

of fragmentation and crisis, South Africa has recently witnessed a resurgent labor movement, efforts to organize a united front to challenge the ANC, and popular demands for the “decolonization” of land and higher education.²¹⁷ Underlying these mobilizations is the question of how the crisis confronting the racialized poor can be translated into a crisis for the postapartheid racial capitalist regime.

In the next chapter, I analyze the crisis facing the Palestinian poor in the West Bank today. Whereas neoliberal restructuring is articulated with a postcolonial project in South Africa, Israel has combined a neoliberal project with a colonial strategy of separation and enclosure. But just as the postapartheid state uses projects such as the ARP as pressure relief valves, Israel uses a permit regime and the Palestinian Authority provides public employment to assuage the crisis confronting the Palestinian poor. Yet, as in South Africa, these strategies are unable to contain popular struggles and the neoliberal colonial regime confronts a crisis of hegemony.

CHAPTER 3

Bethlehem: Neoliberal Colonization

What happened after Oslo? The settlements got bigger. The jobs disappeared. And our villages are being strangled.

FARMER FROM AL-KHADER VILLAGE, September 2012

“Welcome to the ghetto,” proclaims graffiti near the main checkpoint leading into Bethlehem.¹ The symbolism evokes not only US inner city neighborhoods but also the Jewish ghettos of Europe: spatial expressions of anti-Semitism for hundreds of years.² While the definition of a “ghetto” is hotly contested, urban sociologists have traced a shift in the structure of exclusion during the late twentieth century: from ghettos defined primarily by race to ghettos that concentrate and contain racialized populations whose labor is no longer considered necessary.³ The Palestinian “ghettos” in the West Bank are distinct because they are produced by a combination of settler colonialism and neoliberal capitalism—a combination that I call *neoliberal colonization*.

As products of settler colonialism, the Palestinian ghettos are the continually shrinking remainders of a national homeland.⁴ Through the Oslo “peace process,” the State of Israel fragmented the occupied territories into an archipelago of isolated Palestinian enclaves separated by Israeli controlled territory. While *concentrating* the Palestinian population into these enclaves, Israel is aggressively *colonizing* the rest of the land in the West Bank.

As products of neoliberal restructuring, the Palestinian enclaves are containers designed to warehouse a racialized surplus population.⁵ By reducing Israeli dependence on Palestinian workers, neoliberal restructuring has enabled Israel to carry out its strategy of concentration and colonization. At the same time, however, the Oslo process produced a new Palestinian elite. Unlike many neoliberal ghettos, therefore, the Palestinian enclaves are not ghettos of exclusion or spaces of concentrated poverty but spaces of *concentrated inequality* where rich and poor live side by side.

Scholars increasingly recognize Israel as a colonial state. But most studies of Palestine/Israel focus on the political dynamics of state violence rather than analyzing the political, economic, and social dynamics unleashed by the combination of colonialism and capitalism. In this chapter, I explore the articulation of colonization and neoliberalization in the West Bank today with a focus on the Bethlehem region. After a brief social history of Bethlehem, I trace the territorial fragmentation of the Bethlehem region into a series of isolated Palestinian enclosures. These *neoliberal enclosures* attempt to contain a colonized population that has become increasingly disposable with the restructuring of Israel's economy. As sites of concentrated inequality and intense marginalization, however, they offer only a precarious form of containment.

I then turn to the Palestinian villages, which are the front lines of struggles over colonization in the West Bank today. In the hills west of Bethlehem, Palestinian villagers confront colonial violence by Israeli settlers and the state. They also confront a crisis of unemployment and rapid urbanization. These dynamics have combined to create an indirect form of displacement and a market-based strategy of colonization. Overall, therefore, I argue that Palestinians in the West Bank today are experiencing a unique form of *neoliberal colonization*. I conclude with a discussion of Palestinian resistance to colonialism and neoliberalism. As in South Africa, it is not only the poor that confront a crisis in Palestine/Israel today but also the racial capitalist regime.

BETHLEHEM

The biblical city of Bethlehem was a small Ottoman town in the late nineteenth century, closely tied to the district capital of Jerusalem. Bethlehem and its neighboring villages grew alongside Jerusalem: skilled construction workers from Bethlehem and Beit Jala built modern neighborhoods in Jerusalem while workshops in Bethlehem and Beit Sahour produced religious artifacts for the city's tourist economy.⁶ The early twentieth century brought new dynamics in the form of Zionist settlement. During the 1940s, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) targeted the area southwest of Bethlehem for colonization and established the Gush Etzion settlement bloc.⁷ Religious Zionists committed to Jewish sovereignty built three settlements; socialist Zionists who envisioned a binational state established a fourth. Yet all four groups came into conflict with the Palestinian villagers that they displaced.⁸

During the 1948 *Nakba* (Palestinian catastrophe), more than 70,000 Palestinians from the Jerusalem region became refugees.⁹ Some fled after hearing of the massacre by Zionist militias in the nearby village of Deir Yassin; others

were driven out by Israeli forces as part of Plan Dalet—a program to secure the Jewish state by depopulating and destroying Palestinians villages.¹⁰ Bethlehem became host to three refugee camps: Dheisheh, Aida, and Azza. Meanwhile, Arab forces expelled 2,000 Jews from the Old City of Jerusalem and besieged and destroyed the Gush Etzion settlements.¹¹

Under Jordanian rule, East Jerusalem was the center of a tourist industry that accounted for 85 percent of the income in the West Bank.¹² Bethlehem provided key destinations for Christian pilgrims—including the Church of the Nativity—and manufactured religious items made of olive wood and mother-of-pearl for the markets of East Jerusalem. Yet the Bethlehem region was generally depressed. Villages along the 1949 Armistice Line (a.k.a. the Green Line) remained in a constant state of tension due to border clashes, incursions, and invasions.¹³ And the refugees, displaced and dispossessed during the *Nakba*, became a reserve army with limited opportunities for employment.¹⁴

After occupying the West Bank in 1967, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and renewed the colonization of Palestinian land. For religious Zionists, the occupation provided evidence of divine support for Jewish settlement in the hills of "Judea and Samaria" (the West Bank).¹⁵ Less than four months after the occupation began, religious Zionists established the first West Bank settlement on the former site of Gush Etzion.¹⁶ Since that time, the Etzion settlements have multiplied and expanded throughout the Bethlehem region.¹⁷

The Israeli military linked colonization to an economic policy that incorporated the 1967 Palestinians into Israel's racial Fordist economy.¹⁸ While generating a supply of low-wage labor and a captive market, the incorporation of Palestinian workers was also advantageous for colonization. The state made use of an Ottoman-era land law to confiscate land from farmers who stopped cultivating their fields when they found work inside Israel.¹⁹ And Israeli politicians expected that jobs would stifle resistance by raising the Palestinian standard of living.²⁰ Many Palestinians in the villages around Bethlehem now feel that they "fell into a trap" by accepting jobs in Israel while Israeli settlers colonized their land.²¹

During the 1970s and 1980s, Palestinians organized grassroots structures throughout the occupied territories: labor unions, women's organizations, student groups, popular committees, and voluntary work committees.²² The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Communist Party led the organizing drives in the Bethlehem area.²³ Beginning in 1982, the residents of Dheisheh refugee camp waged a popular struggle against the Israeli military and religious settlers who attempted to establish an outpost across from the camp.²⁴ And, from 1987 to 1993, Palestinians throughout the


Bethlehem area took part in the first intifada. Children with stones confronted Israeli soldiers, while popular committees organized health care, food co-ops, and schools. The Dheisheh, Aida, and Azza refugee camps became key sites of struggle, and the city of Beit Sahour became the center of a tax revolt that revived the old US slogan: "No taxation without representation."²⁵ The intifada also witnessed the emergence of Hamas as a rival to the leadership of the PLO.²⁶ To smash the uprising, the Israeli military employed mass arrests, administrative detention, torture, curfews, deportations, home demolitions, undercover agents, broken bones, rubber bullets, live ammunition, death squads, and other forms of collective punishment.²⁷

The Oslo Accords brought an end to the uprising and introduced new dynamics to the occupation. Through the Oslo process, Israel has colonized Palestinian land, concentrated the Palestinian people into isolated enclosures, fragmented the Palestinian population, and, for the first time in history, separated the twin cities of Bethlehem and Jerusalem.

THE BETHLEHEM ARCHIPELAGO

Like other West Bank regions, the Bethlehem district is now a fragmented space. The district is centered on an urban enclave—the "Bethlehem ghetto" (Area A)—that consists of three historic cities (Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour), three refugee camps (Dheisheh, Aida, and Azza), two villages (Al-Khader and Artas), and a new municipality (Al-Doha).²⁸ The district also includes dozens of separate village enclaves (Area B) to the east, south, and west. Together, these enclaves (Areas A and B) make up 13 percent of the Bethlehem district—leaving Israel with full jurisdiction over the remaining 87 percent of the land (Area C).²⁹ Israel also controls the roads in and out of the enclaves and regulates Palestinian movement with permits, closures, and checkpoints. In the mid-1990s, Israel established the first permanent checkpoint between Jerusalem and Bethlehem: a small hut with a boom gate. Over time, the state fortified the checkpoint, moved it closer to Bethlehem, and erected other checkpoints throughout the region.³⁰

Israel targets Area C for land confiscation and settlement construction. To the north, the settlements of Gilo and Har Homa separate Bethlehem from Jerusalem. The Etzion settlement bloc fragments the rest of the Bethlehem district. The Etzion bloc consists of two large cities, a major cluster of settlements west of Bethlehem, a small cluster to the east, and several hilltop outposts.³¹ Israeli officials consider the Etzion settlement bloc an integral part of "Metropolitan Jerusalem" and insist that these settlements will eventually be






FIGURE 3.1. Bypass road between Jerusalem and the Erzion bloc




FIGURE 3.2. Military checkpoint near Beit Sahour



FIGURE 3.3. Walls and fences surrounding Bethlehem

annexed. Since 2004, plans have circulated for a new settlement that would further enclose Bethlehem by linking the Etzion bloc to Gilo and Har Homa.³²

Since the 1990s, Israel has also built three bypass roads in the Bethlehem region to connect the settlements to Jerusalem and Israeli cities on the coast.³³ Until Oslo, Israeli settlers traveled on the main roads through the heart of Bethlehem and the nearby villages. The bypass roads loop around Areas A and B, further constricting and isolating these enclaves. Palestinians are prohibited from traveling on parts of these roads, and their movement is highly restricted on others. Built on confiscated land, the new highways have created a complex grid of tunnels, bridges, and separate (but unequal) roads for Palestinians and Israelis.³⁴

Since 2002, the state has built a series of fences and walls in the Bethlehem district.³⁵ To the north, an 8-meter concrete wall separates Bethlehem from Jerusalem, annexing Rachel's Tomb and transforming Aida refugee camp into a virtual prison. To the northeast, an array of fences, trenches, military roads, and buffer zones zigzag between Beit Sahour and Har Homa, encircling the village of Nu'aman and cutting it off from the West Bank.³⁶ To the west and south, however, Israel has only built sections of the wall due to opposition by settlers in the Etzion bloc who fear that the wall will limit their expansion.³⁷ If Israel constructs the wall as planned, it will enclose seven Palestinian villages—and the land of three others—within a fully isolated annexation zone.³⁸

Israel's new colonial strategy of separation and enclosure has isolated Jerusalem, separated the West Bank from the Gaza Strip, bifurcated the West Bank into northern and southern regions, and fragmented each region into an archipelago of isolated enclaves. Most residents of the main Bethlehem enclave have not visited the nearby villages for fifteen years. In this context, local allegiances and kin-based networks have become increasingly important.³⁹ As a young Palestinian from Dheisheh refugee camp explains, "Israel has succeeded in creating one hundred Palestinian nations—we are more divided than ever and don't really know one another anymore."⁴⁰

NEOLIBERAL ENCLOSURES

Given the intensity of Israel's settler colonial project in the West Bank, visitors to Bethlehem—and especially Ramallah—are often surprised by the signs of a thriving economy. Expensive cafés, restaurants, and hotels cater to a wealthy clientele. Luxury cars and SUVs line the driveways of palatial "villas." Cranes and construction crews transform the landscape to realize the fantasies and investments of the Palestinian elite.⁴¹ Rather than indicators of broad-based and

sustainable development, these displays highlight the shifting class structure of Palestinian society in the West Bank. While most Palestinians confront deepening poverty and unemployment, a small Palestinian elite with ties to the PA has grown rich. This marks one of the principal contradictions of Israel's new colonial strategy. Although designed as zones of abandonment to contain the disposable Palestinian population, the *neoliberal enclosures* in the West Bank have become sites of *concentrated inequality* that intensify the frustration of the Palestinian poor and enhance the conditions for popular resistance. As such, they offer only a precarious form of containment.

Concentrated Inequality

The Oslo process has linked Israel's settler colonial project with neoliberal restructuring in Palestine/Israel. The neoliberalization of Israel's racial Fordist economy has produced tremendous profits for high-tech and finance capital, dismantled the welfare state, undermined organized labor, and generated growing inequality within Israeli society.⁴² Neoliberal restructuring also made the labor of 1967 Palestinians increasingly redundant. With a shift from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production, the Israeli economy is now dominated by high-tech companies that have little need for low-wage Palestinian workers. Israeli manufacturers have also outsourced production from Palestinian subcontractors in the occupied territories to export processing zones in Jordan and Egypt.⁴³ And 300,000 migrant workers from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa now compete with Palestinians for the remaining low-wage jobs in agriculture and construction.⁴⁴ Neoliberal restructuring transformed the 1967 Palestinians into a truly surplus population, which the enclosures in the occupied territories were designed to contain.⁴⁵

The economic policies of the Palestinian Authority are also based on a neoliberal framework. From the start, the PA embraced the vision of a private-sector-led, export-oriented, free-market economy as the foundation for an independent Palestinian state.⁴⁶ This stems in part from long-standing connections between the Fatah leadership and Palestinian capitalists in the diaspora.⁴⁷ But the World Bank, the IMF, and the US government have had tremendous influence over the economic policies of the PA.⁴⁸ As Palestinian economist Adel Samara notes, "the PA's economy may be alone in having been designed from its very beginning by the policies and prescriptions of globalizing institutions."⁴⁹

The economic policies of the PA have generated a new class of Palestinian capitalists. During the 1990s, the PA encouraged the return of Palestinian



FIGURE 3.4. Jacir Palace hotel and restaurants

capitalists from the diaspora and provided economic incentives for political support.⁵⁰ Since 2007, the PA has pursued an even more aggressively neoliberal economic framework.⁵¹ These policies have consolidated the class of Palestinian capitalists in the West Bank. The new class is an unstable formation of wealthy returnees from the diaspora, traditional landowning elites, and business owners who serve the occupation.⁵² Because their ability to conduct business ultimately depends on the consent of the Israeli authorities, Palestinian capitalists generally accommodate the occupation while some even profit from colonization. Yet it is important to note that some Palestinian capitalists have continued a long tradition of supporting resistance to the occupation.⁵³

Oslo also created opportunities for the emergence of a Palestinian NGO elite with ties to international donors. After 1994, the flow of donor aid, the demobilization of Palestinian grassroots structures, and the liberal doctrine of “civil society” led to a proliferation of international and Palestinian NGOs in the occupied territories.⁵⁴ NGOs have become an important source of employment. Although many Palestinian NGO employees have backgrounds in community organizing, the salaried elite has become increasingly professionalized, accommodating, and responsive to international agendas.⁵⁵

Along with the PA leadership, Palestinian capitalists and NGO officials constitute a new West Bank elite. While protected from some aspects of the occupation, Palestinian elites are still subject to Israeli rule. They confront

humiliation, land confiscations, and violent assaults. Moreover, they are confined to the same enclaves as the Palestinian poor. This makes Bethlehem and other Palestinian ghettos spaces of concentrated inequality. Living in close proximity to the lavish lifestyles of the new elite has heightened the class dynamics of the struggle for many working-class Palestinians.

Across from the Israeli “DCO” military checkpoint at the northeastern entrance to Bethlehem, for instance, middle- and upper-class Palestinians dine at a restaurant with a bowling alley. Like most establishments that cater to the Palestinian elite, the employees of the restaurant—waiters, dishwashers, and kitchen staff—are recruited almost entirely from the refugee camps. Under the watchful eye of the Israeli military, working-class youth from Dheisheh, Aida, and Azza camps serve wealthy Palestinians along with Europeans, Americans, and even Israelis. According to a former waiter from Dheisheh, the workers are often humiliated while serving extravagant meals to patronizing clients. When an Israeli soldier entered the restaurant and ordered a meal, the young man told his boss that he refused to serve Israelis. Just then, a Palestinian man at a table overflowing with food snapped his fingers to summon the waiter. “I refuse to serve him too,” the man told his boss. Insisting that he must serve them all, the manager threatened to fire the young man. Throwing down his towel in disgust, the young man stormed out of the restaurant and was immediately joined by other youth from the camps in a spontaneous walkout.⁵⁶

Growing class inequality combined with territorial divisions has intensified the fragmentation of Palestinian society. Yet it is also generating new critiques of the intersecting colonial and capitalist projects that are exacerbating the marginalization of the Palestinian poor.

Neoliberal Palestine

The neoliberal economic policies of the PA have dovetailed with those of Israel to deepen the precariousness of life for the majority of 1967 Palestinians. As Israeli employers reduced their dependence on Palestinian labor, working-class Palestinians began to confront a crisis of unemployment. While maintaining its overall commitment to free-market policies, the PA rolled out a public employment program to contain this crisis during the 1990s and expanded this program during the second intifada (uprising) when Israel scaled off the occupied territories. Seeking to contain the uprising, the World Bank and IMF encouraged “donor states” in Europe, North America, and the Arab Gulf to fund the PA employment program.⁵⁷

After 2007, however, the PA began implementing a strict prescription of

neoliberal reforms under the leadership of PA prime minister Salam Fayyad, a former IMF employee. Fayyad's plan for economic restructuring—the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP)—was developed in coordination with the World Bank and the British Department for International Development.⁵⁸ The core of the PRDP is public sector fiscal reform and private sector investment. To reduce public expenditures and dependence on donors, the PRDP called for eliminating 40,000 public sector jobs, imposing a three-year freeze on public salaries, and ending subsidized water and electricity for the refugee camps. To promote private sector investment, the PRDP embraced the long-standing goal of establishing free-trade industrial zones to take advantage of the large pool of low-wage labor in the Palestinian enclaves.⁵⁹

In May 2008, Fayyad invited investors to the first Palestine Investment Conference (PIC) in Bethlehem by announcing that, "Palestine is open for business!"⁶⁰ Bethlehem hosted a second PIC two years later.⁶¹ Sponsored by Palestinian business elites in coordination with the United States and the European Union, the PICs sought to promote investment by highlighting business opportunities in the occupied territories.⁶² During both PICs, Israel facilitated the movement of delegates through borders and checkpoints while the PA arrested local activists to prevent demonstrations.⁶³

The first conference opened at the Jacir Palace in Bethlehem, home to the Intercontinental Hotel and multiple five-star restaurants. In the lead-up to the conference, PA security forces requested a list of employees from the hotel. Fifteen workers from the refugee camps were barred from the premises and threatened with responsibility for any disturbances during the conference. When the workers critiqued the PIC as a neoliberal and elitist project, the manager attempted to silence them. Without hesitation, young men and women from the camps quit their jobs and walked out of the building, throwing the hotel—and the conference—into a momentary crisis.⁶⁴

Despite ambitious efforts to attract investors, the private sector in the West Bank remains weak and fragmented. It consists primarily of small, unregulated firms that employ one or two workers.⁶⁵ Moreover, 53 percent of workers are hired without a contract and 35 percent receive less than minimum wage.⁶⁶ With a large pool of Palestinian labor, the PA hoped to attract foreign investors by building free-trade industrial zones along the Green Line (or along the wall).⁶⁷ Despite experiments in Gaza and several locations in the West Bank, the industrial zones have generated little investment and fewer jobs. In Bethlehem, for instance, a building has been constructed and plans remain on the table for a Bethlehem Industrial Estate.⁶⁸ Yet investors remain uninterested due to Israeli restrictions, regional instability, and the relatively high cost of labor.⁶⁹

The Bethlehem area has only two major industries: tourism and stonecutting. For more than one hundred years, tourism dominated the Bethlehem economy and linked the city to Jerusalem. Oslo brought two major shifts. First, Israel's enclosure of East Jerusalem suffocated the Palestinian tourist industry and enabled Israeli firms to capture the vast majority of tourist spending. Second, the PA encouraged the construction of hotels and restaurants in Bethlehem.⁷⁰ Bethlehem experienced a boom in tourism in preparation for the new millennium ("Bethlehem 2000"), but the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000 disrupted these plans. While some large stores and hotels have experienced a recovery since 2006, the industry increasingly squeezes the smallest players: tour guides, hotel and restaurant employees, small souvenir stands, and the factory workers who produce keepsakes made of olive wood and mother-of-pearl.⁷¹

Tourism in Bethlehem is structured by the Israeli occupation. The Israeli government controls the border crossings and checkpoints, regulates the entry of foreign visitors, and directs tourists toward Israeli businesses. The overwhelming majority of tourists travel with groups organized by Israeli or international agencies: they sleep in Israeli hotels, eat at Israeli restaurants, and buy souvenirs at Israeli stores. In Bethlehem, 85 percent of visitors arrive with such groups and spend only half a day in town: two hours at the Church of the Nativity and a stop at one souvenir shop.⁷² People traveling without a group confront the confusing geography of separation as well as the refusal of Israeli car rental agencies to provide insurance for Areas A and B.⁷³ In addition, tourists receive warnings from Israeli officials and tour guides—as well as their own governments—about the dangers of visiting Palestinian areas.⁷⁴

These restrictions make the Palestinian tourism industry in Bethlehem highly competitive and extremely concentrated. According to a representative of the PA Ministry of Tourism, the industry is "controlled by family money and a group of wealthy tycoons. They dominate the hotel business, travel agencies, and souvenir shops."⁷⁵ Some of the families have worked in tourism for decades; others are new elites backed by foreign investors. Their rivalries are as intense as their labor exploitation.

Due to unregulated construction, the number of hotel rooms in Bethlehem has doubled since 2006.⁷⁶ This expansion, combined with Israeli control over the flow of tourists, has driven down prices in Bethlehem hotels. According to a professor of tourism at Bethlehem University, "Israeli tour agencies are now encouraging people to stay in Bethlehem because it doubles their revenue. They are pressuring the hotels to keep their prices low, hoping that Bethlehem becomes a market for low budget tourists."⁷⁷ Low rates have increased

overnight stays by 30 percent, while providing justification for owners to cut wages.⁷⁸ "The workers are underpaid and are hardly making a living," explains the professor. "The owners say that they can't raise salaries. They have been pushed to lower their rates and now they cannot come up."⁷⁹

While the hotels engage in a race to the bottom, souvenir stores purchase customers from tour operators. Because each group only stops at one store, tour operators determine where customers spend money. Owners of large stores pay 30 to 40 percent commission for each bus. Some pay \$400–2,000 per bus in advance to ensure a steady stream of customers.⁸⁰ "We still make money. But we have to stay open late," claims a storeowner. "We give 50 percent off at night because customers come in alone and we don't have to pay commission."⁸¹ They also make money by squeezing their suppliers.

Until recently, hundreds of small factories in the Bethlehem area specialized in handicraft production for the tourist market—especially olive wood and mother-of-pearl.⁸² The devastation of the second intifada combined with the opening of the Palestinian market to Chinese imports precipitated the collapse of handicraft production. Most souvenir shops in Bethlehem now sell imported goods and demand ever-lower prices from local factories.⁸³ More than 80 percent of the mother-of-pearl and olive wood factories in the Bethlehem region have closed.⁸⁴ Most factories that remain open have accelerated production, driving down both quality and worker safety.⁸⁵

Competition has also devastated the small shops in the souk near the Church of the Nativity. Because most tour groups do not have free time to explore the markets after visiting the church, the old shops in the souk attract few customers. "We used to pay 20 percent commission," says a shopkeeper standing next to a rack of old, fading postcards. "But now the big stores buy the busses ahead of time. And small stores like mine can't have more than ten people inside anyway. The business has become a mafia."⁸⁶ Two young men sit idly in front of another store, talking about long hours and low pay while awaiting the rare customer.⁸⁷

There are two attempts to revive tourism in Bethlehem. The first is a worker-oriented co-operative movement to market Palestinian handicrafts internationally. Co-ops help connect small factories with international distributors by visiting expos around the world. "Our goal is to keep people working and to stop emigration," explains an official with a co-op in Beit Sahour.⁸⁸ The second is a neoliberal initiative to promote tourism through marketing and branding. "Put aside the wall, the occupation, and politics. We are not capitalizing on two million visitors per year," argues a young consultant. "We need to encourage them to spend more money and more time in the West Bank."⁸⁹ Backed by USAID,

the PA Ministry of Tourism, and the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the initiative seeks to improve the tourist experience by beautifying the area, promoting cultural activities, and upgrading transportation options.

The other major industry in the Bethlehem area is stonecutting.⁹⁰ Stone and marble accounts for 25 percent of Palestinian industrial revenue, and nearly one-third of the factories are in the Bethlehem region—mostly around the village of Beit Fajjar.⁹¹ In recent years, more than seventy-five (out of 150) factories in Beit Fajjar have closed and only ten to twelve still operate full time.⁹¹ The industry suffers because Israel refuses to issue new permits for Palestinian quarries, confiscates construction equipment from quarries operating without a permit, restricts the export of Palestinian products, and encourages Israeli companies to open quarries in the occupied territories.⁹² The only reason that stonecutting remains profitable is the expansion of Israeli settlements. Because an Israeli law requires all buildings in the Jerusalem region to be faced with "Jerusalem Stone," more than 70 percent of Palestinian stones are sold to Israeli developers for construction in Jerusalem and the settlements.⁹³ By placing limitations on exports, the Israeli government is able to drive down the price of these stones. Yet the stonecutting industry generates few jobs. Most factories are small, only to percent employ more than twenty workers, the industry is increasingly automated, and the jobs that remain are difficult, dirty, and dangerous.⁹⁴ But the spatial dynamic is unmistakable: cutting down some West Bank hills to build Israeli settlements on others.

The neoliberal policies of the PA have produced wealth for Palestinian capitalists—including the owners of hotels, restaurants, and stonecutting factories—but very few jobs for working-class Palestinians. Advertised as the pathway to liberation, neoliberalization has instead exacerbated inequality within Palestinian society and intensified the suffering of the Palestinian poor.

Pressure Valve Politics

In 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected prime minister of Israel on a platform of "economic peace" rather than a final-status agreement with the Palestinian people.⁹⁵ While intensifying the siege on Gaza, Netanyahu proposed twenty-five economic development projects to improve the conditions of Palestinian life in the West Bank. In line with this vision, Israel removed some West Bank checkpoints to facilitate movement between Palestinian enclaves and increased the number of work permits for West Bank Palestinians. Reviving ideas articulated by Moshe Dayan during the 1970s and Shimon Peres during the 1990s, Netanyahu's vision of economic peace assumed that Palestinians

would accept improvements in their standard of living as an alternative to self-determination and decolonization. As such, it is part of a broader pattern of pressure valve politics through which Israel and the PA attempt to contain the frustration and resistance of the Palestinian poor. In line with other post-Washington Consensus forms of “roll-out” neoliberalism, these pressure valve projects respond to crises and seek to quell resistance.⁹⁶ But they fail to address the root causes of suffering and struggle.

Whereas previous Israeli policies made Palestinian workers dependent on jobs in Israel, the state now treats such jobs as a reward for individual and collective subservience. The flexibility of the permit regime allows the state to address the changing demands of Israeli employers as well as the shifting political context.⁹⁷ The state can adjust the number of work permits to accommodate a busy harvest or increase housing starts, to punish resistance or reward quiescence, to avert an uprising or increase pressure on the PA.⁹⁸ In April 2002, Israel suspended work permits for all Palestinians. Since 2006, the state has punished Hamas by issuing no work permits for the Gaza Strip while rewarding the moderate PA by increasing the number of permits for the West Bank.⁹⁹

In the context of widespread unemployment, the permit regime provides a powerful disciplinary tool for the occupation. Israel blacklists hundreds of thousands of Palestinians for undisclosed “security” reasons, for entering Israel without a permit, or for failing to pay a fine or comply with a military order.¹⁰⁰ Youth who have been arrested for throwing stones expect to never receive permits.¹⁰¹ And the state denies permits to the family members of Palestinians who are incarcerated or have been killed by the Israeli military.¹⁰² In addition, the state uses the permit regime to recruit informants. Children in jail for throwing stones confront interrogators who threaten to revoke their parents’ work permits if they don’t provide information.¹⁰³ Similarly, Palestinians who appeal their placement on the blacklist are generally offered a permit in exchange for information.¹⁰⁴

Israel now directs nearly 50 percent of work permits toward the West Bank settlements.¹⁰⁵ In addition to the industrial zones that Israel has established in several settlements, the state’s settlement expansion policy has generated a steady demand for Palestinian construction workers. Because Israeli labor laws are rarely enforced in the settlements, Palestinian workers confront wage theft, hazardous conditions, denial of social rights, violence and abuse.¹⁰⁶ According to a 2011 survey, 82 percent of Palestinians employed in the settlements would leave their jobs if they could find a suitable alternative.¹⁰⁷ As a Palestinian worker explains, the economic crisis forces them to accept this work: “What logic is there to this—that Arabs build houses for Jews on land




FIGURE 3.5. Palestinian workers building the wall around Bethlehem

belonging to Arabs? Why am I doing this? Because I must work and earn money for my family. So I build, and in my heart I pray that tomorrow they will return all this land to Arabs, and I hate myself, but I have no choice.”¹⁰⁸

Like Israel, the PA also uses public employment as a pressure release valve. Since 2007, the PA has renewed its commitment to free-market economics yet continues to rely on public sector jobs to contain unemployment and resistance. Cuts to public spending under the PRDP reduced the government payroll from 180,000 to 153,000.¹⁰⁹ But the PA continues to pay the salaries of former employees in Gaza in order to contain the impact of the Israeli siege. And 16.5 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank still work for the PA. As a result, 52 percent of the PA budget is allocated for wages.¹¹⁰

More than any other sector, public employment with the PA is concentrated in the security forces. With more than 70,000 employees, the PA security forces account for roughly 30 percent of the PA budget.¹¹¹ This is significant for three reasons. First, the PA security forces are charged with ensuring the security of Israel and are less expensive to deploy than Israeli military personnel. As long as they fulfill their mission, Israel and its allies have no interest in reducing their numbers. Second, security forces are generally immune from neoliberal demands for cuts in government spending. On the contrary, neoliberal

restructuring produces crises that are increasingly addressed by the expansion of security forces.¹¹² Finally, investments in security do not generate sustainable development. The creation of public sector security jobs, therefore, is a short-term effort to reduce unemployment while ensuring Israeli security and containing the crises generated by neoliberal colonization.

But the PA public employment program only creates low-wage, precarious work. The basic wage is NIS1600 per month (\$400)—roughly one-third the wage of a Palestinian construction worker in Israel.¹¹³ And the PA is often unable to pay its employees due to a perpetual budget crisis that stems from dependence on donor states and Israel.¹¹⁴ Some months, PA employees receive half of their salary. Other months, they receive nothing at all. Moreover, PA employees face political pressure to join Fatah.¹¹⁵ Since 2007, the PA has purged members of Hamas from positions in educational and religious institutions.¹¹⁶ Overall, therefore, the public employment project is, in the words of a Palestinian economist, “creating a class that sees its life and its interest tied to the PA and the donors.”¹¹⁷

With the Palestinian poor confronting a crisis caused by neoliberalization and colonization, Israel and the PA have deployed pressure release programs to contain resistance and promote acquiescence. Both employment programs also incorporate Palestinian workers into their own oppression: asking them to either build Israeli settlements on confiscated Palestinian land or cooperate with the Israeli military to suppress resistance to the occupation. These jobs produce intense psychological conflicts and personal crises for working-class Palestinians who have few other options.

Precarious Containment

The pressure valve politics of Israel and the PA do not address the fundamental causes of the crisis facing the Palestinian poor in the West Bank. Colonization, constant repression, and neoliberalization have exacerbated the suffering of the Palestinian poor, intensified the class divisions within Palestinian society, and enhanced the conditions for popular resistance. As a result, the neoliberal enclosures do not provide a sustainable form of containment.

The lives of the Palestinian poor in Bethlehem have become increasingly precarious. People without Israeli work permits, PA employment, or NGO jobs depend on creative life strategies to survive through the informal economy. Israeli checkpoints have become hubs of the informal economy.¹¹⁸ Merchants set up stands to sell shoes, snacks, and drinks; vendors walk between cars selling CDs, phone cords, and tissues; porters help carry bags and groceries; taxi

drivers offer rides to nearby cities and villages. For the right fee, some drivers even take passengers around the checkpoints through mountains and fields.¹¹⁹ Poverty has also created the conditions for a market in illicit goods. Drugs, stolen cars, unlocked iPhones, and other merchandise are available in every Palestinian ghetto.

Refugee camps contain the most concentrated poverty in the West Bank. Dispossessed of their land in 1948, Palestinian refugees now face neoliberal cutbacks on the services provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Association (UNRWA). In Bethlehem, the businesses that cater to the Palestinian elite recruit employees from Dheishel, Aida, and Azza, and wealthy families hire women from the camps to clean their homes. Although many refugees work for the PA security forces or in Israel and the settlements, the camps confront high rates of poverty and unemployment. As a result, refugee camps have become centers of the informal economy. Many women work from home producing embroidered dresses, scarves, purses, and other items for sale to international visitors.¹²⁰ And many refugee families have transformed a room in their home into a small shop, where they sell basic necessities such as fruits and vegetables, milk and eggs, school supplies and falafel. In Aida camp, home to 3,500 people, there are now more than fifty small stores—most of which sell the same basic items and generate very little income.¹²¹

One of the most common informal economic activities is undocumented work in Israel and the settlements.¹²² Most estimates suggest that 20,000 to 30,000 Palestinians work in Israel and the settlements without permits.¹²³ Some of these workers are blacklisted on “security” grounds; others do not meet Israel’s age and family requirements;¹²⁴ others find that they make more money by not paying the NIS2,000 (\$500) fee to apply for a permit. Some sneak into Israel through holes in the fence, climb over the wall, and or pay drivers to take them around checkpoints. Bold entrepreneurs have devised simple solutions to bypass the barrier—such as erecting a ladder on each side of the wall and charging people NIS10 (\$2.50) to climb over.¹²⁵ Most workers, however, simply converge on areas where the wall has not yet been built—such as the western villages of Bethlehem—and walk across the Green Line.¹²⁶ This casts doubt on arguments that the wall is primarily about security.¹²⁷

Although Israeli law requires employers to provide benefits to all workers regardless of documentation, most undocumented workers do not receive minimum wage, sick days, holidays, pensions, or other social rights.¹²⁸ As a worker explains, “If the bosses know that you don’t have a permit, they will often make problems with you at the end of the month so they don’t have to pay you.”¹²⁹ Undocumented workers live in constant fear of arrest and abuse,

returning home once a week or less and sleeping at their work sites—often without shelter or in cramped quarters. Despite their caution, most undocumented workers have been arrested.¹³⁰ Every worker that I spoke with shared stories about encounters with the police or the military. On the first arrest, they are generally returned to the West Bank. Subsequent arrests lead to jail time (three months then six months then a year) along with a fine and a three-year ban on receiving a work permit.¹³¹

Alongside the informal economy, Palestinians draw on several forms of social support. With funding from the European Union, the PA provides small cash grants to extremely poor families. Some refugees still receive food subsidies from UNRWA. More important, however, are forms of social solidarity from family members in the occupied territories and in the diaspora. Some women have formed rotating microfinance networks with family members.¹³² Each participant contributes a small amount to the fund every month and, on a rotating basis, one person withdraws money.

Poverty in the Palestinian enclaves is compounded by inflation. The 1994 Paris Protocol codified the economic ties between Israel and the PA as a “joint customs union.”¹³³ As a result, the cost of living for Israelis and Palestinians is closely related despite vastly different median incomes and gross national products.¹³⁴ When the 2008 global economic crisis drove up food and oil prices around the world, rising inflation made life increasingly difficult for Palestinians to navigate. Understanding that virtually all consumer goods in the occupied territories are either produced in Israel or pass through Israel, Palestinians see rising prices as a way that Israeli companies extract money from Palestinians.¹³⁵ Shir Hever describes this as exploitation “via remote control.”¹³⁶

In these conditions, credit has become an increasingly important source of livelihood. For years, credit has circulated informally in the occupied territories. A barber in Dheisheh showed me a registry of clients who receive his services on credit. He is currently owed more than NIS30,000 (\$7,500), but this is down from NIS60,000 (\$15,000) during the second intifada.¹³⁷ Since 2008, the Palestinian Monetary Authority has required banks to increase the availability of consumer loans. From 2008 to 2011, bank credit for consumer spending increased 245 percent, reaching nearly \$1 billion—mostly for credit cards, real estate, or vehicles.¹³⁸ “The banks will give you money to buy a car, but not to start an agricultural project or productive program. Nothing developmental,” points out a local leader in Aida camp.¹³⁹ Some suggest that the loans are part of a donor agenda to trap people in debt so they focus on work rather than political struggle. Others expect that the credit bubble will burst,

that the banks will be unable to carry out mass evictions or repossessions, and that the entire system will collapse.¹⁴⁰

Most Palestinians exist in a state of perpetual precariousness. In the words of a Fatah leader from Bethlehem, “They don’t want us to die. They want us to survive. To survive and nothing more.”¹⁴¹ Precariousness in Palestine, of course, is not simply an economic phenomenon. Palestinians confront aggressive colonization and intense repression. Israel deployed the full power of its military against the Palestinian enclaves during the second intifada and has repeatedly attacked the Gaza Strip since 2009. On a more mundane level, the Israeli military surrounds the enclaves and invades them on a daily basis to arrest activists, demolish homes, or issue military orders. Thousands of Palestinian prisoners and hundreds of administrative detainees languish in Israeli prisons. Meanwhile, the state confiscates Palestinian land and provides the settlers with free rein to assault Palestinians and their property. Because the Palestinian Authority participates in the regime of security coordination with Israel, many Palestinians now insist that they live under “two occupations” (see chapter five).

Rather than simply a political project, however, Palestinians in the West Bank today confront a dangerous combination of colonization and neoliberalization. Despite the pressure valve politics of Israel and the PA, the combination is explosive. In the opinion of a former official in the PA Ministry of Finance, “Palestinians can live with much less income if they are satisfied politically. The problem is the combination. Palestinians are not happy with their leadership. There is a legitimacy problem. They’re not happy with the peace process. They’re not happy with the internal politics because of the split [between Fatah and Hamas]. And when you have on top of that the economic crisis, the combination is dangerous.”¹⁴²

Israel’s new colonial strategy seeks to isolate and contain the increasingly disposable colonized population. As sites of concentrated inequality and intense marginalization, however, the neoliberal enclosures in the West Bank have exacerbated the precariousness of Palestinian life and enhanced the conditions for popular struggle. As a result, the containment that they provide is almost as precarious as the lives of the Palestinian poor.

NEOLIBERAL COLONIZATION IN THE WESTERN VILLAGES

While concentrating the Palestinian population into neoliberal enclosures, Israel is colonizing Palestinian land in Area C. As a result, the Palestinian villages

have become key battlegrounds in the struggle over colonization in the West Bank. Although colonial settlement in the West Bank is driven by political and ideological motives, the dynamics are shaped by the articulation between colonialism and capitalism. As a result, Palestinian villages confront a unique form of *neoliberal colonization*. Before tracing the contours of neoliberal colonization, however, it is important to briefly outline the juridical division of the Palestinian villages under Oslo.

Palestinian Villages under Oslo

When the borders of the Palestinian enclaves were established under the Oslo negotiations of the mid-1990s, the core residential and commercial districts of the West Bank villages were designated Area B, and the Palestinian Authority gained jurisdiction over civilian affairs.¹⁴³ The remainder of the village land was labeled Area C and Israel retained complete jurisdiction – including control over civilian affairs such as planning and development. The majority of land in almost every village was designated Area C—including the cultivated fields of farmers, the pastureland of shepherds, and the land set aside for future residential, commercial, and agricultural development. The Israeli military administration requires Palestinians to obtain permits to build on or otherwise develop this land, but – with rare exceptions – systematically refuses to issue such permits. While the population is confined to the small enclaves of Area B, the remainder of village land is open for colonization.

The hills west of Bethlehem are home to nine Palestinian villages that have historically served as the agricultural heartland of the Bethlehem region. Two of the villages (Artas and Al-Khader) are connected to the main Bethlehem enclave; six are isolated in separate enclaves (Wadi Fukin, Husan, Battir, Al-Jab'a, Nahhalin, and Al-Walaja), and one (Beit Sakariya) exists entirely within Area C.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the vast majority of land in every village west of Bethlehem is designated Area C: more than 75 percent of the land in eight of nine villages and more than 90 percent in five. This means that the residents of Beit Sakariya are unable to build anywhere in their village and that the residents of other villages require military permits to build houses, dig wells, repair roads, terrace fields, or otherwise develop the majority of their land. Yet these permits are not forthcoming.

Prior to the second intifada, the Israeli military and the PA security forces carried out joint patrols in Area B.¹⁴⁵ Since 2000, however, the Israeli military has reclaimed complete control over security in Area B. The PA police no longer have a regular presence in any of the villages west of Bethlehem.¹⁴⁶ But

the Israeli army continues to patrol the villages. In Al-Khader, for instance, Israeli soldiers park outside the entrance to a school almost every day. Ostensibly there to prevent children from throwing stones at Israeli cars on an adjacent bypass road, the soldiers often assault children walking home from school. In September 2013, I was touring the orchards of the Saint George Monastery in Al-Khader, where several ancient olive trees had caught fire the previous day due to tear gas fired by soldiers outside the school. While we stood among the trees, Israeli soldiers again fired tear gas canisters at children leaving school; two landed inside the orchard and started new fires.¹⁴⁷

The PA exercises its jurisdiction over civilian affairs in Area B through local village councils and executive branches such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agriculture. The budgets of the village councils depend largely on the collection of fees for water and wastewater. Yet many residents cannot pay their fees. "People used to work in Israel but now can't get a permit and can't pay anything to the municipality," says an employee of the Nahhalin village council.¹⁴⁸ As a result, the councils do not provide many services. The Artas village council cannot even afford electricity for the municipal hall. Its lights and computer run on electricity borrowed through an extension cord from the mosque next door. The scenic village has a putrid odor because there is no sewage system and garbage is only collected every other week.¹⁴⁹

Budget cuts and Israeli restrictions also limit the ability of PA executive branches to support Palestinian villagers. For example, only 1 percent of the PA budget is allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture—85 percent of which covers employee salaries.¹⁵⁰ The Ministry of Agriculture is further incapacitated by the fact that most agricultural land is located outside of the ministry's jurisdiction in Area C. "The Ministry of Agriculture does not care for us at all," says an old man from Al-Khader. "So the Palestinian farmer gets weaker and weaker each year and in the end the land does not produce."¹⁵¹

In 2000, the PA and the European Union established regional Joint Services Councils for Planning and Development (JSCPDs) to coordinate service provision between villages.¹⁵² Many Joint Service Councils soon closed due to budget cuts during the second intifada. Although the JSCPD that serves western Bethlehem still exists, coordination is difficult due to Israeli restrictions on Area C. In 2012, for instance, after the JSCPD helped repave a road from Battir to Beit Jala, the Israeli military sent bulldozers to raise the asphalt. According to a JSCPD official, repression combined with budget restrictions generates conservative politics: "We often avoid taking risks with projects that we think Israel might destroy. We do not have much money and we want to minimize the friction between soldiers and the people."¹⁵³

Unable to provide many services to village residents or support to Palestinian farmers, the PA has severely limited authority in the West Bank villages. This is especially true in villages such as Beit Sakariya, which exist fully within Area C. "The PA can't do anything here," says a village leader. "The PA can only help a little in Bethlehem and Al-Khader. But they can't do anything here."¹⁵⁴ As a result, Palestinian villagers are largely on their own against the forces of neoliberal colonization.

Manufactured Farm Crisis

Unemployment has led many village residents who previously worked in Israel to return to farming. According to the World Bank, the number of West Bank Palestinians employed in agriculture doubled from 1995 to 2006.¹⁵⁵ Yet the contribution of agriculture to Palestinian GDP fell from 13.3 percent in 1994 to 5.9 percent in 2012.¹⁵⁶ This is because Palestinian farmers face an intense agricultural crisis manufactured by the colonial state.

To begin with, Israeli authorities issue confiscation orders to Palestinian landowners, expropriating their land to build settlements, military bases, roads, and walls. The Israeli government uses a range of mechanisms to confiscate land for settlements, including confiscations for military purposes, nature reserves, public needs, and "state lands."¹⁵⁷ Looking up at the settlement of Beitar Illit from Nahhalin village, a young man recalls walking over the empty hills to visit friends in Wadi Fukin. "People grew wheat and lentils on the land," he points out. "And sheep used to graze on top of the hill."¹⁵⁸ The settlement now expands over two entire hilltops and is descending into the valleys below—Nahhalin on one side, Wadi Fukin on the other.

Israeli authorities also issue a range of military orders to prevent Palestinians from using land in Area C: "demolition orders" for houses built without permission, "stop work orders" for ongoing projects, and "revert orders" that require the restoration of land to its previous condition.¹⁵⁹ When the Israeli military issues an order pertaining to Palestinian land, soldiers do not give the order directly to the landowner. Instead, they place the written order beneath a rock on the land. Palestinians have forty-five days to challenge the order in court, but do not always find the paper in time.¹⁶⁰

"They wait until we finish the work and get tired, then they tell us to stop," complains a farmer from Wadi Fukin who had just finished upgrading several *dunums* of land when he received a "stop work" order.¹⁶¹ He and two other farmers from the village spent two years digging wells, building terraces, and planting trees with the support of Palestinian and Dutch NGOs. They

found the military orders under a rock nine days after Israeli soldiers placed them on the land. The same week, a farmer from Al-Khader found a revert order on land that he had just finished restoring after six months of work and a NIS15,000 (\$3,750) investment. The order contained a map, a satellite image taken the previous year, and a demand that the farmer restore the land to its previous state.¹⁶² When a Palestinian landowner ignores a military order, the Israeli military deploys bulldozers to carry out the work and bills the landowner to recover the costs. According to a PA Ministry of Agriculture official, farmers generally follow the orders—especially if family members need permits to work in Israel.¹⁶³

The construction of Israel's West Bank wall has further isolated Palestinians from their land. In more than 150 West Bank communities, the wall separates the residential areas of villages from their fields.¹⁶⁴ In Al-Walaja, for instance, 30 percent of village lands are isolated behind the wall. If the wall is completed according to plan, it will isolate 68 percent of the land of Al-Khader and 37 percent of the land of Artas.¹⁶⁵ The Israeli military controls access to these lands with permits and agricultural gates.

The Israeli authorities also use more mundane methods to keep Palestinians off their land.¹⁶⁶ They confiscate machinery, such as bulldozers, that Palestinians use without permission in Area C.¹⁶⁷ To avoid the costs of recovering confiscated machinery, the owners of farming equipment often refuse to allow people to use their machines in Area C.¹⁶⁸ Simple barriers and everyday forms of harassment also limit Palestinian access to the land. In September 2012, for instance, Israeli authorities erected guardrails along a section of the bypass road around Al-Khader village, blockading several dirt roads used by local farmers. No longer able to reach their fields by car, the farmers resorted to traveling on foot or by donkey.¹⁶⁹ The Israeli police and army also regularly stop Palestinians traveling to their fields along bypass roads or near settlements. Twice within a one-week period, I was with farmers from Al-Khader picking grapes in village lands when the police pulled us over for questioning.¹⁷⁰

The farming crisis also stems from limited access to water. The State of Israel controls all three sources of water in the region: the Jordan River, the Coastal Aquifer, and the Mountain Aquifer (which lies beneath the West Bank).¹⁷¹ The Israeli national water company, Mekorot, extracts 89 percent of the water from the Mountain Aquifer, enabling 500,000 Israeli settlers to use six times more water than 2.6 million Palestinians.¹⁷² While the settlements have access to water twenty-four hours a day, many Palestinian cities, villages, and refugee camps only receive water once every two to three weeks during the

summer.¹⁷³ Palestinians fill large rooftop tanks and hope the water lasts. "The problem is not the lack of resources, but the unfair distribution," explains a Palestinian water engineer.¹⁷⁴

To irrigate their fields, the villages west of Bethlehem rely entirely on rain and spring water. Yet the flow from these springs has steadily declined due to overconsumption and settlement construction. The large concrete settlements limit the ability of the ground to absorb rainwater, and the use of explosives in the construction process disrupts the flow of underground water.¹⁷⁵ To address the water crisis, Palestinians dig wells and build cisterns, but Israeli authorities regularly target these projects with demolition orders.¹⁷⁶ In addition, settlers have increasingly claimed control over West Bank springs and deterred Palestinians from accessing them.¹⁷⁷

Villages located in valleys beneath settlements also confront soil contamination due to wastewater runoff from the settlements.¹⁷⁸ Wastewater from Beitar Illit, for instance, is often released into the fields of Wadi Fukin and Nahhalin. "Big tanks collect their wastewater and then pump the water onto Palestinian land, which affects the soil, the plants, and the agricultural economy," explains an official with the PA Ministry of Agriculture.¹⁷⁹ According to a member of the Wadi Fukin village council, the sewage destroys not only the soil but also the reputation of the village: "People say that there is sewage in the village and so they don't want to buy our produce."¹⁸⁰

Finally, the farm crisis stems from the inability of Palestinian farmers to market their produce. Historically, farmers from the villages west of Bethlehem sold their goods in the markets of Jerusalem. These markets have largely been eliminated due to the enclosure of East Jerusalem. As an old woman from Battir says, "It is 7 kilometers to Jerusalem. Before, I used to go three times a week with whatever I grew. For the last fifteen years, I haven't been to Jerusalem once. How can we live?"¹⁸¹ Although some farmers cross into Jerusalem without permits to sell their crops, most farmers from the area have turned to the Bethlehem market. But Bethlehem has a much smaller market and is easily overwhelmed with produce from nearby villages. "If you go in the morning to the market in Bethlehem, you'll find all of the farmers in the Bethlehem region," says a farmer from Al-Khader.¹⁸² To make matters worse, Israeli farmers dump produce in Palestinian markets at rock-bottom prices, undercutting the local farmers.¹⁸³ And, on a broader scale, the state limits the ability of Palestinian farmers to export their goods.¹⁸⁴ Subject to export controls imposed by the Israeli military, fresh produce often sits in containers for hours or even days awaiting a security check. As a Palestinian economist jokes, "When a strawberry goes through a security checkpoint, instead of fresh berries we only have

jam."¹⁸⁵ The situation is compounded by Israeli agricultural companies—such as Agrexco, Mehadrin, and Arava—that operate in settlements, exploit Palestinian labor, and benefit from free-trade agreements by marketing their products as "Made in Israel."¹⁸⁶

Settler Violence

Along with the manufactured farm crisis, Palestinian villagers also confront colonial violence by ideologically motivated Israeli settlers. Violence by extremist settlers dates back to the 1970s, when groups such as Kach and the Gush Emunim Underground targeted Palestinian political leaders.¹⁸⁷ In 1994, a right-wing settler massacred twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers attending morning prayers at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. As the heart of religious Zionism in the West Bank, the Etzion settlements are notorious for violent attacks on Palestinians. Among the most extreme settlers in the region are the violent activists of Women in Green and the Bat Ayin Underground.

Settler violence has increased in recent years due to the rise of coordinated "price tag" attacks. After Israel withdrew its settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005, settler organizations insisted that Palestinians should pay a price every time the Israeli government tried to limit settlement activity.¹⁸⁸ Despite the overwhelmingly pro-settler policies of the Israeli government, "price tag" attacks have proliferated. Although most Israeli officials do not openly condone these attacks, the state does little to prevent or punish settler violence because such violence constitutes an extension of state policy.¹⁸⁹ Patrick Wolfe captures the dynamic perfectly: "Rather than something separate from or running counter to the colonial state, the murderous activities of the frontier rabble constitute its principal means of expansion."¹⁹⁰

The majority of settler violence involves small-scale attacks on people, buildings, cars, and crops. In 2011 alone, settlers destroyed 10,000 Palestinian trees in the West Bank.¹⁹¹ In the Bethlehem region, settlers uproot olive trees, destroy grape vines, throw stones at passing cars, assault pedestrians, and attack farmers trying to reach their fields. But sometimes the assaults are much more serious. In August 2012, a settler threw a petrol bomb at a Palestinian taxi near Bethlehem. Driving with the windows down to enjoy the summer evening, the passengers—a family of five plus the driver—suffered severe burns when the petrol bomb exploded inside the vehicle.¹⁹² Still covered in bandages a month later, the driver explained that the fire would not go out even after they got out of the car and rolled on the ground: "It was not a normal Molotov cocktail. There must have been benzene mixed with glue or something unnatural,

because we could not put out the fire."¹⁹³ Similar attacks took place in July 2014, when settlers kidnapped and burned to death a Palestinian teenager in East Jerusalem, and again in July 2015, when settlers threw firebombs into a home in the village of Duma—killing an infant and his father.

In addition to violent assaults, ideological settlers also unilaterally expropriate Palestinian land. Groups such as the "Hilltop Youth" establish settlement outposts by placing caravans on hilltops and then demanding military protection.¹⁹⁴ Settlers also claim land by planting trees and other crops. Near the borders of El'azar settlement in the Etzion bloc, for instance, settlers cultivate new plots of land each year.¹⁹⁵ In October 2012, settlers began cultivating two plots of land belonging to farmers from Al-Khader. On one plot, they planted flowers that spelled the word "victory" in Hebrew.¹⁹⁶ Although largely overlooked, this form of colonization has expanded rapidly since Oslo. Of the land now cultivated by settlers in the Etzion bloc, 55 percent is privately owned Palestinian land.¹⁹⁷ Cultivation provides settlers with a quick, inexpensive way to unilaterally expand the boundaries of the settlements.

It should be clear from these descriptions that the actions of the Israeli state and the settlers are motivated by the colonial project. Driven by political and ideological goals, the state and the settlers use violence to displace and dispossess the colonized Palestinian population. Yet the process of colonization is shaped by the relationship between this settler colonial project and a neoliberal capitalist project. Neoliberalization not only helped create the economic crisis that is leading so many Palestinians to attempt a return to farming. It has also contributed to the rapid urbanization of the villages, the changing class dynamic within the villages, and the expansion of a market-based form of colonization.

Rapid Urbanization

Due to colonial settlement and neoliberal restructuring, many Palestinian villages have experienced a process of rapid urbanization in recent years. Because Palestinians are only allowed to build within Area B, usually less than 25 percent of the village land, the core areas of the villages are becoming more and more crowded. Within Area B, Palestinians have two options for construction. They can either add new floors to existing buildings or fill in the gaps between buildings. A more risky tactic is to build in Area C without a permit, but this often results in a demolition order.¹⁹⁸ As a result, the core residential sections of villages are becoming increasingly dense while also expanding vertically. As an official with the Joint Services Council for the western villages of Bethlehem



FIGURE 3.6. "You came to Artas refugee camp"

explains, "There is no land left for public needs: schools, clinics, sports fields, playgrounds, green spaces, parks, water reservoirs, new roads, sewage treatment, etc. Land prices are unimaginable. Our villages were rural, but they have now become cities."¹⁹⁹

Many Palestinian villagers express concerns about the urbanization of their villages. "Here in the middle of the village it was all olive trees," recalls a resident of Wadi Fukin. "Look today, most of it has been built up."²⁰⁰ A resident of Al-Khader sees a similar pattern: "There will be a demographic bomb in Al-Khader. People used to build individual houses, now they build towers. We started growing up because there is no land."²⁰¹ According to a geographer from Bethlehem, "The villages have been turned into slums."²⁰² In Artas village, which borders the Dheishel refugee camp, a member of the village council told me: "You didn't come to Artas village; you came to Artas refugee camp."²⁰³

In describing their villages as cities, slums, or refugee camps, Palestinians are not only pointing to the densification of the built environment. They are also commenting on the changing social and economic conditions in the villages—particularly the sharpening of class divisions. Like the urban enclaves, the villages have become sites of concentrated inequality. Palestinian elites are building multi-million-dollar mansions in the villages. In addition,

restrictions on land use in Area C have inflated the value of the land in Area B. To take advantage of the bubble in land rent, speculators are now building residential towers in the villages.²⁰⁴ Yet rates of poverty and unemployment in the villages rival the cities. As a farmer from Al-Khader village explains, "There used to be three classes in our villages: the rich, the middle class, and the *fellahin* (peasants). But now there are only two classes: the extremely rich and the dispossessed."²⁰⁵ People recognize that class relations began to change with Oslo. "Since Oslo, there began to be growing class differentiation between the people," explains a resident of Husan village. "Now we see the social isolation of the poor. The class structure has become clear. There are more problems between families, less cooperation, and more fights between the children of the rich and the poor."²⁰⁶

When asked about the biggest problem in the villages, residents of the villages west of Bethlehem almost universally point to the crisis of unemployment. Situating the crisis historically, they argue that Israel encouraged the *fellahin* to leave their lands in the 1970s by opening the Israeli labor market. This provided Israeli firms with a source of cheap labor and enabled the Israeli government to confiscate lands that were not being cultivated. Yet the introduction of permits, closures, and the wall has eliminated access to jobs for thousands of Palestinians. Now, says an organizer from Wadi Fukin, "There is no work in our village. Nothing. You can leave the village or stay here and do nothing. There are no other options."²⁰⁷

Indeed, people without Israeli permits or jobs with the PA have few options in the villages. Some cross into Israel without permits.²⁰⁸ The villages west of Bethlehem are popular crossing routes due to their proximity to Jerusalem and the fact that Israel has still not completed the wall in the area. Workers from across the West Bank arrive in the villages on Fridays and Saturdays. They climb the hills at night on dangerous journeys to Jerusalem or Tel Aviv.²⁰⁹ According to one worker, "I wear nice clothes to move across the border so that I don't look like a Palestinian worker."²¹⁰ I have watched workers cross into Israel from the western villages on donkeys, bicycles, motorbikes, and on foot—some dressed up, others in work clothes. The Israeli government knows full well that workers use these paths to cross into Israel. Some Palestinians suspect that the state has not finished the wall because it provides Israeli businesses with access to low-wage workers.²¹¹

The presence of the settlements generates other strategies for dealing with the crisis of unemployment. The village of Husan is located near the entrance to Beitar Illit, the largest settlement in the region. For decades, workers from

Husan have specialized in construction. Each day, more than two hundred village residents work in Beitar Illit, expanding the settlement on land that has been confiscated from Husan and two other villages.²¹² Since 2008, residents of Husan have developed an even more controversial economic strategy. The road from Husan to Beitar Illit is now lined with auto repair shops, gas stations, and grocery stores that cater almost exclusively to Israeli settlers. Many Palestinians oppose this type of business. But a member of the Husan village council is unmoved: "Without Israeli customers, all of the businesses on the main road would close. They can come and go any time of day, because we want to live in peace."²¹³

High rates of unemployment, a manufactured farm crisis, limited space for expansion, growing inequality, and attacks by settlers and the state place tremendous pressure on the rural poor to leave their villages and seek opportunities in the cities. This constitutes a form of displacement that some Palestinians have identified as a new Israeli strategy of displacement: "indirect forcible transfer."²¹⁴ An advocate for Palestinian farmers argues that this constitutes a neoliberal, do-it-yourself form of expulsion: "a self-immigration plan for the Palestinians."²¹⁵ The rural exodus contributes to overcrowding in the urban enclaves. It also opens the door for another form of colonization: land purchases by Zionist organizations.

Land Sales

Although Israel initially discouraged private land purchases in the occupied territories, the state reversed course in the early 1980s during the early stages of neoliberal restructuring. The state began encouraging private developers to buy land from West Bank Palestinians for the purposes of settlement construction. To facilitate the process, the state adopted two policies. First, the state allowed people involved in the transactions to conceal their identities for up to fifteen years; in practice, this often extends to twenty-five years. Second, the state allowed Israeli developers to avoid publicizing the transactions by transferring newly purchased land to the state rather than registering it as privately owned. The state then declares the land "state land" and allots it to the developer for settlement construction.²¹⁶ The ostensible goal of both policies is to protect Palestinians involved in the transactions. But the policies eliminate the opportunity for Palestinians to challenge the legality of the alleged sales and open the door for fraudulent claims.²¹⁷ As a result, transfers of ownership over the most contested land on earth are incredibly murky.

Over time, an extensive web of organizations, individuals, and businesses has emerged to purchase Palestinian land. Three of the most important organizations are the Israel Land Fund, the Land Redemption Fund, and Elad.²¹⁸ Much of their funding comes from wealthy international donors and is funneled through tax-exempt organizations in the US and offshore tax-shelters.²¹⁹ Key to the process is an Arab “front man” who identifies potential sellers, negotiates the transaction, purchases the land, and transfers it to an Israeli front company. The front companies, with names such as Al-Wattan (Arabic for “homeland”), operate on behalf of the organizations and businesses managing the entire operation.²²⁰

In the Bethlehem region, settler organizations have used these methods to purchase land near Rachel’s Tomb and the settlement of Efrat.²²¹ In 2009, two Israeli businessmen announced that they had purchased 2,500 *dunums* (750 acres) along the bypass road connecting the Etzion bloc to Jerusalem and were seeking government approval for the construction of a large new settlement.²²² In 2011, the Israeli military began demolishing Palestinian homes, businesses, and infrastructure in the area—generating speculation that the settlement may soon be approved.²²³

Despite the secrecy and obfuscation, Palestinians are well aware of the process. “Lots of people are selling their land,” complained a community leader.²²⁴ On two separate occasions, people told me they had been offered “blank checks” worth millions of dollars for their land.²²⁵ I also met a man who had been arrested by the PA for attempting to sell his land to settlers. Although he insisted that he just wanted to find out how much the land was worth, a Palestinian court later sentenced him to ten years’ hard labor.²²⁶ The lack of transparency creates tremendous suspicion. When a poor Palestinian buys a new car or builds a new house, neighbors often suspect he has sold land. It also creates the potential for fraud—including the widespread use of forged title deeds by organizations claiming to buy land.²²⁷

Dating back to the early twentieth century, Zionist organizations have presented land purchases as a consensual, market-based practice that is neither colonial nor even controversial. Yet it is important to remember that the land market is embedded in a broader social context. The settler state not only facilitates these transactions, it also creates the crisis conditions that lead some people to sell their land. As a farmer explained, “Nobody would go sell his land except under pressure. Especially to sell land to the enemy.”²²⁸ Colonization, therefore, not only contributes to the agricultural crisis, it also operates through that crisis. The “free” market in land is a key mechanism of neoliberal colonization.

Neoliberal Colonization

In the West Bank, the Palestinian villages bear the brunt of the Israeli settler colonial project. While the state confiscates Palestinian land and manufactures a crisis for Palestinian farmers, Israeli settlers expropriate Palestinian land, destroy Palestinian crops, and assault Palestinian people. Neoliberal restructuring dovetails with this colonial project by intensifying the economic crisis, accelerating the urbanization of Palestinian villages, exacerbating class divisions within the villages, creating a do-it-yourself form of displacement, and producing the conditions for a market-based strategy of colonization. Moreover, colonization of Palestinian land leads to the construction of Israeli settlements. And settlement construction creates tremendous opportunities for capital accumulation due to free land, low-wage construction workers from nearby villages, inexpensive stones and cement from West Bank quarries, and export-oriented agricultural and industrial zones that exploit Palestinian and migrant workers.²²⁹ Altogether, therefore, the neoliberal colonization of the West Bank is at the center of the “ongoing *Nakba*” confronting the Palestinian population.²³⁰

RESISTANCE

The combination of colonization and neoliberalization has made life miserable for most Palestinians in the West Bank. Growing class inequality has exacerbated the territorial fragmentation of the Palestinian enclaves, intensifying existing social divisions and introducing new ones. The result is a completely fragmented Palestinian society. Along with the pressure valve projects and repressive policies of Israel and the PA, this fragmentation is all that prevents explosive social conditions from generating a new uprising or intifada in the occupied territories. Nevertheless, Palestinians continue finding ways to challenge Israeli rule and the precariousness of their existence.

During the 1990s, the Palestinian grassroots structures that sustained the first intifada were demobilized—much like the South African labor unions and civic organizations—due to Israeli repression, PA co-optation, and the rise of the NGOs. The creation of the Palestinian enclosures also limited the opportunities for Palestinian youth to directly confront Israeli soldiers. Along with the rise of Hamas, these processes contributed to the emergence of the suicide bomb as a tactic for challenging colonization. Yet grassroots mobilizations continued throughout the 1990s. In the Bethlehem region, the construction of Har Homa settlement led to sustained demonstrations, and the Dheishel

refugee camp hosted the first gathering of a global movement to defend the Palestinian right of return.

As conditions declined and opposition to Oslo increased, the occupied territories erupted in a second intifada (uprising) from 2000 to 2005.²³¹ The brutality of Israeli repression combined with the demobilization of Palestinian grassroots organizations led to a rapid militarization of the uprising. Armed struggle soon overshadowed popular demonstrations. But armed struggle never became the primary tactic of the Palestinian resistance. Marches, sit-ins, hunger strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of civil unrest took place every day. Palestinian youth gathered at checkpoints to confront heavily armed soldiers with slings and stones. Palestinian organizations played an integral role in the emerging global justice movement. And thousands of international activists joined Palestinians and Israelis in nonviolent direct actions against the occupation.²³²

With US support, Israel unleashed the full force of its military to crush the second intifada. Israel changed the rules of military engagement to allow soldiers to fire live ammunition at stone-throwing youth. The Israeli military invaded and besieged the Palestinian enclaves with curfews, trenches, fences, and walls; deployed F-16 fighter planes, gunship helicopters, and unmanned drones to rain violence from the skies above; assassinated political leaders, killed civilians, and arrested thousands. In Bethlehem, the Gilo checkpoint, Rachel's Tomb, and Al-Khader village became sites of regular unequal confrontations that left dozens of Palestinian children dead and injured. From 2000 to 2008, Israeli soldiers killed more than 4,800 Palestinians, while Palestinians killed 1,000 Israelis.²³³

The most intense fighting in the West Bank took place in March and April 2002. In early March, the army invaded Bethlehem and laid siege to the Dheisheh refugee camp. For six days, Palestinian fighters resisted Israeli attempts to enter the camp. When the army finally took over Dheisheh, Israeli soldiers rounded up all Palestinian men aged fifteen to fifty and took them away in blindfolds and handcuffs.²³⁴ In late March, a young woman from Dheisheh responded with a bomb attack in Jerusalem that killed two Israelis.²³⁵ Three days later, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Bethlehem as part of a broader campaign that involved a siege on Arafat's compound in Ramallah and the destruction of the Jenin refugee camp. For forty days, Israeli forces imposed a curfew on Bethlehem and besieged the Church of the Nativity, where Palestinian fighters and civilians had taken refuge.²³⁶ The siege ended with thirteen Palestinian fighters deported to Europe and another twenty-six exiled to Gaza.

As the intifada was winding down, 170 Palestinian civil society organizations called on people around the world to support the Palestinian people by organizing "Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions" (BDS) campaigns.²³⁷ The BDS movement has grown rapidly as student groups, churches, trade unions, and other organizations build rights-based campaigns against occupation, discrimination, and colonization. Along with the rise of the BDS movement, Palestinian struggles on the ground continue. Weekly nonviolent protests in villages such as Nabi Saleh, daily confrontations with soldiers at checkpoints and in refugee camps, hunger strikes in Israeli prisons, and independent trade unions in Tulkarem represent some of the most vibrant forms of struggle in the West Bank.

Above all, however, Palestinians challenge colonization through a culture of resistance known as *sumoud* (steadfastness)—the will to remain present rather than succumb to dispossession and displacement. The long-standing connection between Palestinians and their land has intensified in the face of colonization. The village of Beit Sakariya, located entirely in Area C, is surrounded on all sides by Israeli settlements. Settlers assault the residents on a daily basis, and the state refuses to allow the villagers to build homes, dig wells, or even use the speaker at the mosque. But the residents built a school without permission and defied the demolition order. "We have been kicked out of our lands by every way possible," says a resident of Beit Sakariya. "They refuse us access to water, they take our land, and they use other means to force us out. But my father refused to leave. Now I am on my land and I will protect it."²³⁸ In the western villages of Bethlehem, farmers continue planting their fields despite limited access to land, water, and markets. As an old man explains, "I don't make any money from my vegetables. But I continue to farm in order to defend the land."²³⁹ A handful of nongovernmental organizations help farmers rehabilitate land, plant trees, dig wells, and pave roads. Although Israeli authorities routinely issue demolition and stop work orders for these projects, the organizations and farmers rarely give up. According to one farmer, "When you cut five trees, I plant ten trees. Last year, we planted more than 1,000 trees."²⁴⁰

The 2011 revolutionary uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that sparked the "Arab Spring" also galvanized the Palestinian struggle. An emergent Palestinian youth movement began organizing creative forms of civil disobedience such as "freedom rides" to Jerusalem on settler busses and "protest villages" on land designated for settlement construction. Young Palestinian women have taken key leadership positions within this movement. Opposing the continuation of "security coordination" and negotiations between Israel and the

PA, the youth movement has revitalized the critique of the entire Oslo regime. Their protests often feature coffins representing the death of Oslo.²⁴¹

In September 2012, the occupied territories erupted in protests connected to the revolutionary uprisings in the Arab world. As in Tunisia, the protests began when a young, unemployed man in Gaza died after setting himself on fire. People took to the streets to demonstrate their anger at the high rates of unemployment, the rising cost of living, and the growing sense of hopelessness. Targeting the neoliberal policies of the PA, protesters organized marches, demonstrations, and a general strike that shut down the West Bank. Most called on Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to resign; others demanded that President Mahmoud Abbas step down as well. Yet the loudest chants of all echoed the revolutionary slogan of the Arab Spring: "*Al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam*" ("The people want the fall of the regime").²⁴² Although short-lived, the 2012 protests were widely regarded as dangerous crises for both Israel and the PA. In the words of a former PA spokesperson, "all of the factors that led to this volatile situation remain in effect. Whether the spark is political or economic, another blow-up is just around the corner."²⁴³

Much like the Palestinian poor in the occupied territories, poor Black South Africans confront extreme forms of marginalization. As I discussed in chapter two, neoliberalization combined with partial decolonization in South Africa has produced fragmented, surplus populations living precarious lives in conditions of concentrated abandonment. The principal difference in Palestine/Israel, of course, is that neoliberal projects are articulated with an ongoing Israeli colonial project. Concentrating the Palestinian population into neoliberal enclosures, however, has not produced a viable form of long-term rule. Efforts on the part of Israel and the PA to manage the crisis through employment-based pressure release projects have been no more successful at containing the struggles of the urban poor than the "developmental" Alexandra Renewal Project in South Africa. Although Palestinians and Black South Africans remain divided, the struggles of the poor create a constant crisis for the racial capitalist regimes. In both contexts, the wealthy and powerful have responded by developing advanced strategies of securitization to uphold their fragile systems. These strategies are the focus of the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 4

A Legalized Mafia: Security Privatization in Johannesburg

[The] imaginary body of the paranoid imaginings of suburban South Africa has lurked like a bogeyman at the periphery of this story for the past year. It is the threatening body, nameless and faceless, of an armed and dangerous black intruder.

ORFORD 2014

In early 2014, the murder trial of Oscar Pistorius turned a spotlight on the "paranoid imaginings of suburban South Africa."¹ As a young track star, Pistorius gained worldwide acclaim as the first athlete with two prosthetic limbs to medal at the World Championships and compete in the Olympics.² On February 14, 2013, Pistorius killed his girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, at his home in Pretoria. Late at night, he fired four rounds through the bathroom door, hitting Steenkamp three times and killing her instantly.

Prosecutors charged Pistorius with premeditated murder, arguing that he had a history of domestic violence and firearm abuse and that he killed Steenkamp during a jealous rage. The defense insisted that Pistorius awoke to sounds in the bathroom, feared a criminal intruder, felt vulnerable without his prosthetics, and fired in self-defense. Although race remained unspoken, the criminal in South Africa is always imagined as a Black male. The question before the court, therefore, was whether Pistorius knew he was shooting a white woman or thought he was shooting a Black man. If the latter, he could not be guilty of murder.³

The specter of the Black criminal lurked in the background of the trial, presenting itself when a forensic psychiatrist argued that Pistorius suffered from "generalized anxiety disorder" and lived in a secure housing estate due to fears about crime.⁴ By bringing fear into the courtroom, the defense opened a broader conversation about race, crime, and insecurity in postapartheid South Africa. Max du Preez, a journalist and author, offered an uncomfortable but not uncommon explanation for the racialized fear of crime: "It is tied in with the deep seated, subconscious feelings that we are the haves and the former

197. Interview with organizer from Wynberg Concerned Residents, August 2012.
198. Field notes from High Court proceedings, April 2005.
199. Interview with community organizer from Wynberg Concerned Residents, August 2012.
200. Interview with ARP acting director, August 2012.
201. Interview with community organizer from Marlboro, July 2012.
202. Interview with a local political leader, July 2012.
203. Interview with ARP director, March 2005.
204. Interview with community organizer from Marlboro, August 2012.
205. Interview with community organizer from Marlboro, August 2012.
206. Interview with community organizer from Marlboro, August 2012.
207. Interview with community organizer from Marlboro, August 2012.
208. Interview with an ARP official, August 2012.
209. Focus group discussion with the Alexandra Vukuzenzele Crisis Committee, August 2012.
210. Field notes from a meeting of the tenants, July 2012.
211. Focus group discussion with tenants of Extensions 9 and 10, July 2012; interview with a resident of Extension 9, July 2012.
212. Focus group discussion with tenants of Extensions 9 and 10, July 2012.
213. Interview with an ARP community liaison officer, July 2012.
214. Interview with an ARP community liaison officer, July 2012.
215. Field notes, July 2012.
216. Interview with a resident of Extension 9, July 2012.
217. Alexander 2010; Saul 2014; Shivambu 2014; Mbembe 2015; Pillay 2015.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Field notes, August 2005. The graffiti is no longer visible.
2. Haynes and Hutchison 2008.
3. Marcuse 1997; Wilson 1997; Wacquant 2008. For an alternative view, see Patullo 2003. See also the symposium on the “ghetto” in *City and Community* 7 (4) (2008).
4. Salamanca et al. 2012; Collins 2012.
5. Halper 2012. See also Davis 2006; Gilmore 2007; Sassen 2014.
6. Schölich 1982.
7. Katz 1998; Morrison 2004.
8. Katz 1998. For more on the interaction between the socialist Zionist settlements of *Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair* and Palestinian villagers, see Sabbagh-Khoury 2014.
9. Tamari 1999.
10. Morris 2004; Tamari 1999; Masalha 2012.
11. Gorenberg 2006.
12. Armstrong 1996, 391.
13. Plascov 1982.
14. Tamari 2009.
15. Lustick 1988; Friedman 1992.

16. Morrison 2004; Gorenberg 2006.
17. Lustick 1988; Morrison 2004.
18. Hilal 1976; Graham-Brown 1990; Samara 1992; Roy 1995.
19. From 1980 to 1984, Israel confiscated 800,000 dunums of Palestinian land in this way (B'Tselem 2002b). See also Shehadeh 1993.
20. Farsakh 2009; Hever 2010.
21. Field notes, September 2012.
22. Hiltermann 1991.
23. Field notes, September 2012. Interview with community organizer from Nahhalin, September 2012.
24. In 1987, the Israeli government appeased the settlers by building a 20-foot chain link fence around Dheisheh and controlling movement in and out of the camp with a revolving gate. See Hamzeh 2001.
25. Schiff and Ya'ari 1990; Hiltermann 1991; Lockman and Beinun 1989; Qumsiyeh 2011.
26. Abu-Amr 1994.
27. Schiff and Ya'ari 1990; Lockman and Beinun 1989.
28. For an overview of the district, see United Nations 2009. For profiles of each village, see the “Village Profiles” project of the Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem: <http://vprofile.arij.org>.
29. United Nations 2009.
30. News from Wilhin 1999a; van Teeffelen 2005.
31. Although the municipalities of Efrat and Beitar Illit are not under the jurisdiction of the Gush Etzion Regional Council, they are part of the Etzion settlement bloc.
32. Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem 2009.
33. Al-Haq 1984; B'Tselem 2004.
34. Weizman 2007; Gordon 2008.
35. Sorkin 2005; Backmann 2010.
36. B'Tselem 2003; Al-Haq 2006.
37. Hever 2010.
38. United Nations 2009.
39. Hilal 2010.
40. Field notes, August 2012.
41. Taraki 2008b; Rabie 2013.
42. Grinberg and Shafir 2000; Shalev 2000; Ram 2008.
43. Byrne 1997; Drori 2000.
44. Ellman and Laacher 2003; Rajman and Semyonov 2004; Drori 2009.
45. Halper 2012, 2015.
46. Samara 2000; Hanieh 2013.
47. Nakhleh 2012.
48. Early studies advocating neoliberal development in the occupied territories include World Bank 1993; Fischer et al. 1994.
49. Samara 2000, 21.
50. Nakhleh 2012; Hanieh 2013.
51. Khalidi and Samour 2011; Hanieh 2013; Haddad 2016.

52. Hanieh 2013, Dana 2014b.
53. Seikaly 2016.
54. Hammami 1995, 2000.
55. Hanafi and Tabar 2005; Nakhleh 2012.
56. Field notes, October 2012.
57. Farsakh 2009.
58. Palestinian Authority 2008; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Hanieh 2013; Rabie 2014.
59. Hanieh 2013.
60. Lakoff 2008.
61. Asali 2010.
62. Nakhleh 2012.
63. Nieuwhof 2008.
64. Field notes, September 2012.
65. International Labor Organization 2013.
66. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2014.
67. Lagerquist 2003; Hanieh 2013.
68. On the Bethlehem Industrial Estate, see <http://bmupbethlehem.com>.
69. Interview with a representative of the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry, October 2012.
70. Interview with a professor of tourism, Bethlehem University, September 2012.
71. Interviews with a professor of tourism at Bethlehem University, an official in the PA Ministry of Tourism, and tourism-oriented business owners, factory workers, and tour guides, September and October 2012.
72. Interview with an official of the PA Ministry of Tourism, September 2012.
73. Field notes from trying to rent a car, August 2012.
74. Field notes from meetings with Palestinian tourism businesses, September 2012.
75. Interview with an official of the PA Ministry of Tourism, September 2012.
76. Interview with an official of the PA Ministry of Tourism, September 2012.
77. Interview with a professor of tourism, Bethlehem University, September 2012.
78. Interview with an official of the PA Ministry of Tourism, September 2012.
79. Interview with a professor of tourism, Bethlehem University, September 2012.
80. Field notes from meetings with Palestinian tourism businesses, September 2012.
81. Interview with a Palestinian storeowner, September 2012.
82. Field notes from meetings with Palestinian handicraft industries, October 2012.
83. Field notes from meetings with Palestinian tourism businesses, September 2012.
84. Interview with a handicraft cooperative employee, September 2012.
85. Interview with olive wood factory employees, September 2012.
86. Interview with a Palestinian storeowner, September 2013.
87. Field notes, September 2012.
88. Interview with a handicraft cooperative employee, September 2012.
89. Interview with a tourism promotion consultant, October 2012.
90. Palestinian Authority 2002; Palestine Trade Center 2014.
91. United Nations 2009.
92. Interview with the owner of a large stonecutting factory in Bethlehem, September 2012. See also Union of Stone and Marble Industry 2011; Sherwood 2012; Cali and Maaari 2013.
93. Prusher 2000.
94. Prusher 2000; Palestine Trade Center 2014.
95. Bitterlemons 2008; Lunat 2010; Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre 2011.
96. Peck and Tickell 2002; Wacquant 2009; Peck 2010a.
97. Shenhav and Berda 2009; Berda 2006.
98. Farsakh 2009; Hanieh 2013.
99. Kav LaOved 2012; World Bank 2014.
100. Shenhav and Berda 2009; Berda 2006.
101. Field notes, September 2012.
102. Berda 2006.
103. Field notes, September 2012.
104. Berda 2006.
105. International Labor Organization 2013. See also Farsakh 2005.
106. Kav LaOved 2012.
107. Democracy and Workers' Rights Center 2011.
108. Foundation for Middle East Peace 1998.
109. Interview with a Palestinian economist at Birzeit University, October 2012.
110. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2014; World Bank 2014.
111. Hever 2013; Abu Amer 2015.
112. Wacquant 2009; Peck 2010b.
113. Field notes, September 2012.
114. Interview with a Palestinian economist at Birzeit University, October 2012.
115. Interview with a Palestinian economist in Ramallah, October 2012.
116. International Crisis Group 2010.
117. Interview with a Palestinian economist in Beit Sahour, October 2012.
118. Hammami 2004; Tawil-Souri 2009.
119. Hammami 2010.
120. Field notes, September 2012.
121. Interview with a Palestinian NGO in Aida refugee camp, September 2012.
122. Amiry 2010.
123. Kav LaOved 2012.
124. Palestinian men must be married with children and meet minimum age requirements that have recently fluctuated from twenty-four to thirty-five depending on the state of unrest and the demands of Israeli employers.
125. Field notes, August 2012.
126. Focus group with undocumented workers, September 2012.
127. B'Tselem 2002b.
128. Kav LaOved 2012.
129. Focus group with undocumented workers, September 2012.
130. Focus group with undocumented workers, September 2012.
131. Kav LaOved 2012.

192. Field notes, October 2012.
193. Protocol on Economic Relations 1994.
194. The one exception was during the second intifada, when the cost of living declined for Israelis but skyrocketed in the occupied territories due to Israeli restrictions on production, transportation, and imports as well as supply shortages and Palestinian monopolies. See Hever 2010.
195. Interview with a Fatah leader in Aida refugee camp, September 2012.
196. Hever 2010, 49.
197. Field notes, October 2013.
198. Hamieh 2013; Dana 2014b.
199. Interview with a Fatah leader from Aida refugee camp, September 2012.
140. Interviews with a grassroots organizer, an economist, and a NGO official, September and October 2012.
141. Interview with Fatah leader in Aida refugee camp, September 2012.
142. Interview with former PA Ministry of Finance official, October 2012.
143. In some villages that border Palestinian cities, such as Al-Khader, small sections of the village were also designated Area A. Even in these villages, however, the majority of land is in Area C.
144. For individual village profiles, see Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem website: "Village Profiles," <http://vprofile.arij.org>.
145. Heifetz-Yahav 2004.
146. The Oslo agreements stipulated that the PA could establish twenty-five police stations within Area B—yet the Israeli authorities have refused to permit the construction of most stations. One of the proposed police stations would have been in the village of Husan, west of Bethlehem. Israel rejected the proposal due to concerns settlers raised about encountering armed Palestinians on nearby roads. Interview with a member of the Husan village council, September 2012.
147. Field notes, September 2013.
148. Interview with an employee of the Nahhalin village council, September 2012.
149. Field notes, October 2012.
150. Abdelnour, Tartir, and Zurayk 2012.
151. Focus group discussion with Palestinian farmers in Al-Khader village, September 2012.
152. Interview with member of the JSCPD—West Rural Bethlehem, September 2012.
153. Interview with member of the JSCPD—West Rural Bethlehem, September 2012.
154. Interview with community leader in Beit Sakaniya village, September 2012.
155. Cali and Miazri 2013.
156. Sansour and Tartir 2014.
157. Sheladeh 1993; B'Tselem 2002b, 2010, 2013.
158. Field notes, September 2014.
159. Field notes, September and October 2012. See also B'Tselem 2008.
160. Interview with officials from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, September 2012.
161. Field notes, September 2012.
162. Field notes, September 2012.
163. Interview with officials from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, September 2012.
164. United Nations 2012.
165. For profiles of Al-Walaja, Al-Klader, and Artas, see Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem website: "Village Profiles," <http://vprofile.arij.org>.
166. B'Tselem 2008.
167. Interview with a Palestinian farmer from Nahhalin village, September 2012.
168. Interview with officials from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, September 2012.
169. Field notes, September 2012.
170. Field notes, September 2012.
171. Amnesty International 2009.
172. Al-Haq 2013b.
173. Field notes, September 2012 and September 2013. Interview with a Palestinian water engineer, October 2012.
174. Interview with a Palestinian water engineer, October 2012. See also Amnesty International 2009.
175. Interview with a Palestinian water engineer, October 2012.
176. Presentation by an advocate for Palestinian farmers, October 2012.
177. United Nations 2012.
178. Interview with farmer from Nahhalin village, September 2012; interview with member of the Wadi Fukin village council, September 2012.
179. Interview with officials from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, September 2012.
180. Interview with member of the Wadi Fukin village council, September 2012.
181. Field notes, September 2012.
182. Focus group discussion with farmers from Al-Khader village, September 2012.
183. Interview with official from the Bethlehem Municipality, October 2012.
184. Palestinian Farming and Civil Society Organizations 2013.
185. Interview with an official from the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry, October 2012.
186. Palestinian Farming and Civil Society Organizations 2013.
187. Lustick 1988.
188. Nir 2011; Al-Haq 2013a; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015.
189. B'Tselem 2001, 2002a; Al-Haq 2013a.
190. Wolfe 2006, 392.
191. Byman and Sachs 2012.
192. Interview with the driver, September 2012.
193. Interview with the driver, September 2012.
194. Weizman 2007.
195. Field notes, September 2012 and September 2013.
196. Field notes, October 2012.
197. Keren Navot 2013.
198. B'Tselem 2013.
199. Interview with member of the JSCPD—West Rural Bethlehem, September 2012.
200. Interview with community organizer from Wadi Fukin village, September 2012.
201. Focus group discussion with Palestinian farmers in Al-Khader village, September 2012.
202. Field notes, September 2012.

CHAPTER FOUR

203. Field notes, October 2012.
 204. Yaser 2015.
 205. Focus group discussion with Palestinian farmers in Al-Khader village, September 2012.
 206. Interview with resident of Husan village, September 2012.
 207. Interview with a community organizer, September 2012.
 208. Amiry 2010.
 209. Focus group discussion with undocumented workers, September 2012.
 210. Focus group discussion with undocumented workers, September 2012. For a similar dynamic along the US-Mexico border, see Rosas 2006.
 211. Interview with a community organizer in Bethlehem, September 2012.
 212. Field notes, September 2012.
 213. Field notes, September 2012.
 214. Al-Haq 2006.
 215. Interview with organizer for a Palestinian farmers' union, October 2012.
 216. Binkom 2008; B'Tselem 2010.
 217. Hass 2012.
 218. Algazi 2009; Blau 2012.
 219. Several 2011; Blau and Hasson 2016.
 220. Blau 2012.
 221. Blau 2012.
 222. Hasson 2010.
 223. Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem 2012; B'Tselem 2013.
 224. Interview with community leader in Al-Khader village, September 2012.
 225. Interview with a resident of Al-Khader village, September 2013; presentation by a Palestinian farmer from Nahhalin village, October 2012.
 226. Field notes, September 2012. See also Ma'an News 2012.
 227. Binkom 2008; Hass 2012.
 228. Focus group discussion with farmers from Al-Khader village, September 2012.
 229. For more on settlement construction and capital accumulation, see Algazi 2009.
 230. Interview with a refugee rights organizer in Bethlehem, September 2012.
 231. Honig-Parnass and Haddad 2007.
 232. Qumsiyeh 2011.
 233. For more on fatalities, see the B'Tselem "Fatalities before Operation Cast Lead" webpage: <http://www.btsdem.org/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event>.
 234. For details, see reports by Shirabe Yamada: <http://oznik.com/news/020307.html> #Shirabe and <http://oznik.com/shirabe/020312.html>.
 235. Medalia 2007.
 236. Raheb 2004.
 237. Barghouti 2011.
 238. Field notes, September 2012.
 239. Field notes, September 2012.
 240. Presentation by a Palestinian farmer from Nahhalin village, October 2012.
 241. Interviews with Palestinian youth activists, September 2013.
242. Field notes, September 2012.
 243. Khaub 2012.
1. Orford 2014.
 2. Pistorius 2012.
 3. Wiener and Bateman 2014.
 4. Germaner 2014.
 5. Quoted in Serino 2014.
 6. In July 2016, a judge sentenced Pistorius to six years in prison for murder. At the time this book went to press, prosecutors were appealing the sentence as too lenient.
 7. Fanon 1967 [1952]; Hall et al. 2013 [1978].
 8. See Hugo (1988) for survey research on anxieties about the future in late apartheid South Africa.
 9. Greenberg 2004; Southall 2007; Von Holdt 2013.
 10. Mbembe 2015.
 11. Field notes from the meeting of a residents' association, June 2012.
 12. Segal, Pelo, and Rampa 2001; Shaw 2002; Steinberg 2004. For historical background, see Van Onselen 1984.
 13. Desai 2002; Ngwane 2003; McKinley and Naidoo 2004; Shivambu 2014; Pillay 2015.
 14. Albekker 2007; Herrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby 2010; South African Police Service 2013.
 15. Steinberg 1999; Shaw 2002; Dirisuweit 2002; Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002.
 16. South African Police Service 2013. See Burger, Gould, and Newham (2010) for a critical analysis of SAPS crime statistics.
 17. Statistics South Africa 2012.
 18. Comaroff and Comaroff 2006.
 19. Mistry 2004; Louw 2006; Harris and Radaelli 2007; Burger, Gould, and Newham 2010; Statistics South Africa 2012; Govender 2013.
 20. Shaw and Louw 1998; Steinberg 1999; Shaw 2002; Dirisuweit 2002; Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002; Lemanski 2004; Statistics South Africa 2012.
 21. Field notes, June 2012.
 22. Interview with the chair of a residents' association, June 2012.
 23. Seekings 1995; Steinberg 2001b; Dirisuweit 2002; Lemanski 2004; Samara 2011; Hudson 2012; Henkemen 2013.
 24. Interview with the chair of a residents' association, July 2005; interview with a member of a residents' association, July 2005. See also Statistics South Africa 2012.
 25. Fanon 1952.
 26. Shaw 2002.
 27. Shaw 2002.
 28. Laufer 2001; Shaw 2002; Singh 2008; Steinberg 2008; Samara 2011.
 29. Samara 2003; Singh 2008; Steinberg 2011.