am also deeply indebted to my editors at Zed Press, Robert Molteno and Anna Gourlay. To them is owed any coherence which might exist in the work that follows.

Among the number of scholars to whom an intellectual acknowledgement is owed, I must distinguish St. Clair Drake. Both his patience and example are reflected in the body of the work. He carries his knowledge with wisdom and grace.

The last word is reserved for my family: Elizabeth, who read the first writings and suggested their worth; and Najda, who will some day, I hope, share that opinion. Six of her first eight years are at stake. I expect she will, if for no other reason than the authority of her mother, who read every line of this manuscript (and suggested some). To the two of them I extend my deepest appreciation.

INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to map the historical and intellectual contours of the encounter of Marxism and Black radicalism, two programs for revolutionary change. I have undertaken this effort in the belief that in its way each represents a significant and immanent mode of social resolution, but that each is a particular and critically different realization of a history. The point is that they may be so distinct as to be incommensurable. At issue here is whether this is so. If it is, judgments must be made, choices taken.

The inquiry required that both Marxism and Black radicalism be subjected to interrogations of unusual form: the first, Marxism, because few of its adherents have striven hard enough to recognize its profound but ambiguous indebtedness to Western civilization; the second, Black radicalism, because the very circumstance of its appearance has required that it be misinterpreted and diminished. I have hoped to contribute to the correction of these errors by challenging in both instances the displacement of history by aeriform theory and self-serving legend. Whether I have succeeded is for the reader to judge. But first it may prove useful to outline the construction of the study.

In Western societies for the better part of the past two centuries, the active and intellectual opposition of the Left to class rule has been vitalized by the vision of a socialist order: an arrangement of human relations grounded on the shared responsibility and authority over the means of social production and reproduction. The variations on the vision have been many, but over the years of struggle the hardiest tradition has proven to be that identified with the work and writings of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and V. I. Lenin. Obviously here the term "tradition" is used rather loosely since the divergencies of opinion and deed between Marx, Engels, and Lenin have been demonstrated by history to be as significant as their correspondence. Nevertheless, in common as well as in academic parlance, these three activist-intellectuals are taken to be the principal figures of Marxist or Marxist-Leninist socialism. Marxism was founded on the study of the capitalist expropriation and exploitation of labor as first taken up by Engels, then elaborated by Marx's "material theory of history," his recognition of the evolving systems of capitalist production and the inevitability of class struggle, and later augmented by Lenin's conceptions of imperialism, the state, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and the role of the revolutionary party. It has provided the ideological, historical, and political vocabulary for much of the radical and revolutionary presence

emergent in modern Western societies. Elsewhere, in lands economically parasitized by the capitalist world system, or in those rare instances where its penetration has been quarantined by competing historical formations, some sorts of Marxism have again translated a concern with fundamental social change.

However, it is still fair to say that at base, that is at its epistemological substratum, Marxism is a Western construction—a conceptualization of human affairs and historical development that is emergent from the historical experiences of European peoples mediated, in turn, through their civilization, their social orders, and their cultures. Certainly its philosophical origins are indisputably Western. But the same must be said of its analytical presumptions, its historical perspectives, its points of view. This most natural consequence though has assumed a rather ominous significance since European Marxists have presumed more frequently than not that their project is identical with world-historical development. Confounded it would seem by the cultural zeal that accompanies ascendant civilizations, they have mistaken for universal verities the structures and social dynamics retrieved from their own distant and more immediate pasts. Even more significantly, the deepest structures of "historical materialism," the foreknowledge for its comprehension of historical movement, have tended to relieve European Marxists from the obligation of investigating the profound effects of culture and historical experience on their science. The ordering ideas that have persisted in Western civilization (and Marx himself as we shall see was driven to admit such phenomena), reappearing in successive "stages" of its development to dominate arenas of social ideology, have little or no theoretical justification in Marxism for their existence. One such recurring idea is racialism: the legitimation and corroboration of social organization as natural by reference to the "racial" components of its elements. Though hardly unique to European peoples, its appearance and codification, during the feudal period, into Western conceptions of society was to have important and enduring consequences.

In the first part of this study, I have devoted three chapters to explicating the appearance and formulation of racial sensibility in Western civilization and its social and ideological consequences. Chapter 1 reconstructs the history of the emergence of racial order in feudal Europe and delineates its subsequent impact on the organization of labor under capitalism. Racism, I maintain, was not simply a convention for ordering the relations of European to non-European peoples but has its genesis in the "internal" relations of European peoples. As part of the inventory of Western civilization it would reverberate within and without, transferring its toll from the past to the present. In contradistinction to Marx's and Engels's expectations that bourgeois society would rationalize social relations and demystify social consciousness, the obverse occurred. The development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force, then, it could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term "racial capitalism" to refer to this development and to the subsequent structure as a historical agency. The second chapter, as it rehearses the formation of the working classes in England, looks precisely at this phenomenon. Since the English working classes were the social basis for Engels's conceptualization of the modern proletariat, and conjoined with the *sans-culotte* of the French Revolution to occupy a similar place in Marx's thought, their evolving political and ideological character is of signal importance in reckoning the objective basis for Marxist theory. Of particular interest is the extent to which racialism (and subsequently nationalism) both as ideology and actuality affected the class consciousness of workers in England. In the intensely racial social order of England's industrializing era, the phenomenology of the relations of production bred no objective basis for the extrication of the universality of class from the particularisms of race. Working-class discourse and politics remained marked by the architectonic possibilities previously embedded in the culture.

But the appearance of European socialism and its development into a tradition was, as well, somewhat at odds with socialism's subsequent historiography and orthodoxies. The third chapter pursues among the middle classes the obscured origins of socialism and the contradictions that weakened its political and ideological expressions. It was indeed nationalism, a second "bourgeois" accretion, that most subverted the socialist creation. Nationalism, as a mix of racial sensibility and the economic interests of the national bourgeoisies, was as powerful an ideological impulse as any spawned from these strata. As an acquired temper and as a historical force met on the fields of social and political revolution, nationalism bemused the founders of historical materialism and those who followed them. It was to overtake both the direction of capitalist development and eventually the formative structures of socialist societies as they appeared in the present century. The historical trajectories of those developments, again, were almost entirely unexpected in a theoretical universe from which it had been discerned that ideology and false consciousness were supposedly being expelled. When in its time Black radicalism became manifest within Western society as well as at the other junctures between European and African peoples, one might correctly expect that Western radicalism was no more receptive to it than were the apologists of power.

Part II takes up this other radical tradition, Black radicalism, the conditions of its historical emergence, its forms, and its nature. This exposition begins in chapter 4 with the reinvestigation of the past relations between Europeans and Africans, a past that has been transformed by Europeans and for Europeans into a grotesque parody, a series of legends as monstrously proportioned as Pliny's *Blemmyae* "whose heads / Do grow beneath their shoulders." The obscuring of the Black radical tradition is seated in the West's suppression of Europe's previous knowledge of the African (and its own) past. The denial of history to African peoples took time—several hundreds of years—beginning with the emergence of Western Europeans from the shadow of Muslim domination and paternalism. It was also a process that was to transport the image of Africa across separate planes of dehumanization latticed by the emerging modalities of Western culture. In England, at first gripped by a combative and often hysterical Christianity—complements of the crusades, the "reconquests," and the rise of Italian capitalism—medieval English devouts recorded dreams in which the devil appeared

as "a blacke moore," "an Ethiope." This was part of the grammar of the church, the almost singular repository of knowledge in Europe. Centuries later the Satanic gave way to the representation of Africans as a different sort of beast: dumb, animal labor, the benighted recipient of the benefits of slavery. Thus the "Negro" was conceived. The Negro—whose precedents could be found in the racial fabrications concealing the Slavs (the slaves), the Irish and others—substantially eradicated in Western historical consciousness the necessity of remembering the significance of Nubia for Egypt's formation, of Egypt in the development of Greek civilization, of Africa for imperial Rome, and more pointedly of Islam's influence on Europe's economic, political, and intellectual history. From such a creature not even the suspicion of tradition needed to be entertained. In its stead there was the Black slave, a consequence masqueraded as an anthropology and a history.

The creation of the Negro was obviously at the cost of immense expenditures of psychic and intellectual energies in the West. The exercise was obligatory. It was an effort commensurate with the importance Black labor power possessed for the world economy sculpted and dominated by the ruling and mercantile classes of Western Europe. As chapter 5 indicates, the Atlantic slave trade and the slavery of the New World were integral to the modern world economy. Their relationship to capitalism was historical and organic rather than adventitious or synthetic. The Italian financiers and merchants whose capital subsidized Iberian exploration of the Atlantic and Indian oceans were also masters of (largely "European") slave colonies in the Mediterranean. Certainly slave labor was one of their bases for what Marx termed "primitive accumulation." But it would be an error to arrest the relationship there, assigning slave labor to some "pre-capitalist" stage of history. For more than 300 years slave labor persisted beyond the beginnings of modern capitalism, complementing wage labor, peonage, serfdom, and other methods of labor coercion. Ultimately, this meant that the interpretation of history in terms of the dialectic of capitalist class struggles would prove inadequate, a mistake ordained by the preoccupation of Marxism with the industrial and manufacturing centers of capitalism; a mistake founded on the presumptions that Europe itself had produced, that the motive and material forces that generated the capitalist system were to be wholly located in what was a fictive historical entity. From its very foundations capitalism had never been-any more than Europe—a "closed system."

Necessarily then, Marx's and Engels's theory of revolution was insufficient in scope: the European proletariat and its social allies did not constitute *the* revolutionary subject of history, nor was working-class consciousness necessarily *the* negation of bourgeois culture. Out of what was in reality a rather more complex capitalist world system (and one to which Marx in his last decade paid closer attention), other revolutionary forces emerged as well. Informed as they were by the ideas and cultures drawn from their own historical experiences, these movements assumed forms only vaguely anticipated in the radical traditions of the West. In the terms of capitalist society they were its negation, but that was hardly the source of their being. And among them was the persistent and continuously evolving resistance of African peo-

ples to oppression. The sixth chapter rehearses the history of this Black radical tradition in the African diaspora and to some extent in the African continent itself. As both this and the seventh chapter attempt to demonstrate, the record of resistance for four centuries or more, from Nueva Espana to Nyasaland, leaves in no doubt the specifically African character of those struggles. Resistances were formed through the meanings that Africans brought to the New World as their cultural possession; meanings sufficiently distinct from the foundations of Western ideas as to be remarked upon over and over by the European witnesses of their manifestations; meanings enduring and powerful enough to survive slavery to become the basis of an opposition to it. With Western society as a condition, that tradition almost naturally assumed a theoretical aspect as well.

The third and final section of this study traces the social and intellectual backgrounds of the processes that led to the theoretical articulation of Black radicalism. The conditions for modern Black theory were present first in the African diaspora. Far from Africa and physically enveloped by hostile communities, Black opposition acquired a penetrative comprehension. But it was a social and political as well as a historical process that nurtured theory. In the pursuit of that process I have identified three seminal Black radical intellectuals: William Edward Burkhardt Du Bois, Cyril Lionel Robert James, and Richard Nathaniel Wright. They have been chosen for detailed treatment not only because they made substantial contributions to the theoretical text, but because their lives and circumstances were prisms of the events impending on and emanating from the Black radical tradition. Their reactions to their confrontation with Black resistance, the very means used for their expression were distinct but related, characterized by circumstance, temperament, and training. Though their lives were very dissimilar—only Wright could be said to have been directly produced by the Black peasant and working classes—they all came to that tradition late (and hesitantly, as I will argue with respect to Du Bois and James). For all three, though, Marxism had been the prior commitment, the first encompassing and conscious experience of organized opposition to racism, exploitation, and domination. As Marxists, their apprenticeships proved to be significant but ultimately unsatisfactory. In time, events and experience drew them toward Black radicalism and the discovery of a collective Black resistance inspired by an enduring cultural complex of historical apprehension. In these concluding chapters I have attempted to demonstrate how and why this was so. Taken together, the efforts of Du Bois, James, and Wright consisted of a first step toward the creation of an intellectual legacy that would complement the historical force of Black struggle. Their destiny, I suggest, was not to create the idea of that struggle so much as to articulate it. Regardless, the Black opposition to domination has continued to acquire new forms. In a very real sense then, the present study follows.

PART

THE EMERGENCE AND LIMITATIONS OF EUROPEAN RADICALISM



MAPIER

RACIAL CAPITALISM: THE NONOBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT



The historical development of world capitalism was influenced in a most fundamental way by the particularistic forces of racism and nationalism. This could only be true if the social, psychological, and cultural origins of racism and nationalism both anticipated capitalism in time and formed a piece with those events that contributed directly to its organization of production and exchange. Feudal society is the key. More particularly, the antagonistic commitments, structures, and ambitions that feudal society encompassed are better conceptualized as those of a developing civilization than as elements of a unified tradition.

The processes through which the world system emerged contained an opposition between the rationalistic thrusts of an economistic worldview and the political momenta of collectivist logic. The feudal state, an instrument of signal importance to the bourgeoisie, was to prove to be as consistently antithetical to the commercial integration represented by a world system as it had to the idea of Christendom. Neither the state nor later the nation could slough off the particularistic psychologies and interests that served as contradictions to a global community. A primary consequence of the conflict between those two social tendencies was that capitalists, as the architects of this system, never achieved the coherence of structure and organization that had been the promise of capitalism as an objective system. On the contrary, the history of capitalism has in no way distinguished itself from earlier eras with respect to wars, material crises, and social conflicts. A secondary consequence is that the critique of capitalism, to the extent that its protagonists have based their analyses upon the

presumption of a determinant economic rationality in the development and expansion of capitalism, has been characterized by an incapacity to come to terms with the world system's direction of developments. Marxism, the dominant form that the critique of capitalism has assumed in Western thought, incorporated theoretical and ideological weaknesses that stemmed from the same social forces that provided the bases of capitalist formation.

The creation of capitalism was much more than a matter of the displacement of feudal modes and relations of production by capitalist ones.² Certainly, the transformation of the economic structures of noncapitalist Europe (specifically the Mediterranean and western European market, trade, and production systems) into capitalist forms of production and exchange was a major part of this process. Still, the first appearance of capitalism in the fifteenth century³ involved other dynamics as well. The social, cultural, political, and ideological complexes of European feudalisms contributed more to capitalism than the social "fetters" that precipitated the bourgeoisie into social and political revolutions. No class was its own creation. Indeed, capitalism was less a catastrophic revolution (negation) of feudalist social orders than the extension of these social relations into the larger tapestry of the modern world's political and economic relations. Historically, the civilization evolving in the western extremities of the Asian/European continent, and whose first signification is medieval Europe,5 passed with few disjunctions from feudalism as the dominant mode of production to capitalism as the dominant mode of production. And from its very beginnings, this European civilization, containing racial, tribal, linguistic, and regional particularities, was constructed on antagonistic differences.

Europe's Formation

The social basis of European civilization was "among those whom the Romans called the 'barbarians.' "6 Prior to the eleventh or twelfth centuries, the use of the collective sense of the term "barbarian" was primarily a function of exclusion rather than a reflection of any significant consolidation among those peoples. The term signified that the "barbarians" had their historical origins beyond the civilizing reach of Roman law and the old Roman imperial social order. The "Europe" of the ninth century for which the Carolingian family and its minions claimed paternity was rather limited geopolitically and had a rather short and unhappy existence. Interestingly, for several centuries following the deaths of Charlemagne and his immediate heirs (the last being Arnulf, d.899), both the Emperor and Europe were more the stuff of popular legend and clerical rhetoric than manifestations of social reality. The idea of Europe, no longer a realistic project, was transferred from one of a terrestrial social order to that of a spiritual kingdom: Christendom.

In fact, those peoples to whom the Greeks and the Romans referred collectively as barbarians were of diverse races with widely differing cultures. The diversity of their languages is, perhaps, one measure of their differences. But in using this measure, we

must be cautious of the schemes of classification of those languages that reduce the reality of their numbers to simple groupings like the Celtic, the Italic, the Germanic, the Balto-Slavonic, and Albanian languages.¹⁰

Direct and indirect evidence indicates that a more authentic mapping of the languages of the proto-Europeans would be much more complex. For instance, H. Munro Chadwick, as late as 1945, could locate extant descendants of those several languages among the Gaelic, Welsh, and Breton languages of Great Britain and France; the Portuguese, Spanish, Catalan, Provençal, French, Italian, Sardinian, Alpine, and Rumanian languages and dialects of southern and western Europe; the English, Frisian, Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Icelandic languages of England, Scotland the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavia; the Russian, Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, Slovenian, Slovakian, Czech, Polish, and Lusitian languages and dialects of central and eastern Europe; and the Latvian and Lithuanian languages of northern Europe. 11 But even Chadwick's list was of merely those languages that had survived "the millennium of Europe." The list would lengthen considerably if one were to consider the languages which existed in this area at the beginning of this era and are no longer spoken (for example, Latin, Cornish, and Prusai), along with those languages of peoples who preceded the migrations from the north and east of Rome's barbarians (for example, Basque, Etruscan, Oscan, and Umbrian).¹²

The Ostrogoth, Visigoth, Vandal, Suevi, Burgundi, Alamanni, and Frank peoples—that is the barbarians—whose impact on the fortunes of the Late Roman Empire from the fifth century was quick and dramatic, ¹³ were in fact a small minority of thousands among the millions of the decaying state. Henri Pirenne, relying on the estimates of Emile-Felix Gautier and L. Schmidt, reports that the Ostrogoths and Visigoths may have numbered 100,000 each, the Vandals 80,000, and the Burgundi 25,000. ¹⁴ Moreover, the warrior strata of each kingdom are consistently estimated at about 20 percent of their populations. On the other hand, the Empire that they invaded contained as many as 50–70 million persons. ¹⁵ Pirenne cautiously concludes:

All this is conjecture. Our estimate would doubtless be in excess of the truth if, for the Western provinces beyond the *limes*, we reckoned the Germanic element as constituting 5 percent of the population.¹⁶

More importantly, the vast majority of the barbarians "came not as conquerors, but exactly as, in our own day, North Africans, Italians, Poles cross into Metropolitan France to look for work." In a relatively short time, in the southern-most European lands that were bounded by the Western Roman Empire, these peoples were entirely assimilated by the indigenous peoples as a primarily slave labor force. The pattern was already a familiar one within the dying civilization of the Mediterranean with which they desired and desperately needed to join. It is also important to realize that with respect to the emerging European civilization whose beginnings coincide with the arrivals of these same barbarians, slave labor as a critical basis of production would continue without any significant interruption into the twentieth century.

From the *familia rustica* that characterized Roman and even earlier Greek (*doulos*) rural production within vast estates, through the *manucipia* of the *colonicae* and *mansi* land-holdings of Merovingian (481–752) and Carolingian eras, the feudal villains of western medieval Europe and England, and the *sclavi* of the Genoese and Venetian merchants who dominated commercial trade in the Mediterranean from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, slave labor persisted as an aspect of European agrarian production up to the modern era.²² Neither feudal serfdom, nor capitalism had as their result the elimination or curtailment of slavery.²³ At the very most (it is argued by some), their organization served to relocate it.²⁴

Despite the "Romanization" of the southern Goths, or seen differently because of it, the Germanic tribes did establish the general administrative boundaries that were to mark the nations of modern western Europe. The kingdoms that they established, mainly under the rules of Roman *hospitalitas* and in accordance with Roman administration,²⁵ were in large measure the predecessors of France, Germany, Spain, and Italy.

Still, we must not forget that in historical reconstruction, a medieval age is to be intervened between these two ages. Medieval Europe, though still agricultural in economy, was a much cruder existence for slave, peasant, farmer, artisan, land-owner, cleric, and nobility alike than had been the circumstance for their predecessors in the Empire. Urban life declined, leaving the old cities in ruins, ²⁶ long-distance trade, especially by sea routes, decayed dramatically. ²⁷ Latouche summarizes:

The balance-sheet of the Merovingian economy is singularly disappointing. The now fashionable, if unpleasant, word "rot" describes it to perfection. Whether in the sphere of town life, commerce, barter, currency, public works, shipping, we find everywhere the same policy of neglect, the same selfish refusal to initiate reform. From this disastrous, drifting laissez-faire which left men and things as they had always been, pursuing unchanged their traditional way of life, there sprang the illusion that the ancient world still lingered on; it was, in fact, no more than a facade.²⁸

The Carolingian Empire did little to repair the "rot" that anticipated the restructuring of Europe in feudal terms. The Muslim conquests of the Mediterranean in the seventh and eighth centuries had deprived the European economies of the urban, commercial, productive, and cultural vitality they required for their reconstruction. Pirenne put it boldly:

The ports and the cities were deserted. The link with the Orient was severed, and there was no communication with the Saracen coasts. There was nothing but death. The Carolingian Empire presented the most striking contrast with the Byzantine. It was purely an inland power, for it had no outlets. The Mediterranean territories, formerly the most active portions of the Empire, which supported the life of the whole, were now the poorest, the most desolate, the most constantly

menaced. For the first time in history the axis of Occidental civilization was displaced toward the North, and for many centuries it remained between the Seine and the Rhine. And the Germanic peoples, which had hitherto played only the negative part of destroyers, were now called upon to play a positive part in the reconstruction of European civilization.²⁹

Latouche, though he differed with Pirenne on many of the particulars of the Carolingian response to the loss of the Mediterranean, finally concurred:

[T]he Empire broke up less than half a century after its creation, and Charlemagne did nothing to prevent, and did not even attempt to delay, the development of feudal institutions, so heavy with menace for the future . . . a world in which there were no great business concerns, no industries, and in which agricultural activity was predominant.30

Urban life, trade, and market systems incorporating the goods of long-distance trade did not return to Europe until the end of the eleventh century at the earliest, and most probably during the twelfth century.³¹ By then, the depth to which the degradation of European life had fallen is perhaps best expressed by the appearance of commercialized cannibalism.32

The First Bourgeoisie

Into this depressed land where few were free of the authority of an intellectually backward and commercially unimaginative ruling class, where famine and epidemics were the natural order of things, and where the sciences of the Ancient World had long been displaced as the basis of intellectual development by theological fables and demonology,³³ appeared the figure to which European social theorists, Liberal and Marxist, attribute the generation of Western civilization: the bourgeoisie. The merchant was as alien to feudal society as the barbarian invaders had been to the Empire. Unlike the Mediterranean tradesmen,³⁴ the origins of the western European bourgeoisie are obscured. No doubt this is largely due to the fact that historical documentation is inevitably sparse where civilization in the formal sense of urban culture has largely disappeared, and where life is recorded by an elite of land and church largely preoccupied with its own experience while hostile to commerce.³⁵ Nevertheless, it is clear that the western European merchant class—"a class of deracines"36—crystallized within a social order for which it was an extrinsic phenomena.

The economic organization of demesne production was characterized by Pirenne as a "closed domestic economy one which we might call, with more exactitude, the economy of no markets."37 In fact, there were markets, local ones, but their function and existence had no part in the development of the markets of long-distance trades that were the basis of the merchant class's development. The mercati, whose existence predates the bourgeoisie, dealt not in trade but foodstuffs at the retail level.³⁸ The one factor "internal" to the feudal order that did contribute to the rise of the bourgeoisie was the eleventh century's population growth. This increase had ultimately placed significant strains on feudal production:

It had as a result the detaching from the land an increasingly important number of individuals and committing them to that roving and hazardous existence which, in every agricultural civilization, is the lot of those who no longer find themselves with their roots in the soil. It multiplied the crowd of vagabonds. . . . Energetic characters, tempered by the experience of a life full of the unexpected, must have abounded among them. Many knew foreign languages and were conversant with the customs and needs of diverse lands. Let a lucky chance present itself . . . they were remarkably well equipped to profit thereby. . . . Famines were multiplied throughout Europe, sometimes in one province and sometimes in another, by that inadequate system of communications, and increased still more the opportunities, for those who knew how to make use of them, of getting rich. A few timely sacks of wheat, transported to the right spot, sufficed for the realizing of huge profits. . . . It was certainly not long before nouveaux riches made their appearance in the midst of this miserable crowd of impoverished, bare-foot wanderers in the world. 39

In the beginning, before they could properly be described as bourgeoisie, these merchants traveled from region to region, their survival a matter of their mobility and their ability to capitalize on the frequent ruptures and breakdowns of the reproduction of populations sunk into the manorial soil. Their mobility may have also been occasioned by the fact that many of them were not free-born and thus sought respite from their social condition by flight from their lords: "By virtue of the wandering existence they led, they were everywhere regarded as foreigners."40 For security they often traveled in small bands-a habit that would continue into their more sedentary period. It was not long before they began to establish porti (storehouses or transfer points for merchandise) outside the burgs (the fortresses of the Germanic nobles) bishoprics and towns that straddled the main routes of war, communications, and later, international trade. It was these porti, or merchant colonies, that founded, in the main, the medieval cities of Europe's hinterland. It was at this point that the merchants of Europe became bourgeoisies (burgenses). By the beginnings of the twelfth century, these bourgeoisies had already begun the transformation of European life so necessary for the emergence of capitalism as the dominant organization of European production.

The western European bourgeoisie re-established the urban centers by basing them upon exchange between the Mediterranean, the East, and northern Europe:

[In the tenth century] there appears in Anglo-Saxon texts the word "port," employed as a synonym for the Latin words *urbs* and *civitas*, and even at the present day the term "ports" is commonly met with in the names of cities of every land of English speech.

Nothing shows more clearly the close connection that existed between the eco-

nomic revival of the Middle Ages and the beginnings of city life. They were so intimately related that the same word which designated a commercial settlement served in one of the great idioms of Europe to designate the town itself.⁴¹

Elsewhere, Pirenne puts it more succinctly: "Europe 'colonized' herself, thanks to the increase of her inhabitants." Flanders—geographically situated to service the commerce of the northern seas, and economically critical because of the Flemish cloth industry—was the first of the major European merchant centers. Close behind Flanders came Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Lille, Douai, Arras, Tournai, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Liege, Huy, Dinant, Cologne, Mainz, Rouen, Bordeaux, and Bayonne. Cloth, which both Pirenne Amad Karl Polanyi identify as the basis of European trade, originally a rural industry, was transformed by the bourgeoisie in Flanders into an urban manufacture "organized on the capitalistic basis of wage labour." The urban concentration of industry was thus initiated:

The increase of the population naturally favored industrial concentration. Numbers of the poor poured into the towns where cloth-making, the activity of which trade grew proportionately with the development of commerce, guaranteed them their daily bread. . . .

The old rural industry very quickly disappeared. It could not compete with that of the town, abundantly supplied with the raw material of commerce, operating at lower prices, and enjoying more advanced methods....

[W]hatever might be the nature of industry in other respects, everywhere it obeyed that law of concentration which was operative at such an early date in Flanders. Everywhere the city groups, thanks to commerce, drew rural industry to them.⁴⁷

It is also true that the bourgeoisie, in so doing, came to free some portions of the serfs⁴⁸ only to re-enslave them through wage labor. For with urban industry came the successful attack on feudal and seigniorial servitude:

Freedom, of old, used to be the monopoly of a privileged class. By means of the cities it again took its place in society as a natural attribute of the citizen. Hereafter it was enough to reside on city soil to acquire it. Every serf who had lived for a year and a day within the city limits had it by definite right: the statute of limitations abolished all rights which his lord exercised over his person and chattels. Birth meant little. Whatever might be the mark with which it had stigmatized the infant in his cradle, it vanished in the atmosphere of the city.⁴⁹

With the flourishing of long-distance trade and the development of urban centers in western Europe came some specializations in rural production. Though open-field agriculture dominated Europe as a whole in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, specialized grain production could be found in Prussia (corn), Tuscany and Lombardy (cereals), England (wheat), and north Germany (rye). By the late fifteenth century, viticulture had appeared in Italy, Spain, France, and southwest Germany. In

the Baltic and North Seas, fishing and salt made up a significant part of the cargoes of Hanseatic shippers. And in England and Spain, meat production for export had begun to emerge. 50

In northern Europe, these exports joined wool and woolen cloth as the major bases of international trade. In southern Europe—more precisely the Mediterranean—the long-distance trade in cloth (wool, silk, and later cotton), grains, and wines came to complement a significant trade in luxury goods:

The precious stuffs from the east found their way into every rich household, and so did the specialities of various European regions: amber and furs from the countries bordering on the Baltic; *objets d'art* such as paintings from Flanders, embroidery from England, enamels from Limoges; manuscript books for church, boudoir or library; fine armor and weapons from Milan and glass from Venice.⁵¹

Still, according to Iris Origo, the most precious cargo of the Mediterranean tradesmen was slaves:

European and Levantine traders sold Grecian wines and Ligurian figs, and the linen and woolen stuffs of Champagne and Lombardy, and purchased precious silks from China, carpets from Bokhara and Samarkand, furs from the Ural Mountains, and Indian spices, as well as the produce of the rich black fields and forests of the Crimea. But the most flourishing trade of all was that in slaves—for Caffa was the chief slave-market of the Levant.⁵²

Tartar, Greek, Armenian, Russian, Bulgarian, Turkish, Circassian, Slavonic, Cretan, Arab, African (*Mori*), and occasionally Chinese (Cathay) slaves⁵³—two-thirds of whom were female⁵⁴—were to be found in the households of wealthy and "even relatively modest Catalan and Italian families."

From the thirteenth century to the beginnings of the fifteenth century, the primary function of these predominantly European slaves in the economics of southern Europe was domestic service.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, in Spain (Catalan and Castile) and in the Italian colonies on Cyprus, Crete, and in Asia Minor (Phocaea) and Palestine, Genoese and Venetian masters used both European and African slaves in agriculture on sugar plantations, in industry, and for work in mines:

This variety of uses to which slaves were put illustrates clearly the degree to which medieval colonial slavery served as a model for Atlantic colonial slavery. Slave manpower had been employed in the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean for all the kinds of work it would be burdened with in the Atlantic colonies. The only important change was that the white victims of slavery were replaced by a much greater number of African Negroes, captured in raids or bought by traders.⁵⁷

In an unexpected way, this trade in slaves would prove to be the salvation of the Mediterranean bourgeoisie. In the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, however, it appeared that the merchants of the European hinterland would inevitably overshadow those of Italy's city-states. They, unlike the Italians, were undeterred, as

Giuliano Procacci points out, by the peninsula's small but densely packed populations; the increasingly unfavorable ratios of townsmen to countrymen (Florence could only survive on the produce of its countryside for five months of the year, Venice and Genoa had to be almost entirely supplied by sea); and the rapid deforestation of the countryside that aggravated the destruction of the autumn and spring floods.⁵⁸

However, it was the fate of this nascent bourgeoisie not to thrive. Indeed, for one historical moment, even the further development of capitalism might be said to have been in question. The events of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries intervened in the processes through which feudalism was ultimately displaced by the several forms of capitalism.⁵⁹ The consequence of those events were to determine the species of the modern world: the identities of the bourgeoisies that transformed capitalism into a world system; the sequences of this development; the relative vitalities of the several European economies; and the sources of labor from which each economy would draw.

The momentous events of which we speak were: the periodic famines that struck Europe in this period, the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century and subsequent years, the Hundred Years War (1337–1453), and the rebellions of peasants and artisans. 60 Together they had a devastating impact on western Europe and the Mediterranean—decimating the populations of cities and countryside alike, disrupting trade, collapsing industry and agricultural production—leveling, as it were, the bulk of the most developed regions of western European bourgeois activity. Denys Hay has summed it up quite well:

The result of prolonged scarcity, endemic and pandemic plague, the intermittent but catastrophic invasions of ruthless armies, and the constant threat in many areas from well-organized robber bands, was seen not only in a dwindling population but in roads abandoned to brambles and briars, in arable land out of cultivation and in deserted villages. Contraction in the area of cultivation in its turn made dearth the more likely. There was in every sense a vicious circle. A sober estimate suggests that "in 1470 the number of households was halved in most European villages compared with the start of the fourteenth century"; the reconquest of forest and waste of the arable is "an episode equal in importance to the drama of the earlier clearings."

This general economic decline in Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was marked in a final and visible way by social disorders much more profound than the territorial wars. Such wars, after all had been in character with feudal society. The appearance of peasant movements was not:

In the boom condition of the thirteenth century there had been in rural areas a degree of over-population which made many peasants—day labourers, poor serfs—very vulnerable. Now the countryside was more sparsely occupied and a better living was possible for those who remained. . . . What was new in the slump

conditions of the fourteenth century was a bitterness in the lord's relations with the villagers. 62

As Hay indicates, the most intense of the peasant rebellions occurred in Flanders (1325–28), northern France (the Jacquerie of 1358), and England (1381). But such movements erupted over much of western Europe during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. In France, and especially Normandy (precipitated surely by the final savaging of the peasants by the forces of the Hundred Years War), in Catalonia (1409–13 and later), in Jutland (1411), in Finland (1438), and in Germany (1524), peasants arose, seizing land, executing lords, clergy, and even lawyers, demanding an end to manorial dues, petitioning for the establishment of wage-labor, and insisting on the dissolution of restrictions on free buying and selling.⁶³

Within the vortex of these disturbances, long-distance trade declined drastically. In England, the export of wool and cloth, and subsequently their production, fell well below thirteenth-century levels.⁶⁴ In France (Gascony), the export of wine was similarly affected.⁶⁵ Hay remarks that "Florentine bankruptcies in the first half of the fourteenth century are paralleled by similar troubles in Florence at the end of the fifteenth century,"⁶⁶ while P. Ramsey notes the precipitous fall of "the great merchant bankers of southern Germany."⁶⁷ Further north, the Hansa League disintegrated,⁶⁸ while to the west, the Flemish cloth industry collapsed.⁶⁹ Finally, even the northern Italian city-states found their bourgeoisie in decline. The rise of the Ottoman Empire, at first disruptive to the Italian merchant houses, would dictate new accommodations to Islam and commerce, eventually persuading some of the Italians to relocate as capitalist colonists in the Iberian peninsula.⁷⁰ For the moment, however, the foundations of the European civilization, still figuratively embryonic, appeared to be crumbling.

The Modern World Bourgeoisie

Henri Pirenne, however, provided a key to one of the mysteries of the emergence of the modern era in the sixteenth century from the chaos and desperation of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: the "survival" of the bourgeoisie. Pirenne also anticipated the somewhat rhetorical question put by K. G. Davies in the heat of the debate revolving around the historical authenticity of the phrase: the rise of the middle class. Davies queried:

What, after all, is wrong with the suggestion that the *bourgeoisie*, not steadily but by fits and starts, improved its status over many centuries, a process that began with the appearance of towns and has not yet been finally consummated?⁷¹

Forty years earlier, Pirenne had already replied:

I believe that, for each period into which our economic history may be divided, there is a distinct and separate class of capitalists. In other words, the group of capitalists of a given epoch does not spring from the capitalist group of the preceding epoch. At every change in economic organization we find a breach of con-

tinuity. It is as if the capitalists who have up to then been active recognize that they are incapable of adapting themselves to conditions which are evoked by needs hitherto unknown and which call for methods hitherto unemployed.⁷²

Both Pirenne and Davies understood that the biological metaphor of a bourgeoisie emerging out of the Middle Ages, nurturing itself on the "mercantilisms" and administrations of the Absolute Monarchies of the traditional period between feudalism and the capitalism, and on the lands and titles of impoverished nobilities, then finally achieving political and economic maturity and thus constituting industrial capitalism, is largely unsupported by historical evidence. Rather it is a historical *impression*, a phantom representation largely constructed from the late eighteenth century to the present by the notional activity of a bourgeoisie as a dominant class. This history of "the rise of the middle class" is an amalgam of bourgeois political and economic power, the self-serving ideology of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class and thus an intellectual and political preoccupation—mediated through the constructs of evolutionary theory:

From Darwin has descended the language of error, a language that has locked up historical thinking and imposed slovenly and imprecise conclusions even upon scholarly and sensible researchers. Words like "growth," "decline," "development," "evolution," "decay," may have started as servants but they have ended as masters: they have brought us to the edge of historical inevitability.⁷³

Hegel's dialectic of *Aufhebung*, Marx's dialectic of class struggle and the contradictions between the mode and relations of production, Darwin's evolution of the species and Spencer's survival of the fittest are all forged from the same metaphysical conventions. The declining European bourgeoisies of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were not, for the most part, the lineal antecedents of those that appeared in the sixteenth century. The universality of capitalism is less a historical reality than a construct of this "language of error." These "distant and separate class[es] of capitalists" were less the representatives of an immanent, rational, commercial order than extensions of particular historical dynamics and cultures. They were not the "germ" of a new order dialectically posited in an increasingly confining host—feudalism—but an opportunistic strata, willfully adaptive to the new conditions and possibilities offered by the times. Not only did different western European bourgeoisies appear in the sixteenth century, but these new bourgeoisie were implicated in structures, institutions, and organizations that were substantively undeveloped in the Middle Ages.

For one, the focus of long-distance trade in Europe gravitated from the Mediterranean and Scania areas to the Atlantic. The most familiar forms of this extension of trade to the south and west of the European peninsula were merchant voyages and colonization. Second, "expanded bureaucratic state structures" became the major conduits of capitalist expansion: determining the direction of investment, establishing political security for such investments, encouraging certain commercial networks and relations while discouraging others:

In these conditions, in fact, may be seen the matrix of modern capitalism: like nationalism, less the creator than the creation of the modern state. It had many antecedents, but its full emergence required a conjunction of political and moral as well as strictly economic factors. This emergence could take place within the intricate framework of one type of western state then evolving; it may be doubted whether it could have done so under any other circumstances that we know of in history; at any rate it never did.⁷⁶

The city, the point of departure for the earlier bourgeoisies and their networks of long-distance trade and productive organization, proved to be incapable of sustaining the economic recovery of those bourgeoisies situated where the merchant town had reached its highest development: northern Italy, western Germany, the Netherlands, and the Baltic.⁷⁷ The Absolutist State, under the hegemony of western European aristocracies, brought forth a new bourgeoisie. The territories of Castile (Spain), the Ile de France, the Home Counties and London (England), the expansionist and colonial ambitions and policies of their administrations, and the structures of their political economies organized for repression and exploitation, these constituted the basis of this bourgeois' formation.

The bourgeoisies of the sixteenth century accumulated in the interstices of the state. And as the state acquired the machinery of rule—bureaucracies of administrative, regulatory, and extractive concerns, and armies of wars of colonial pacification, international competition, and domestic repression⁷⁸—those who would soon constitute a class, settled into the proliferating roles of political, economic, and juridical agents for the state. And as the state necessarily expanded its fiscal and economic activities,⁷⁹ a new merchant and banking class parasitized its host: State loans, state monopolies, state business became the vital centers of its construction.

So while the territorial states and empires acquired lands in plenty, they were unable to exploit unaided the resultant huge economic units. This incapacity again opened the door to the towns and the merchants. It was they, who, behind the facade of subordination were making their fortunes. And even where the states could most easily become masters, in their own territory with their own subjects, they were often obliged to make shifts and compromises.⁸⁰

It is still debatable whether this was a result of what Adam Smith and Eli Heckscher after him termed the "system" of *mercantilism*,⁸¹ or the consequence of what other historians describe as the ideology of *statism*.⁸² Nevertheless, it is clear that by the seventeenth century, the new bourgeoisies were identified with political attitudes and a trend in economic thought that was pure mercantilism:

[I]mplicit in the "tragedy of mercantilism" was the belief that what was one man's or country's gain was another's loss. . . . It was, after all, a world in which population remained remarkably static; in which trade and production usually grew only very gradually; in which the limits of the known world were expanded slowly and with great difficulty; in which economic horizons were narrowly limited; and in

which man approximated more closely than today to Hobbes' vision of his natural state: for most men most of the time, life was "poor, nasty, brutish and short."83

The parochialism of the town, which had so much characterized the perspective of the bourgeoisie of the Middle Ages, was matched in this second era of Western civilization by a parochialism of the state. Heckscher commented that:

The collective entity to [peoples of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries] was not a nation unified by common race, speech, and customs: the only decisive factor for them was *the state...*. Mercantilism was the exponent of the prevailing conception of the relationship between the state and nation in the period before the advent of romanticism. It was the state and not the nation which absorbed its attention.⁸⁴

Again, the particularistic character of the formations of these bourgeoisies⁸⁵ withheld, from what would be called capitalism, a systemic structure. The class that is so consistently identified with the appearance of industrial capitalism was inextricably associated with specific "rational" structures—a relationship that profoundly influenced bourgeois imaginations and realizations. Political economies, ⁸⁶ that is national economies, enclosed them, and thus the bourgeoisie perceived what later analysis argues in retrospect is the beginnings of a world system as something quite different: an international system. ⁸⁷ The bourgeoisies of early modern capitalism were attempting to destroy or dominate each other.

The Lower Orders

Just as the western European middle classes were suspended in webs of state parochialisms, so too was that vast majority of European peoples: the lower orders. The class that ruled, the nobility, by its orchestration of the instrumentalities of the state, imprinted its character on the whole of European society. And since much of that character had to do with violence, 88 the lower orders were woven into the tapestry of a violent social order. By the nature of hierarchical societies, the integration of the lower classes—wage laborers, peasants, serfs, slaves, vagabonds, and beggars—into the social, political, and economic orders of the Absolute State was on the terms of the clients of the latter. The function of the laboring classes was to provide the state and its privileged classes with the material and human resources needed for their maintenance and further accumulations of power and wealth. This was not, however, a simple question of the dominance of a ruling class over the masses.

The masses did not exist as such. As earlier, Greek and Roman thinkers had created the totalizing construct of the barbarians, the feudal nobilities of western Europe had inspired and authored a similar myth. Friedrich Hertz has reported that:

In the Middle Ages and later, the nobility, as a rule, considered themselves of better blood than the common people, whom they utterly despised. The peasants were supposed to be descended from Ham, who, for lack of filial piety, was known to have been condemned by Noah to slavery. The knightly classes of many lands, on the other hand, believed themselves to be the descendants of the Trojan heroes, who after the fall of Troy were said to have settled in England, France and Germany. This theory was seriously maintained not only in numerous songs and tales of knightly deeds, but also in many scholarly works.⁸⁹

It was a form of this notion that Count Gobineau revived in the mid-nineteenth century, extending its conceptualization of superiority so as to include elements of the bourgeoisie. The nobilities of the sixteenth century, however, proved to be more circumspect about "the masses" than their genealogical legends might imply. They did not become victims of their own mythic creations. When it came to the structures of the state, their knowledge of the social, cultural, and historical compositions of the masses was exquisitely refined. Perhaps this is no more clearly demonstrated than in one of the most critical areas of state activity: the monopolization of force.

The Absolutist State was a cause and effect of war. Its economy was a war economy, its foreign trade was combative, ⁹¹ its bureaucracy administered the preparations and prosecutions of war. ⁹² Such a state required standing armies (and, eventually, navies). But for certainly political and sometimes economic reasons, soldiers could not be recruited easily from, in V. G. Kiernan's phrase, "the mass of ordinary peasants and burghers." Kiernan puts the situation most simply for France, though it was the same all over Europe: "Frenchmen were seldom eager to serve their king, and their king was not eager to employ Frenchmen." ⁹³ Loyalty to the state of the monarchy from the exploited ranks of the lower classes was rare. In any case, not one state of the sixteenth or seventeenth century was reliant on such an identification between the masses and their rulers. The soldiers of the armies of France, Spain, England, Holland, Prussia, Poland, Sweden, and at first Russia, were either alien to the states for which they fought and policed or very marginal to them:

European governments . . . relied very largely on foreign mercenaries. One of the employments for which they were particularly well suited was the suppression of rebellious subjects, and in the sixteenth century, that age of endemic revolution, they were often called upon for this purpose. . . . Governments . . . had to look either to backward areas for honest, simple-minded fellows untainted by political ideas . . . or to foreigners. 94

Depending then on changing fortunes, the "identities" of the combatants, the geopolitics of wars, and the mission, mercenaries were drawn from among the Swiss, the Scots, Picardians, Bretons, Flemings, Welsh, Basques, Mavarrese, Gallowayians, Dalmatians, Corsicans, Burgundians, Gueldrians, the Irish, Czechs, Croatians, Magyars, and from Gascony, Allgaeu, Norway, and Albania. Since one function and result of the work of these mercenaries was the suppression of subject peoples, the degree of their success is directly indicated by their own absence, for the most part, from the political geography of modern Europe. The Absolute State (or its direct successors), the instrument that propelled them into prominence in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries (for France, into the late eighteenth century), ultimately absorbed the autonomous sectors from which the mercenaries originated.

In the armies of the sixteenth century, native recruits distributed among the foreign mercenaries were also chosen with an eye to minimizing the political and social risks of the monarchy and its allied nobility. In France, the army "drew its volunteers from the least 'national,' most nondescript types, the dregs of the poorest classes," Kiernan informs us.⁹⁵ In Spain, the hills of Aragon and the Basque provinces served a similar function. In Britain, until the mid-eighteenth century, the Scottish Highlands were the most frequent sites of recruitment; and the Welsh soldier's skills became legendary.⁹⁶

Important as the formation of these armies was for the construction of the states that dominated Europe for more than 200 years, we must not be diverted from their more historical importance by the romantic richness of the social and political drama to which they contributed. Louis XI's innovation in 1474, of organizing a "French infantry without Frenchmen" was revolutionary in scale, not in character. The tactic of composing armies from mercenaries and from marginal peoples and social strata extended back into the Middle Ages and earlier. Imperial armies, republican armies, bandit armies, invading armies and defending armies, the armies of rebellious slaves, of nobles, and even of the chauvinist medieval cities, all laid claim to, or incorporated to some extent, souls for whom they had at best few considerations in less intense times. More significantly, in reviewing this phenomenon for the sixteenth and later centuries, the point is not that mercenaries were recruited from the outside and from among those least secure internally; this is simply the best documented form of a more generalized pattern of structural formation and social integration.

The important meaning is that this form of enlisting human reserves was not peculiar to military apparatus but extended throughout Europe to domestic service, handicrafts, industrial labor, the ship- and dock-workers of merchant capitalism, and the field laborers of agrarian capitalism. There has never been a moment in modern European history (if before) that migratory and/or immigrant labor was not a significant aspect of European economies. 100 That this is not more widely understood seems to be a consequence of conceptualization and analysis: the mistaken use of the nation as a social, historical, and economic category; a resultant and persistent reference to national labor "pools" (e.g., "the English working class"); and a subsequent failure of historical investigation. Wallerstein, in his otherwise quite detailed study of the origins of the capitalist world system, can devote a mere page to this phenomenon, including a single paragraph on the ethnic divisions of sixteenth-century immigrant labor. And though compelled to acknowledge that "not much research seems to have been done on the ethnic distribution of the urban working class of early modern Europe," he goes on to speculate that Kazimiery Tymimecki's description of systematic ethnic distinctions of rank within the working class "in the towns of sixteenthcentury East Elba . . . [is] typical of the whole of the world economy." 101 Despite the paucity of studies there are historical records that tend to confirm this view. We

discover in them Flemish cloth workers in early sixteenth-century London; and later in the sixteenth and in the seventeenth century, Huguenot refugees (40,000-80,000 of them), many of them handloom weavers, fleeing France and settling in Spitalfields in London's East End and thus, establishing England's silk industry. 102 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Irish workers "formed the core of the floating armies of labourers who built canals, the docks, the railways and transformed the face of England."103 And again on the European Continent, as German farm workers and peasants were drawn to urban and industrial sectors of central and western Germany, Polish labor was used to fill the vacuum in eastern Germany. 104 France and Switzerland also recruited heavily from Poland, Italy, and Spain. 105 And, of course, the formation of industrial cores in the United States before the Civil War located immigrant workers from northern Italy, Germany, Scotland, and Ireland; and after the Civil War from southern Italy, and the lands of eastern, northern, and central Europe: Russia, Finland, Poland, Greece, and the Balkans. 106 (Perhaps the only unique aspect of north American industrial recruitment was the appearance of Asian workers beginning in the late nineteenth century, from China, Japan, and the Philippines.)107

We begin to perceive that the nation is not a unit of analysis for the social history of Europe. The state is a bureaucratic structure, and the nation for which it administers is more a convenient construct than the historical, racial, cultural, and linguistic entity that the term "nation" signifies. The truer character of European history resides beneath the phenomenology of nation and state. With respect to the construction of modern capitalism, one must not forget the particular identities, the particular social movements and societal structures that have persisted and/or have profoundly influenced European life:

Altogether western Europe had acquired a greater richness of forms, of corporate life, a greater crystallization of habits into institutions, than any known elsewhere. It had a remarkable ability to forge societal ties, more tenacious than almost any others apart from those of the family and its extensions, clan or caste; ties that could survive from one epoch to another, and be built into more elaborate combinations. But along with fixity of particular relationships went a no less radical instability of the system as a whole.¹⁰⁹

European civilization is not the product of capitalism. On the contrary, the character of capitalism can only be understood in the social and historical context of its appearance.

The Effects of Western Civilization on Capitalism

The development of capitalism can thus be seen as having been determined in form by the social and ideological composition of a civilization that had assumed its fundamental perspectives during feudalism. The patterns of recruitment for slave and mercenary we have reviewed held true for bourgeoisies and proletariats. According to Robert Lopez, in the Carolingian Empire long-distance trade was dominated by Jews and Italians.¹¹⁰ In medieval Europe, Lopez and Irving Raymond have documented the importance of Mediterranean traders at international fairs, and the development of foreign merchant houses in the towns of the hinterland.¹¹¹ Fernand Braudel amplifies:

[M] any financial centres, *piazze*, sprang up in Europe in towns that were of recent origin. But if we look more closely at these sudden, and quite considerable developments, we shall find that they were in fact ramifications of Italian banking that had by then become traditional. In the days of the fairs of Champagne it was already the bankers from Sienna, Lucca, Florence, or Genoa who held the moneychanger's scales; it was they who made the fortune of Geneva in the fifteenth century and later those of Antwerp, Lyons, and Medina del Campo. . . .

In short, throughout Europe a small group of well-informed men, kept in touch by an active correspondence, controlled the entire network of exchanges in bills or specie, thus dominating the field of commercial speculation. So we should not be too taken in by the apparent spread of "finance."¹¹²

For Spain under Charles V (1516–56) and Philip II (1556–98), the German Fuggers, the Genoese, and other "international merchant firms" organized the state revenues, exploited mines, and administered many of the most important estates.¹¹³ And at Constantinople, Genoese, Venetian, and Ragusan bankers and merchants shepherded the trade and financial relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁴ For the Mediterranean towns of the sixteenth century, Braudel has observed the functions of the "indispensable immigrant." To Salonica, Constantinople and Valona, Italian and Spanish Jews, as merchants and artisans, brought new trades to further broaden an already multicultured bourgeoisie.

There were other valuable immigrants, itinerant artists for instance attracted by expanding towns which were extending their public buildings; or merchants, particularly the Italian merchants and bankers, who activated and indeed created such cities as Lisbon, Seville, Medina del Campo, Lyons and Antwerp.¹¹⁵

And in Venice:

A long report by the *Cinque Savii*, in January, 1607, indicates that all "capitalist" activity, as we should call it, was in the hands of the Florentines, who owned houses in the city, and the Genoese, who provided silver, between them controlling all exchanges.¹¹⁶

Just as Nuremberg had ravaged Bohemia, Saxony, and Silesia, Braudel asserts, it was the Genoese who "blocked the development of Spanish capitalism." It was, too, the "indispensable immigrant" who complemented the urban proletariat incapable of maintaining itself "let alone increas[ing] without the help of continuous immigration." In Ragusa it was the *Morlachi*; in Marseilles, the Corsicans; in Seville, the

Moriscos of Andalusia; in Algiers, the Aragonese and the Berbers; in Lisbon, Black slaves; and in Venice, the immigrant proletariat was augmented by *Romagnoli, Marchiani*, Greeks, Persians, Armenians and Portuguese Jews.¹¹⁹

The bourgeoisie that led the development of capitalism were drawn from particular ethnic and cultural groups; the European proletariats and the mercenaries of the leading states from others; its peasants from still other cultures; and its slaves from entirely different worlds. The tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into "racial" ones. As the Slavs became the natural slaves, the racially inferior stock for domination and exploitation during the early Middle Ages, as the Tartars came to occupy a similar position in the Italian cities of the late Middle Ages, so at the systemic interlocking of capitalism in the sixteenth century, the peoples of the Third World began to fill this expanding category of a civilization reproduced by capitalism.¹²⁰

As a civilization of free and equal beings, Europe was as much a fiction in the nineteenth century (and later) as its very unity had been during the Merovingian and Carolingian eras. Both the church and the more powerful nobilities of the Holy Roman Empire and its predecessor had been the source of the illusion in those earlier periods. From the twelfth century forward, it was the bourgeoisie and the administrators of state power who initiated and nurtured myths of egalitarianism while seizing every occasion to divide peoples for the purpose of their domination. The carnage of wars and revolutions precipitated by the bourgeoisies of Europe to sanctify their masques was enormous.

Eventually, however, the old instruments gave way to newer ones, not because they were old but because the ending of feudalism and the expansion of capitalism and its world system—that is the increasingly uneven character of development among European peoples themselves and between Europeans and the world beyond—precipitated new oppositions while providing new opportunities and demanding new "historical" agents. The Reformations in western Europe and then England that destroyed the last practical vestiges of a transcendent, unified Christendom, were one manifestation of this process of disequilibrium.

In England, as an instance, representatives of the great landowners, and agrarian capitalism, in pursuit of their own social and financial destinies disciplined first the church and then the monarchy and finally "the masses" through enclosures, the Poor Laws, debtors' prisons, "transportation" (forced emigration), and the like. 122 The contrasts of wealth and power between labor, capital, and the middle classes had become too stark to sustain the continued maintenance of privileged classes at home and the support of the engines of capitalist domination abroad. New mystifications, more appropriate to the times, were required, authorized by new lights. The delusions of medieval citizenship, which had been expanded into shared patrimony and had persisted for five centuries in western Europe as the single great leveling principle, were to be supplanted by race and (to use the German phrase) *Herrenvolk*, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 123 The functions of these latter ideological

constructions were related but different. Race became largely the rationalization for the domination, exploitation, and/or extermination of non-"Europeans" (including Slavs and Jews). And we shall have occasion in Part II to explore its applications beyond Europe and particularly to African peoples more closely. But while we remain on European soil, it is *Herrenvolk* that matters. In eighteenth-century England, Reginald Horsman sees its beginnings in the "mythical" Anglo-Saxonism that was flown as an ideological pennant by the Whig intelligentsia. 124 In France (for example, Paul de Rapin-Thoyras and Montesquieu, and before them François Hotman and Count Henri de Boulainvilliers), in Germany (Herder, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel), in north America (John Adams and Thomas Jefferson), "bourgeois" ideologists displayed the idea of the heroic Germanic race. 125 And the idea swept through nineteenth-century Europe, gathering momentum and artifice through such effects as Sir Walter Scott's historical novels and Friedrich von Schlegel's philological fables. Inevitably, of course, the idea was dressed in the accoutrement of nineteenth-century European science. Herrenvolk explained the inevitability and the naturalness of the domination of some Europeans by other Europeans. Though he reconstructed the pieces back to front, Louis Snyder, for one, recognized the effect.

Racialists, not satisfied with merely proclaiming the superiority of the white over the coloured race, also felt it necessary to erect a hierarchy within the white race itself. To meet this need they developed the myth of the Aryan, or Nordic, superiority. The Aryan myth in turn became the source of other secondary myths such as Teutonism (Germany), Anglo-Saxonism (England and the United States), and Celticism (France). 126

Then, in the nineteenth century, modern nationalism appeared.

The emergence of nationalism¹²⁷ was again neither accidental nor unrelated to the character that European capitalism had assumed historically. Again, the bourgeoisie of particular cultures and political structures refused to acknowledge their logical and systemic identity as a class. Instead, international capitalism persisted in competitive anarchy—each national bourgeoisie opposing the others as "natural" enemies. But as powerful as the bourgeoisie and its allies in the aristocracy and bureaucracy might be in some ways, they still required the co-optation of their "rational" proletariat in order to destroy their competitors. Nationalism mobilized the armed might they required to either destroy the productive capacities of those whom they opposed, or to secure new markets, new labor, and productive resources.¹²⁸ Ultimately, the uneven developments of national capitalisms would have horrifying consequences for both Europe and the peoples under European dominations.

In Germany and Italy, where national bourgeoisies were relatively late in their formation, the marshaling of national social forces (peasants, farmers, workers, clerics, professional classes, the aristocracy, and the state) was accomplished by the ideological phantasmagoria of race, *Herrenvolk*, and nationalism. This compost of violence, in its time, became known under the name of fascism. ¹²⁹ With the creation of fascism, the bourgeoisie retained the full range of its social, political, and economic preroga-

tives. It had the cake of the total control of its national society, an efficient instrument for expanding its domination and expropriation to the Third World, and the ultimate means for redressing the injuries and humiliations of the past. Again, not unexpectedly, slavery as a form of labor would reappear in Europe.¹³⁰

But this goes far beyond our immediate purposes. What concerns us is that we understand that racialism and its permutations persisted, rooted not in a particular era but in the civilization itself. And though our era might seem a particularly fitting one for depositing the origins of racism, that judgment merely reflects how resistant the idea is to examination and how powerful and natural its specifications have become. Our confusions, however, are not unique. As an enduring principle of European social order, the effects of racialism were bound to appear in the social expression of every strata of every European society no matter the structures upon which they were formed. None was immune. And as we shall observe in the next two chapters, this proved to be true for the rebellious proletariat as well as the radical intelligentsias. It was again, a quite natural occurrence in both instances. But to the latter—the radical intelligentsias—it was also an unacceptable one, one subsequently denied. Nevertheless, it insinuated itself into their thought and their theories. And thus, in the quest for a radical social force, an active historical subject, it compelled certain blindnesses, bemusements that in turn systematically subverted their analytical constructions and their revolutionary project. But this is still to be shown. To that end we will now turn to the history of the English working classes. Since these workers were one of the centerpieces for the development by radical intelligentsias of the notion of the proletariat as a revolutionary class, an inquiry into the effects of racialism on their consciousness forms the next step in the demonstration of the limits of European radicalism.

NOTES

Chapter One

1. One of the most extraordinary expressions of the expectations associated with the appearance of capitalism was Marx's caustic appraisal of the bourgeoisie's world-historical significance:

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." . . .

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured. . . .

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil. . . .

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. . . .

The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation of the world-market, given cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in Robert Tucker [ed.], *The Marx-Engels Reader*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1972, pp. 337–38)

A more recent version of this vision of capitalism—reflecting both its authors' views and those of directors of multinational (or global) corporations—is much less poetic but still as certain. "The power of the global corporation derives from its unique capacity to use finance, technology, and advanced marketing skills to integrate production on a worldwide scale and thus to realize the ancient capitalist dream of One Great Market." Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller, *Global Reach*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1974, p. 18.

- 2. Paul Sweezy et al., *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*, New Left Books, London, 1976; and Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, International Publishers, New York, 1965.
- 3. Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*, Harper and Row, New York, 1973, pp. xiii–
 - 4. Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in Robert Tucker, op. cit., pp. 158-61.
 - 5. Robert Latouche, The Birth of Western Economy, Barnes and Noble Inc., New York, 1961, p. 309.
- 6. Petr Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, Extending Horizon Books, Boston, n.d., pp. 117–18; Henri Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, Unwin University Books, London, 1968, pp. 17–19, pp. 184–85; and William C. Bark, Origins of the Medieval World, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958, pp. 26–27. Denys Hay reminds us: "for neither Greeks nor Romans did Europe mean much. Fear of Persia lent colour to the Greek attitude to the continents, but the empire of Alexander the Great was in Asia, not Europe, while the remnants of this were conquered by a Rome which made its greatest advances in the north and west of Europe. What cemented together the Greek world, and after it the world of Rome, was the inland sea, which linked all but the most remote provinces, which was literally the cradle of Greek civilization and which even the Romans, averse as they were to maritime adventure, annexed as 'Mare nostrum.' Beyond the serenity of the Mediterranean (as later ages were to call it) and the outposts of order carried outwards by the Mediterranean conquerors, Greek or Roman, lay barbarism. Barbarians, as the Romans knew well enough, were confined to no particular continent, and were particularly troublesome in Europe itself." Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968, p. 4.
- 7. Oscar Halecki, *The Millennium of Europe*, Notre Dame University Press, South Bend, Indiana, 1963, p. 50.
- 8. Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe*, Macmillan Co., New York, 1966, pp. 47–49, 53; and Duncan McMillan, "Charlemagne Legends," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, William Benton, Chicago, 1965, 5:291–92.
- 9. H. Munro Chadwick, *The Nationalities of Europe and the Growth of National Ideologies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1945, pp. 50–75.

- 10. Along with the Italic, the Hellenic, the Indian, the Iranian and Armenian, these are said sometimes to constitute the Indo-European languages; see G. L. Brook, *A History of the English Language*, W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., New York, 1958, pp. 30–60.
 - 11. Chadwick, op. cit., pp. 14-49.
- 12. According to Chadwick, Basque presumably "represents the language, or one of the languages, of the ancient Iberians," ibid., p. 49. Brook argues that there is evidence going back to the sixth century, B.C. of Etruscan, Oscan, and Umbrian being spoken in Italy; Brook, op. cit., pp. 36–37.
 - 13. Henri Pirenne, op. cit., pp. 17-71.
 - 14. Ibid., pp. 36–37.
 - 15. Ibid., pp. 28, 32.
- 16. Ibid., p. 37. Pirenne reports that Gautier put the number of Roman Africans at seven to eight million in the fifth century, and that Doren, for the same century, estimates that Italy's population ranged between five and six million.
 - 17. Latouche, op. cit., p. 70.
 - 18. Ibid., pp. 59-60, 71; Pirenne, op. cit., pp. 75-79.
 - 19. Frank Snowden, Blacks in Antiquity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 170-71.
- 20. Both Pirenne and Latouche argue that long before the mounting of political pressures on the Germanic tribes by subsequent "barbarian" peoples—the Iranians, Mongols, Slavs, and Hungarians—the Goths were motivated by essentially economic reasons to integrate with the more productive peoples of the Empire. Pirenne, op. cit., pp. 37–39; Latouche, op. cit., pp. 42–45.
- 21. David Brion Davis, *The Problems of Slavery in Western Civilization*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1966, pp. 29–61. The break in historical and cultural continuity that took place between the disintegration of Greco-Roman civilization and the rise of Germanic civilization had at one time immense significance to western European intelligentsias. Following *Germania*, written by the first-century Roman historian Tacitus, which contrasted the decadence of Rome to the martial virility of the Germanic tribes, they constructed myths of origin that distinguished superior cultures and races from inferior ones. At the latest, from the sixteenth century and well into the twentieth century, English, German, and French scholars generally distinguished "their" own Germanic cultural, racial, and philological roots from earlier (e.g., Celtic, Greco-Roman) and putatively later (the Normans) peoples. See Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 9–42. George Mosse reminds us that excerpts from *Germania* were a part of the standard curriculum "for the teaching of English constitutional history until well after the Second World War." Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*, J. M. Dent and Sons, London, 1978, p. 48.
- 22. For Greek and Roman slavery, see William L. Westermann, *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity*, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1955, and Snowden, op. cit.; for the feudal period, see R. Welldon Finn, *An Introduction to Domesday Book*, Longmans, London, 1963, pp. 118–21, as cited by Davis, op. cit., pp. 38–39, and Iris Origo, "The Domestic Enemy: The Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," *Speculum* 30, no. 3 (July 1955): 321–66, and Latouche, op. cit., pp. 123–25; for Genoese and Venetian trades, see Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1937, pp. 16–20; Davis, op. cit., pp. 43, 52; and Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Harper and Row, New York, 1976, 1:290–93 and 2:754–55—both Davis and Braudel are largely based upon the work of Charles Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe medievale*, vol. 1, Peninsule Iberique, Brugge, France, 1955; and for the modern era see Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, Capricorn Books, New York, 1966.
 - 23. Davis, op. cit., pp. 33, 37.
- 24. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, Academic Press, New York, 1974, pp. 86–90. Wallerstein wishes to distinguish between the economic and legal-political conditions of New World slavery and a capitalist "serfdom" ("coerced cash crop labour") in eastern Europe and among "natives" of the New World (the *encomienda*) of the sixteenth century. His definition of "coerced cash-crop labour" ("a system of agricultural labour control wherein peasants are required by some legal process enforced by the state to labour at least part of the time on a large domain producing some product for sale on the world market" p. 91) would appear to serve as well as a description of slavery. The point is that alone it does not distinguish the presumably distinct forms of forced labor. David Brion Davis observes that for at least the medieval era, the distinctions were not as clear-cut in daily life as modern scholars would suggest. Davis, op. cit., p. 33.
- 25. Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, op. cit., p. 140. In a note to the text, Pirenne observes: "These things were retained: the language, the currency, writing (papyrus) weights and measures, the kinds of foodstuffs in common use, the social classes, the religion—the role of Arianism has been exaggerated—art, the law, the administration, the taxes, the economic organization." Ibid.
- 26. Latouche, op. cit., pp. 97–116; Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., pp. 39–40.
 - 27. Dirk Jellema, "Frisian Trade in the Dark Ages," Speculum 30, no. 1 (January 1955): 15-36; and

Latouche, op. cit., pp. 120-23. The decline of trade in Merovingian Europe is an important aspect of the attempt to challenge Henri Pirenne's "thesis" that the Muslim invasion of Europe by ending the European Mediterranean trade with its social and cultural concomitants precipitated the beginnings of a "new" European civilization inaugurated by Charlemagne's empire. See Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, op. cit., pp. 162-85, Latouche, op. cit., pp. 117-88; Bark, op. cit., pp. 6-28; and Alfred Havighurst (ed.), The Pirenne Thesis, D. C. Heath and Co., Boston, 1958.

- 28. Latouche, op. cit., p. 139.
- 29. Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, op. cit., pp. 184-85; Braudel, op. cit., p. 222.
- 30. Latouche, op. cit., pp. 173-74.
- 31. Ibid., pp. 297-98. Even by the late sixteenth century, the contrast in urban life was still great between the European hinterland and the Mediterranean, Braudel writes: "[T]he Mediterranean region in the sixteenth century (and it must be extended to its maximum when we are talking of towns) was unique in its immensity. In the sixteenth century no other region in the world had such a developed urban network. Paris and London were just on the threshold of their modern careers. The towns of the Low Countries and southern Germany (the latter bathing in the reflected glory of the Mediterranean, the former stimulated economically by merchants and sailors from the South), further north the industrious but small towns of the Hanseatic League, all of these towns, thriving and beautiful though they might be, did not make up a network as closely knit and complex as that of the Mediterranean, where town followed town in endless strings, punctuated by great cities: Venice, Genoa, Florence, Milan, Barcelona, Seville, Algiers, Naples, Constantinople, Cairo." Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, op. cit., pp. 277–78.
- 32. "Raoul Glaber has described with an insistence verging on sadism the appalling famine which preceded the year 1033. He notes for instance that at the fair at Tournus in Burgundy, a man was offering human flesh for sale, ready cooked on a butcher's stall." Latouche, op. cit., p. 298.
 - 33. Bark, op. cit., pp. 70-82.
- 34. Pirenne, The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., pp. 44-49; and Lopez and Raymond, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1955, pp. 87-104.
- 35. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, Their Origins and the Revival of Trade, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1948, p. 140.
 - 36. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., p. 44.
 - 37. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, op. cit., p. 6.
 - 38. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., p. 40.
- 39. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, op. cit., pp. 114-15. Denys Hay, though in disagreement with Pirenne's interpretation of the origins of these merchants, does not specifically cite the evidentiary basis of his view. Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, Longman, London, 1966, p. 71.
- 40. Ibid., p. 126. Elsewhere Pirenne has explained: "[I]t is incontestable that commerce and industry were originally recruited from among landless men, who lived, so to speak, on the margin of a society where land alone was the basis of existence." Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., p. 45.
- 41. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, op. cit., pp. 143-44. In eastern Europe, it was a quite different story since the political and economic powers of the towns were quixotic and short lived: "[T]he towns were compelled to surrender their ancient rights of harbouring serfs; they were compelled to abandon leagues with other towns; and the lords were even able to avoid using the towns as markets for their grain by selling it direct to exporters."; Hay, op. cit., p. 41.
 - 42. Pirenne, op. cit., p. 81.
 - 43. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
 - 44. Ibid., p. 155, and Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., pp. 35–36.
 - 45. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957, p. 64.
 - 46. Ibid.; and Pirenne, The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., pp. 160-66.
 - 47. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, op. cit., pp. 154-56.
- 48. Pirenne, The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., pp. 57-58; and Hay, op. cit.,
- 49. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, op. cit., p. 193. See also Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism, Monthly Review Press, 1977, pp. 80-96; elsewhere, Tigar and Levy summarize their review of the earliest thrusts of the bourgeoisie against the feudal order: "The great achievement of the bourgeoisie in this period [1000 to 1200] was to wrest from seigneurs in hundreds of separate localities the recognition of an independent status within the feudal hierarchy. The urban movement . . . demanded one major concession from the seigneur: a charter . . . the status of bourgeois, burgher, or burgess" (p. 111).
 - 50. Hay, op. cit., pp. 39, 370.
 - 51. Ibid., pp. 373-74.
 - 52. Origo, op. cit., p. 326.
 - 53. Origo, op. cit., pp. 328, 336; Davis, op. cit., p. 43; and Hay, op. cit., pp. 75–76.
 - 54. Origo, op. cit., p. 336.
 - 55. Hay, op. cit., p. 76. Hay observes that: "In these slave-owning communities of the Christian Mediter-

ranean there is not much evidence that slaves were used in agriculture" (ibid.). Charles Verlinden does not agree: "In Spain female slaves were generally cheaper than males, although the opposite was true in most of Italy. This was because much of the slave manpower in Spain was used in agriculture and in industry, whereas in Italy the domestic slave predominated in the cities and therefore more female workers were required." Charles Verlinden, "The Transfer of Colonial Techniques from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic," in *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1970, p. 29.

- 56. Charles Verlinden notes: "The Latin word sclavus, the common source of the words esclave, esclavo, escravo, schiavo, Sklave, and slave, did not take root during that initial period [pre-Middle Ages] when slavery was common to the whole of Europe. . . . It was only when slaves were recruited from entirely new sources that other terms appeared to indicate the nonfree, and among these were sclavus, derived from the ethnic name of the Slav people and popularized. It appeared first in its Latin form in tenth century Germany." "Medieval Slavery in Europe and Colonial Slavery in America," Verlinden, op. cit., pp. 35–36.
 - 57. Charles Verlinden, "The Transfer of Colonial Techniques," op. cit., pp. 31-32.
- 58. Giuliano Procacci, *The History of the Italian People*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970, pp. 44–45.
- 59. R. H. Tawney has commented on the several forms of capitalism in European history. The occasion for his remarks was the review of Maurice Dobb's Studies in the Development of Capitalism (Routledge, London, 1946): "Mr. Dobb's limitation of the term 'capitalism' to a particular system of production, under which labour is employed on the basis of a wage contract to produce surplus value for the owner of capital, might seem, at first sight, to escape some of the ambiguities inherent in less restricted interpretations; but it raises problems of its own. It is not merely that, as he would agree, financial and commercial capitalism have been highly developed in circumstances when the institution, as interpreted by him, has been a feeble plant, and that to exclude these varieties on the ground that they do not fall within the four corners of the nineteenth-century definition is to beg the question. It is that, as his work shows, the origins and growth of the industrial species require for their elucidation to be considered in relation to the history of other members of the family, some of which have been among its progenitors. Obviously the capitalism of our day rests predominantly on a wage-system, and the latter is so familiar that it is tempting to treat it as historically a constant." Tawney, "A History of Capitalism," Economic History Review, 2d ser., vol. 2, no.3 (1950): 310–11.
- 60. Marian Malowist, "The Economic and Social Development of the Baltic Countries from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., vol. 12, no. 2 (1959): 177–78, and Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 21–26.
 - 61. Hay, op. cit., p. 34.
 - 62. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
- 63. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970, pp. 198–99; and Hay, op. cit., pp. 35–37; and Procacci, op. cit., p. 46.
- 64. E. M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, *England's Export Trade*, 1275–1547, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963, pp. 201–7.
 - 65. Hay, op. cit., p. 387.
 - 66. Ibid., p. 389.
- 67. P. Ramsey, "The European Economy in the Sixteenth Century," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., vol. 12, no. 3 (April 1960): 458.
 - 68. Hay, op. cit., p. 389.
 - 69. Ibid.; and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 148.
 - 70. Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966, pp. 133-39.
 - 71. K. G. Davies, "The Mess of the Middle Class," Past and Present, no. 22 (July 1962): 82.
 - 72. As quoted by Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 124 note.
 - 73. Davies, op. cit., p. 79.
- 74. In his important but flawed study of mercantilism, Eli Heckscher made a point on the conceptualization of capitalism related to that of Davies quoted above in the text. Heckscher commented "that the method of treating all sorts of disconnected tendencies, paving the way to modern economic conditions, under the common name of 'modern capitalism' appears to me confusing and a thing to be shunned." *Mercantilism*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1955, 1:14.
- 75. The phrase is Immanuel Wallerstein's, op. cit., p. 133; see also Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolute State*, New Left Books, London, 1974, pp. 40–41.
 - 76. V. G. Kiernan, "State and Nation in Western Europe," Past and Present, no. 31 (July 1965): 34.
 - 77. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
- 78. "War for [the monarchy] was not an optional policy, but an organic need. . . . The whole State apparatus that rulers were putting together piecemeal was largely a by-product of war. During its adolescence, the sixteenth and seventeenth Centuries, fighting was almost continuous; later on it grew rather more intermittent." Ibid., p. 31.

- 79. Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 136–39. For an extensive discussion of the state-merchant associations see Heckscher, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 340–455.
 - 80. Braudel, The Mediterranean, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 344, and vol. 2, p. 695.
- 81. See D. C. Coleman, "Eli Heckscher and the Idea of Mercantilism," Scandinavian Economic History Review 5, no. 1 (1957): 3-4.
 - 82. Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 146-47.
- 83. Coleman, op. cit., pp. 18–19; see also Carl Bucher, *Industrial Evolution*, August Kelley, New York, 1968 (Orio 1901), pp. 136–39.
- 84. Heckscher, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 14–15. Wallerstein apparently has some problems with this particular attribution to sixteenth-century bourgeoisie. While relying on Kiernan for his own characterization—rather loosely—Wallerstein presents an interpretation that is inconsistent with respect to the distinctions to be made between statism and nationalism: "It was only in the late seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries within the framework of mercantilism that nationalism would find its first real advocates amongst the bourgeoisie. But in the sixteenth century, the interests of the bourgeoisie were not yet surely fixed on the state. Too large a number were more interested in open than in closed economies. And for state builders, premature nationalism risked its crystallization around too small an ethno-territorial entity. At an early point, statism could almost be said to be anti-nationalist, since the boundaries of 'nationalist' sentiment were often narrower than the bounds of the monarch's state." Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 146; see also Kiernan, op. cit., pp. 29–30.
 - 85. See Coleman, op. cit., p. 21.
 - 86. Heckscher, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 18.
 - 87. Ibid., pp. 18–23; see also Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 196–97.
- 88. Fernand Braudel: "Beginning in the sixteenth century and with more eclat in this century of renewal, the States—at least those who would live, prosper and especially resist the exhausting expenses of land and sea warfare—the States dominate, deform economic life, subject it to a network of constraints; they capture it in their net . . . the part of economic life that was at that point most modern, that which we would readily designate as operating within the framework of largescale merchant capitalism was linked to these financial ups and downs of the State." Quoted by Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 138 note.
- 89. Friedrich Hertz, Race and Civilization, KTAV (no place), 1970, p. 4; see also Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Meridian Books, Cleveland, 1958, pp. 161–65, and Henri Peyre, Historical and Political Essays, University of Nebraska, (no place), 1968, pp. 29–30. (Peyre acknowledges his debt to Jacques Barzun, see The French Race, Kennirat, New York, 1966 Oris.1432, and Race, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1932.) One should also mention that with respect to the Ham legend and its origins as a rationalization for African slavery in North America, Winthrop Jordan in his highly regarded study White Over Black (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1968), in company with most American scholars, has virtually ignored the phenomenon of racist attitudes among Europeans toward other Europeans—this despite his claim to be familiar with the relevant literature (see his appendix, "Essay on Sources").
 - 90. Hertz, op. cit., p. 6.
 - 91. Heckscher, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 18.
- 92. V. B. Kiernan, "Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy," *Past and Present*, no. 2 (April 1957): 76–77.
 - 93. Ibid., p. 68; see also Braudel, The Mediterranean, op. cit., 2:739-43.
 - 94. Kiernan, op. cit., p. 74.
 - 95. Ibid., p. 78.
 - 96. Ibid., p. 69.
 - 97. Ibid., p. 72.
- 98. That there were several other sides to the relation of the state to mercenaries is attested to by Braudel (*The Mediterranean*, op. cit., vol. 2): "Sea-pirates were aided and abetted by powerful towns and cities. Pirates on land, bandits, received regular backing from nobles. Robber bands were often led, or more or less closely directed, by some genuine noblemen" (p. 749); "banditry had other origins besides the crisis in noble fortunes: it issued from peasantry and populace alike. This was a groundswell—'a flood tide' as an eighteenth-century historian called it, which stirred up a variety of waters. As a political and social (though not religious) reaction, it had both aristocratic and popular components (the 'mountain kings' in the Roman Campagna and around Naples were more often than not peasants and humble folk)" (p. 751).
- 99. The nineteenth-century armies of imperialist Europe continued the tradition of relying on substantial recruitment among ethnic minorities, "riff-raff," outcasts, aliens and the peasantry: to the million serfs of the Russian army were added the Asiatic Bashkirs and Kalmucks, Ingush and Ossietin; the Corsicans and Bretons of the French army were augmented by the Legion founded on Kabyle swordsmen, Swiss and other European mercenaries, but by mid-century the army itself had come to be dominated by West Africans; in the Philippines, the Spanish army was native, as was the Dutch army of the East Indies. In India, the East India Company and the Bengal army (1842) employed between them upward of 70,000 natives in their

sepoy regiments. In Britain itself, in 1832, the Irish accounted for 42 percent of the army. See V. G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1982, pp. 17–32.

100. Bucher, op. cit., p. 346; Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 117; see also Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, pp. 15–25; Braudel says it best: "These indispensable immigrants were not always unskilled labourers or men of little aptitude. They often brought with them new techniques that were as indispensable as their persons to urban life. The Jews, driven out by their religious beliefs not their poverty, played an exceptional role in these transfers of technology. . . . There were other valuable immigrants, itinerant artists for instance attracted by expanding towns which were extending their public buildings; or merchants, particularly the Italian merchants and bankers, who activated and indeed created such cities as Lisbon, Seville, Medina del Campo, Lyons and Antwerp. An urban community needs all sorts and conditions of men, not least rich men. Towns attracted the wealthy just as they attracted the proletariat, though for very different reasons." *The Mediterranean*, op. cit., 1:336–37.

101. Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 118-19; Bucher makes a similar comment, op. cit., p. 353.

102. Chaim Bermant, London's East End, Macmillan Publishing, New York, 1975, pp. 30-31.

103. Ibid., p. 43; see also E. P. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 469–85; and Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, op. cit., pp. 16–17.

104. See Paul Lazarsfeld and Anthony Oberschall, "Max Weber and Empirical Social Research," *American Sociological Review* 30, no. 2 (April 1965): 185–88.

105. See Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, "The Function of Labour Immigration in Western European Capitalism," *New Left Review*, no. 73 (May–June 1972): 6; and Bucher, op. cit., pp. 367–68.

106. See David Brody, Steelworkers in America, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1969, pp. 96–99.

107. See Howard Brett Melendy, *The Oriental Americans*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1972; Mary R. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration*, Arno Press, New York, 1969 (orig. 1909); and Stuart Miller, *The Unwelcome Immigrant*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969.

108. "A 'nation' is etymologically a 'birth,' or a 'being born,' and hence a race, a kin or kind having a common origin or, more loosely, a common language and other institutions. . . . There is not only an original and individual birth for each system but a continual birth of new institutions within it, a continual transformation of old institutions, and even a rebirth of the nation after death." Max Fisch's introduction to *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1970, p. xxiii; see also Friedrich Hertz for an example of the length to which the monarchy was willing to go to produce the appropriate illusion: "The theory already put forward by Bodin that the Franks were a people of Gallic stock who had wandered into Germany, and from there had returned later as deliverers of their brothers from the Roman yoke, came into favour under Louis XIV. Within the French people there was, therefore, no racial difference, but national unity of the kind so much desired by the absolute monarchy. This theory very conveniently lent support to the desire for the annexation of the Rhine, the restoration of which, as old Frankish territory, he affected to demand," op. cit., p. 5.

109. Kiernan, op. cit., Past and Present, no. 31, p. 27.

110. Robert S. Lopez, The Birth of Europe, Phoenix House, London, 1966, pp. 103-4.

111. Robert S. Lopez and Irving Raymond (eds.), *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1955, pp. 79–80 and 87–107.

112. Braudel, The Mediterranean, op. cit., 1:321.

113. Ibid., 2:695.

114. Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966, pp. 133-39.

115. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, op. cit., 1:336–37.

116. Ibid., p. 322.

117. Ibid., p. 344.

118. Ibid., p. 334.

119. Ibid., pp. 334-36.

120. See Charles Verlinden, op. cit.; Eric Williams, op. cit.; and David Brion Davis, op. cit.

121. See Karl Mannhein, *Ideology and Utopia*, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1936, pp. 121–24; and Hertz, op. cit., pp. 6, 10.

122. T. K. Derry and M. G. Blakeway, *The Making of Pre-Industrial Britain*, John Murray, London, 1973, passim.

123. See Arendt, op. cit., pp. 165-67; Hertz, op. cit., pp. 1-19.

124. Reginald Horsman, 1981, pp. 14-15.

125. Ibid., chap. 2.

126. Louis Snyder, *The Idea of Racialism*, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1962, pp. 39–40 (also see pp. 20–23 and 39–53); see also Snyder's *Race*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1939, pp. 93–95; Magnus Hirschfield, *Racism*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1938. (Hirschfield, interestingly, traces the usage of the term "race" from its introduction in scientific literature by Comte de Buffon in 1749, to its appearance in the

prolegomena of Immanuel Kant's summer course in 1775 at Konigsberg in the form of White Race, Negro Race, Hunnish Race, Hindu Race, and mongrel races, pp. 51-54.)

127. See Eric Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on Nationalism," in T. J. Nossiter, A. H. Hanson, and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences, Faber and Faber, London, 1972, pp. 385-406. 128. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Robert Tucker (ed.), The Marx-

Engels Reader, op. cit., 1972, pp. 342-43.

129. See Louis Snyder, The Idea of Racialism, op. cit., pp. 155-65 for excerpts from various National Socialist thinkers in Germany including Adolf Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Hauer, Felix Fischer-Dodeleben, Wilhelm Klesserow, Ernst Krieck, Walter Darre, Herman Gauch, and, as well, appropriate selections from the Nuremberg Laws (1935); see also Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 134-46; M. N. Roy, Fascism, Best Books, Jijnasa, 1976, pp. 33-43; and Renzo De Felice, Interpretations of Fascism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 176-78.

130. See William Styron, "Hell Reconsidered," New York Review of Books, 29 June 1978, pp. 10-12, 14.

Chapter Two

1. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 9.

2. Thompson himself, if I recall correctly, mentions Blacks in his study of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century English working classes on only two occasions! One of these instances is his reference to a Black artisan; the other is the appearance of a Black man as a representation of Satan in a nightmare recalled by a dissident minister.

3. Excerpts from the introductions of two of the many studies of socialist history will suffice in demonstrating the persistence of the identification of socialism with the two "revolutions." George Lichtheim in his Preface writes: "The purpose of the present work is . . . to clarify the origins of socialism, both as a world-view and is the specific response of workers and intellectuals to the twofold upheaval of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution," The Origins of Socialism, Praeger, New York, 1969, p. vii. G. D. H. Cole, though somewhat uneasy about the periodization and definitiveness of the Industrial Revolution, nevertheless succumbs to the convenience of the phrase and its popular significations. He observes: "It is now commonplace to say that from 1789 onwards Europe was in the throes of three kinds of revolutionary change—political and social, symbolized by the events in France and their repercussions in other countries, industrial, marked by the advent of steam power and the extended application of scientific techniques in manufacture and in civil and mechanical engineering, and agrarian, involving vast changes in methods of land-cultivation and stock-breeding, and in the character of rural life." A History of Socialist Thought, vol. 1, Socialist Thought, the Forerunners, 1789-1850, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1953, p. 10.

4. Asa Briggs, "The Language of 'Class' in Early Nineteenth-Century England," in Asa Briggs and John Saville (eds.), Essays in Labour History, Macmillan, London, 1960, p. 43; see also Melvin Kranzberg's "Industrial Revolution," in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1965, 12:210-15.

5. A. E. Musson, "Continental Influences on the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain," in Barrie Ratcliffe (ed.), Great Britain and Her World, 1750-1914, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1975, p. 73. For industrialization in France in the early nineteenth century, see W. O. Henderson, The Industrial Revolution in Europe, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1961, pp. 86-88.

6. For example, Musson notes that: "In the smelting and refining of metallic ores . . . German skill and capital . . . were extremely important. Water-powered technology and mining operations were further developed . . . from Dutch and German experience. It was from the Continent, moreover, that the blast furnace and iron casting were introduced into England in the sixteenth century, followed by rolling and slitting mills for the products of the forge." Ibid.

7. E. J. Hobsbawm, "Economic Fluctuations and Some Social Movements Since 1800," in Economic History Review, 2d ser., vol. 5, no. 1 (1952): 17, 19.

8. Hobsbawm cautions, "Our best indices are mortality rates (average expectation of life, infantile, TB mortality, etc.), morbidity rates and anthropometric data. Unfortunately in Britain we lack any reliable anthropometric data such as the French, and any index of health such as the percentage of rejected recruits. Nor have we any useful morbidity figures." "The British Standard of Living 1790-1850," in Hobsbawm's Labouring Men, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964, p. 71. Hobsbawm's comments take place in the context of a debate with the "optimists" interpretation of the social consequences of the appearance of industrial forms of production; Hobsbawm sides with the "pessimists." "It is today heterodox to believe that early industrialization was a catastrophe for the labouring poor . . . let alone that their standard of living declined. This article proposes to show that the currently accepted view is based on insufficient evidence. . . . It is dangerous to reject the consensus of informed and intelligent contemporaries of industrialization, a majority of whom, as even critics admit, took the dark view. . . . For the sake of convenience the classical (Ricardo-Malthus-Marx-Toynbee-Hammond) view will be called the pessimistic, the modern (Clapham-Ashton-Hayek) view the optimistic school." Ibid., p. 64.