

PA, the youth movement has revitalized the critique of the entire Oslo regime. Their protests often feature coffins representing the death of Oslo.²⁴¹

In September 2012, the occupied territories erupted in protests connected to the revolutionary uprisings in the Arab world. As in Tunisia, the protests began when a young, unemployed man in Gaza died after setting himself on fire. People took to the streets to demonstrate their anger at the high rates of unemployment, the rising cost of living, and the growing sense of hopelessness. Targeting the neoliberal policies of the PA, protesters organized marches, demonstrations, and a general strike that shut down the West Bank. Most called on Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to resign; others demanded that President Mahmoud Abbas step down as well. Yet the loudest chants of all echoed the revolutionary slogan of the Arab Spring: "*Al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam*" ("The people want the fall of the regime").²⁴² Although short-lived, the 2012 protests were widely regarded as dangerous crises for both Israel and the PA. In the words of a former PA spokesperson, "all of the factors that led to this volatile situation remain in effect. Whether the spark is political or economic, another blow-up is just around the corner."²⁴³

Much like the Palestinian poor in the occupied territories, poor Black South Africans confront extreme forms of marginalization. As I discussed in chapter two, neoliberalization combined with partial decolonization in South Africa has produced fragmented, surplus populations living precarious lives in conditions of concentrated abandonment. The principal difference in Palestine/Israel, of course, is that neoliberal projects are articulated with an ongoing Israeli colonial project. Concentrating the Palestinian population into neoliberal enclosures, however, has not produced a viable form of long-term rule. Efforts on the part of Israel and the PA to manage the crisis through employment-based pressure release projects have been no more successful at containing the struggles of the urban poor than the "developmental" Alexandra Renewal Project in South Africa. Although Palestinians and Black South Africans remain divided, the struggles of the poor create a constant crisis for the racial capitalist regimes. In both contexts, the wealthy and powerful have responded by developing advanced strategies of securitization to uphold their fragile systems. These strategies are the focus of the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 4

A Legalized Mafia: Security Privatization in Johannesburg

[T]he imaginary body of the paranoid imaginings of suburban South Africa has lurked like a bogeyman at the periphery of this story for the past year. It is the threatening body; nameless and faceless, of an armed and dangerous black intruder.

ORFORD 2014

In early 2014, the murder trial of Oscar Pistorius turned a spotlight on the "paranoid imaginings of suburban South Africa."²⁴¹ As a young track star, Pistorius gained worldwide acclaim as the first athlete with two prosthetic limbs to medal at the World Championships and compete in the Olympics.² On February 14, 2013, Pistorius killed his girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, at his home in Pretoria. Late at night, he fired four rounds through the bathroom door, hitting Steenkamp three times and killing her instantly.

Prosecutors charged Pistorius with premeditated murder, arguing that he had a history of domestic violence and firearm abuse and that he killed Steenkamp during a jealous rage. The defense insisted that Pistorius awoke to sounds in the bathroom, feared a criminal intruder, felt vulnerable without his prosthetics, and fired in self-defense. Although race remained unspoken, the criminal in South Africa is always imagined as a Black male. The question before the court, therefore, was whether Pistorius knew he was shooting a white woman or thought he was shooting a Black man. If the latter, he could not be guilty of murder.³

The specter of the Black criminal lurked in the background of the trial, presenting itself when a forensic psychiatrist argued that Pistorius suffered from "generalized anxiety disorder" and lived in a secure housing estate due to fears about crime.⁴ By bringing fear into the courtroom, the defense opened a broader conversation about race, crime, and insecurity in postapartheid South Africa. Max du Preez, a journalist and author, offered an uncomfortable but not uncommon explanation for the racialized fear of crime: "It is tied in with the deep seated, subconscious feelings that we are the haves and the former

oppressors . . . and you expect the people who have been oppressed to come back for us.”⁵

Yet prosecutors, pundits, and politicians rarely challenged the premise of the defense that fear invalidates murder. Nor did they question the popularity of privatized violence in fortified enclaves as a strategy to address elite insecurities and confront the racialized specter of crime. Initially, fear proved sufficient grounds for the judge to reject a murder conviction. In 2015, however, an appeals judge upgraded the conviction from culpable homicide to premeditated murder.⁶

In postapartheid South Africa, pockets of wealth and power exist in close proximity to concentrations of racialized poverty. In northern Johannesburg, the affluent neighborhoods around Sandton—just across the M1 Highway from Alexandra—have become laboratories for the development of advanced strategies for securing the powerful and policing poor Black South Africans. This chapter begins with a discussion of crime and insecurity in South Africa and an overview of policing in the postapartheid state. It then traces the fortification of elite white suburbs and the emergence of privatized security regimes. The most sophisticated new strategies of privatized policing operate through a form of “low intensity guerrilla warfare” that targets young Black men. Yet strategies to produce security for the elite are contentious and rely on the labor of the same people they target: poor Black men. This highlights the continuing value of surplus populations—as a source of low-wage labor and as a symbolic threat fueling the expansion of private security industries and fortress suburbs.

CRIME AND (IN) SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The insecurities of the South African elite are rooted in the history of racial capitalism and colonial settlement. Three hundred fifty years of colonial expansion, dispossession, exploitation, and racism consolidated wealth and power for the white minority, but also engendered deep anxieties (see chapter one). These fears transformed displacement and dispossession from the foundations of white rule into the violent desires of the African population. By turning the Black male into a “phobogenic object”—the source of white anxiety—racialized threat discourses provided justification for apartheid policies and tools for policing the crisis of white minority rule.⁷

In postapartheid South Africa, the nightmare scenarios animating white fears about a Black government have not materialized.⁸ Rather, the ANC government has maintained a commitment to reconciliation, nonracialism, private property, and capitalism. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) enabled the perpetrators of apartheid to receive amnesty by acknowledging

their role in human rights abuses. And the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and “willing-seller, willing-buyer” programs have helped consolidate a new Black elite without threatening existing wealth or patterns of accumulation.⁹ In the words of Achille Mbembe, “This is the only country on Earth in which a revolution took place which resulted in not one single former oppressor losing anything.”¹⁰

Nevertheless, the transition has failed to alleviate the sense of insecurity. In part, this is because the state no longer exists to ensure the wealth and power of the white minority. Many white South Africans bemoan affirmative action as “reverse racism,” and elites fear that the government will expropriate their property. Indeed, the example of Zimbabwe looms large.¹¹ Moreover, by making life increasingly precariousness for the Black poor, neoliberalization has contributed to the emergence of illicit markets for stolen cars and other merchandise. Stealing from the white elite is popularly described as “redistribution”—making explicit the political character of crime in postapartheid South Africa.¹² In addition, poor South Africans have resisted marginalization by demanding redistribution, decommodification, and decolonization.¹³ South African elites—white and Black—remain committed to the postapartheid political and economic system. To the extent that the new regime faces a crisis, so too do the ruling classes.

The specter of Black crime has become a focal point for many of these race and class anxieties. Violent crimes and property crimes are a grim reality in postapartheid South Africa. Official statistics demonstrate that South Africa has some of the highest rates in the world of murder, rape, sexual assault, robbery, and burglary.¹⁴ Unsurprisingly, the poor Black population is disproportionately affected by crime.¹⁵ Statistics released by the South African Police Service demonstrate that the rates of most crimes peaked by 2003 and have fallen steadily since that time. But rape and sexual assault have not decreased substantially and home robbery increased until 2009 and has only fallen slightly since that time.¹⁶ Surveys of South Africans reveal that burglary and home robbery are seen as not only the most common but also the most feared crimes in the country.¹⁷ Indeed, home invasions are highly traumatic—especially when they involve bodily injury or sexual assault. Fears about crime in South Africa thus have a strong material foundation.

Yet, as Jean and John Comaroff observe, there is an obsession with crime statistics in South Africa that intensifies the perception of danger.¹⁸ They point to the widespread tendency to disbelieve statistics demonstrating a decrease in crime. Despite the steady decline in most crime rates from the late 1990s onward, the fear of crime continued to rise.¹⁹ Until recently, victim of crime

surveys suggested that anxiety about crime varied inversely with the actual risk of violence. Africans were disproportionately affected by violent crime but expressed the least fear of violence; whites and Asians were least affected but expressed the greatest fear. That seems to be changing in the most recent surveys.²⁰

The heightened sense of vulnerability stems from the centrality of race to discourses about crime. Crime stories circulate rapidly through the public sphere, invariably portraying the perpetrator as a "Black male." In the neighborhoods around Sandton, many affluent white residents imagine the nearby township of Alexandra as a nightmare of concentrated criminality and a springboard for attacks on white wealth.²¹ The primacy of race in discourses about crime is evident in the explicit use of racial profiling by police and private security companies. It is also clear in the discomfort expressed by white residents about wealthy Black families moving into historically white neighborhoods.²² Class, gender, and age also shape the discourse. The principal targets of policing are working-class Black male youth; working-class Black women—especially domestic workers—are also intensely policed.

Reanimating the colonial specter of blackness, crime discourses in post-apartheid South Africa concentrate popular anxieties on the menacing figure of the "Black male criminal."²³ In doing so, they provide an outlet for racial and class anxieties rooted in history and exacerbated by the demise of the old regime, the expansion of racialized poverty, and the resurgence of popular struggles. Of course, anxiety about crime is not omnipresent, and some affluent South Africans recognize crime as a product of poverty and inequality.²⁴ Nevertheless, the discourse of Black criminality demonstrates that the Black male remains a "phobic object" in postapartheid South Africa.²⁵ This discourse provides justification for the fortification of wealthy neighborhoods and the development of privatized policing strategies.

POLICING TRANSFORMATION

Under apartheid, the South African police protected the interests of the white minority. Of all police stations, 75 percent were located in white areas. In Black areas, the police did little more than repress dissent and administer discriminatory policies.²⁶ In addition, apartheid—itsself a crime—spawned crime in Black communities through enforced poverty, dislocation, displacement, and repression. Rather than combating this crime, the South African police merely ensured that it did not spill over into white areas.²⁷ With the end of apartheid,

these containment mechanisms collapsed and white South Africans experienced an increase in crime.

The South African transition has produced two shifts in policing. First, the ANC government oversaw a process of police reform. The new South African Police Service (SAPS) redistributed police resources to more equitably serve the entire population and began prioritizing crime prevention and community policing.²⁸ Recognizing the social roots of crime, the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) emphasized environmental design, educational campaigns, community involvement, and access to the criminal justice system.²⁹ For the first time ever, the South African police began responding to calls from Black South Africans and addressing concerns about crime in Black neighborhoods.³⁰

By 1998, however, the government had begun to replace crime prevention with a more repressive approach to crime.³¹ Although officially a response to rising crime rates, the shift corresponded with a broader reorientation of ANC policy toward neoliberal orthodoxy. Promising to "deal with criminals in the same way a dog deals with a bone," the SAPS launched crackdown operations as part of a new "war on crime."³² Militarized troops began to cordon off neighborhoods, stop vehicles, search pedestrians, and raid buildings.³³

The SAPS now do the "dirty work of democracy," investigating criminal syndicates, arresting and interrogating suspects, and repressing dissent.³⁴ With a reputation for ineptitude, corruption, and violence, their principal targets are poor Black men, vulnerable Black women, Black youth, and African immigrants.³⁵ Moreover, as demonstrated by the massacre of thirty-four striking mine workers at Marikana in August 2012, the SAPS is willing to use deadly force to suppress the struggles of the Black poor.³⁶

Along with police reform, the South African transition led to the privatization of policing. Private security has been the fastest growing industry in the country since the late 1980s.³⁷ The expansion of private security stems from the combination of growing inequality, racialized poverty, anxiety about crime, distrust in the SAPS, and neoliberal faith in the private sector. Over the last twenty years, private security companies have entered fields previously reserved for the police. In the neighborhoods around Sandton, private security companies have taken the lead in developing advanced security regimes.

Private security has a long history in South Africa.³⁸ For decades, private companies provided protection for banks, mines, and other businesses. During the 1980s, the apartheid regime used private security companies as fronts for the illegal trade in weapons, ivory, and diamonds. And after 1994,

former members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and its allied paramilitary units took their counterinsurgency experiences into the private sector.³⁹

Since the early 1990s, the growth of the private security industry has been driven by demand for residential security services. With a heightened sense of vulnerability to crime, affluent residents began fortifying their homes and enclosing their neighborhoods.⁴⁰ They hired private security companies to install and monitor alarm systems and send "armed rapid response" units in case of intrusion. Private security companies now sell a wide range of services and technologies to anxious residents with money to spend.

The private security industry boasts more officers, more weapons, and more advanced technology than the South African police. Private security companies employ 480,000 registered security officers, whereas the SAPS employs just 150,000 uniformed officers.⁴¹ Similarly, private security companies have more firearms, armored vehicles, high-speed cars, tracking devices, and surveillance equipment than the police.⁴² In Gauteng province, for instance, the SAPS emergency response unit has thirty to forty vehicles whereas private security companies have five to six hundred vehicles.⁴³

To attract and maintain clients, private security companies manipulate the racialized anxieties of the elite. Some have even been accused of facilitating criminal activities to amplify fear and generate business.⁴⁴ According to the manager of a private security company, one thing the industry sells is fear. He points out that the market in vehicle security emerged largely because "fear of [car] hijacking has already been sold. A person sees a Black man next to their car door, they get out and they've got their hands up. . . . They've literally been sold this fear."⁴⁵ The business also depends on displacing rather than preventing crime. Security professionals admit that most companies welcome high crime rates and see displacement as a way to attract new clients.⁴⁶ When residents in one area develop a new security initiative or intensify their fortifications, a security manager argues, "the area next door experiences more crime and then we go to that area."⁴⁷

Although small security firms carve out specialized niches within local and regional markets, the industry is dominated by large South African (such as Protea Coin and Bidvest) and multinational corporations (such as Securitas, G4S, and ADT/Tyco). Now owned by Tyco International, ADT is the largest residential security company in the country. ADT boasts 450,000 clients in South Africa—nine times more than the next largest company—and more than 4,000 employees in the Johannesburg region alone.⁴⁸

These privatized armed forces play an increasingly important role in urban governance.⁴⁹ While the SAPS maintain a heavy presence in Black townships such as Alexandra, private security companies prioritize the neighborhoods of the elite. They operate along the lines of a protection racket: enhancing fear and selling security. "We are a legalized vigilante service," the director of a large security firm told residents at a meeting in northern Johannesburg. "We are a legalized mafia. You pay us and we give you protection."⁵⁰ Although "legalized" rackets whose existence is accepted by the state, these companies maintain powerful armed forces that help govern fortified territories. The most advanced companies are developing sophisticated security regimes that promote the fragmentation of urban governance and the decentralization of sovereignty.

THE FORTIFICATION OF THE NORTHERN SUBURBS

The neighborhoods around Sandton in northern Johannesburg are home to the South African elite. Established in 1969, Sandton quickly attracted upscale residential and commercial developments and became the wealthiest white municipality in the Johannesburg region.⁵¹ During the 1990s, Sandton and other white suburbs were incorporated into the city of Johannesburg along with Black townships like Soweto and Alexandra. With the end of formal apartheid, downtown Johannesburg and other parts of the city gained a reputation for danger due to rapid urbanization, rising crime rates, and the racialized discourse of crime. Many businesses left the inner city and relocated to Sandton, which became the most important commercial and financial center in Johannesburg.⁵² Simultaneously, South African elites transformed the high-end residential neighborhoods around Sandton into fortified enclaves and laboratories of securitization. Despite their formal incorporation into Johannesburg, these neighborhoods are still popularly known as the "northern suburbs."

The fortification of the "suburbs" involves a complex rearticulation of race and class. Because of the changing racial composition of the elite, a handful of wealthy Black families have moved into the northern suburbs.⁵³ Black elites share many concerns with their white neighbors; they surround their homes with walls and hire private security companies for protection. In addition, many residents in the northern suburbs have adopted a color-blind language and no longer identify their neighborhoods using explicitly racial terms. Instead, they discuss their neighborhoods using racial/class notions about property, lifestyle, and civility.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, community leaders explain that the presence of even a few Black families is "very unnerving" for many white



FIGURE 4.1. Fortified suburbs of Johannesburg

residents.⁵⁵ And the membership and leadership of every residents' association I interviewed was almost entirely white. Wealthy white residents are therefore driving the development of privatized security regimes, and the fortified northern suburbs remain "white spaces."⁵⁶

Like many South Africans, residents of the northern suburbs do not fully trust the SAPS. This is partially due to concerns—encouraged by private security companies—that the new government either cannot or will not protect the white elite. "You can forget about the police in this country," explains a white woman in a neighborhood near Sandton.⁵⁷ "We simply don't trust them," says her friend.⁵⁸ One resident offers a more subtle analysis. "The guys on the ground are pretty dedicated," he explains. "They take bullets for us if they have to. But they fight crime with one hand tied behind their back because they're always short of resources."⁵⁹

Increasingly concerned about crime but unwilling to trust the police, affluent South Africans have fortified their suburbs and turned to private security companies for protection. Fortification began during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when middle- and upper-class South Africans started replacing the wooden fences around their homes with concrete walls.⁶⁰ Over time, they have extended these walls and added metal spikes, razor wire, security cameras,

motion sensors, and other weaponized accessories. At the same time, gated communities have become the most popular trend for new housing construction: clusters of townhouses for the middle-class and exclusive golf estates for the elite. In South Africa, the defensive impulse to withdraw behind walls is referred to as the "*laager* mentality" in reference to the nineteenth-century *voortrekker* strategy of circling the wagons during battle.⁶¹

The assumption that criminals target the most vulnerable has generated a cycle of intensifying fortification, as neighbors try to outdo one another by building more formidable walls and installing more sophisticated access control systems. In the words of South African investigative journalist Jonny Steinberg, "The security market thrives on the blind necessity of these cascading defenses. It offers more and more, knowing that its clients must take and take."⁶²

Mobilizing elite insecurities, private security companies profit from the fortification of the suburbs. They market the latest developments in perimeter security (razor mesh wires, electrical coils, galvanized steel fencing); access control (security doors, fingerprint scanners, facial recognition); detection and verification devices (alarm systems, motion-detection beams, video



FIGURE 4.2. Laager urbanism



FIGURE 4.3. Perimeter security and armed response

verification); and internal security (retractable security doors, safe rooms, smoke screens, and other disorientation devices).⁶³ The newest trend in home security involves a do-it-yourself approach in which homeowners can monitor their own properties through live video feeds to their cell phones.⁶⁴

Along with technology, private companies sell a range of residential security services. The basic service involves installing and monitoring an alarm system. But the most important market is for "armed response" services.⁶⁵ Private security companies deploy teams of security officers who sit in their vehicles waiting for alarms, panic buttons, and emergency calls. In neighborhoods with sufficient clients, armed response units are always nearby and often respond in less than two minutes.⁶⁶ But profits depend on a careful calculation of the

distribution of clients, the geography of crime, and the cost of salaries and vehicles. Residents often complain that response times decline as companies expand to new neighborhoods.⁶⁷

Residential security, therefore, began as a highly individualized market in which homeowners hired private companies to build perimeter walls, install and monitor alarms, and deploy armed response teams. In the mid- to late 1990s, some neighborhoods began supplementing these individual services with collective security initiatives. The process was driven by residents' associations (RAs), voluntary organizations made up of residents in particular neighborhoods.

According to a local councilor in the northern suburbs, "there has been a paradigm shift from relying on council to provide services to relying on residents to provide for themselves."⁶⁸ In a context of neoliberal restructuring, RAs use voluntary contributions to supplement city services. Some fill pot-holes or plant flowers in medians. In the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, their principal activity involves the development and management of collective security initiatives.

In the mid-1990s, dozens of RAs in Johannesburg enclosed their neighborhoods with fences and gates. Some requested permission from the city to close roads, but most erected gates without the city's permission. In defiance of the law, RAs closed roads, hired private security companies to monitor boom gates, and dared the city to remove the closures.⁶⁹ By 2002, over three hundred roads had been closed in Johannesburg, although only seventy-nine applications had been filed and only twenty-three had been approved.⁷⁰ Since that time, the city and the RAs have fought an ongoing battle over the constitutionality of road closures. This contest demonstrates the contentious relationships between private sector security forces and the state.

The road closures initiated two major transformations in the market for security services: collective bargaining and preventive security.⁷¹ Whereas individual households never had leverage to bargain with their service providers, RAs negotiated collectively for an agreement that would cover the entire neighborhood.⁷² Collective security initiatives emerged in closed neighborhoods because the gates provided a simple mechanism for monitoring and regulating movement through public space. With the power of collective bargaining, RAs began asserting a more central role in local governance.⁷³ Their principal demand was that private security companies work to *prevent* crime, rather than just responding after the fact.⁷⁴

The philosophy underlying preventive security is that crime originates in public space while existing security arrangements focus on private space. The

problem, explains a security professional, is that "public space was ownerless. Nobody was watching it."⁷⁵ Hoping to prevent crime, therefore, residents' associations began hiring security companies to establish private "ownership" over public space.

With an eye to prevention, security companies began deploying guards to monitor access gates and patrol the closed neighborhoods. Security teams drive through the streets of gated neighborhoods, watching for "suspicious" behavior and hoping that their presence will prevent crime—or at least displace it to a neighborhood that has not yet purchased coverage. The number of patrols in a neighborhood depends on the negotiated contract and the specific demands of the residents' association. Residents insist that the gates and preventive security arrangements have helped reduce crime and increase property values, an assessment shared by insurance companies that now offer discounts to residents in closed neighborhoods.⁷⁶

The development of preventive security has rescaled and fragmented white space. The apartheid state organized security at the municipal scale by officially designating entire cities as white space and policing Black movement. Privatized collective security regimes, on the other hand, are organized at the neighborhood scale. Each residents' association works with a private company to design and operate a localized security initiative. As a result, the northern suburbs of Johannesburg are now governed through a fragmented patchwork of security regimes that incorporate the police but are driven by private sector forces.

At an outdoor RA meeting in 2005, the manager of a private security company kept a close watch on every Black person who walked past. He was there to discuss security and encourage the association to renew his company's contract. On the four occasions when Black men or women walked by the park, his gaze conspicuously followed their every movement—even when an African woman walked by with a white baby in a stroller.⁷⁷ The manager was demonstrating to an entirely white audience that he understood their anxieties about Black people in "their" neighborhood. As the same manager explained at another meeting that year: "It's not like the old South Africa. Everybody has the right to walk down the street. Everyone has the right to be anywhere. If we see somebody who looks suspicious, we can't go up to them and ask them what they're doing there. This makes our job much more difficult."⁷⁸

By 2012, however, the rules had changed considerably. The power of RAs in gated neighborhoods set the stage for the emergence of an even more sophisticated private security strategy in the northern suburbs. Recognizing the success of collective bargaining in gated neighborhoods, residents' associations in

suburbs without gates began working with private security companies to develop preventive security schemes for open neighborhoods.⁷⁹ These schemes represent the latest frontier in privatized securitization.

PREVENTIVE SECURITY: INFLUX CONTROL FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

In the early 2000s, the city of Johannesburg began challenging the use of road closures as a strategy of collective fortification. Although residents' associations prevented the removal of existing enclosures, the city clamped down on new road closures. In response, RAs and private security companies began developing new strategies to fortify neighborhoods without gates. These strategies are the most advanced approaches to privatized preventive security in Johannesburg. Formally acknowledging freedom of movement yet targeting Black bodies, they constitute an updated form of "influx control." They mobilize visibility, violence, community, and information to keep out the unwanted. Yet they remain business initiatives grounded in the profit motive.

Influx Control

Privatized approaches to preventive security have redesigned "influx control" for a neoliberal age. Like under apartheid, preventive security companies seek to regulate access to white space and displace crime to other areas. Yet these operations are complicated by formal legal equality. As I noted above, a security manager explained in 2005 that the freedom of movement prevents security officers from stopping people on the streets to question them. In 2012, a security professional explained the latest strategies for preventive security: "People have the right to be anywhere, but we have the right to make it as uncomfortable as possible for them to be in our neighborhoods."⁸⁰ While acknowledging equality, therefore, preventive security companies operate through a loophole.

Although complicated by the postapartheid discourse of color blindness, privatized approaches to "influx control" rely on racial profiling. A white resident who helped develop the security initiative for her RA explains that, "You never say 'Black male' because Blacks are sensitive. You only say male—unless it is a white male, then you say 'white male.'"⁸¹ Yet the managers and employees of several security companies admitted to me that the definition of "suspicious" is quite simple: two Black males. Whenever security officers come across two Black males in their area of operations, they are instructed

to stop and question them.⁸² In the language of the security companies, Black males are often referred to as “Bravos”—military terminology that identifies Black males as potential threats or enemies while avoiding explicitly racialized language.⁸³

Some residents concede that racial profiling is unfortunate. “I understand why Black guys, young Black guys would resent it,” explains one white resident. “I would too if I were an innocent young Black guy walking with a couple of my friends and suddenly I get stopped by these two guys saying ‘What are you doing here?’”⁸⁴ Such voices are often described as naive. The leader of a residents’ association explains that, “One has to put a bit of a racial profile on it, in order to get the guards to be able to identify positively what is a threat and what is not a threat.”⁸⁵ Another RA leader agrees: “Our approach has been, if they are not doing anything wrong, then they won’t mind; if they are, then they will.”⁸⁶

Although the owners and managers of private security companies are predominantly white, almost all of the security guards and rapid response teams are Black—not to mention the construction crews that build the walls ever higher. In addition, most suburban residents employ Black landscapers and domestic workers. Although people may trust their own domestic workers, stories about burglaries often involve facilitation by a treacherous Black cook, gardener, or security guard. The presence of Black workers in the suburbs is therefore absolutely necessary but carefully regulated. In 2014, a suburb of Cape Town issued “Green Cards” to Black workers employed in the area so that security officers could determine who had legitimate reasons to be in the area.⁸⁷ Although many people denounced this revival of apartheid-era pass laws, the Cape Town suburb merely formalized the procedures that operate informally throughout the northern neighborhoods of Johannesburg.

Low Intensity Guerrilla Warfare

In Johannesburg, security companies have developed a relatively coherent set of procedures to regulate access and displace crime. Although different companies sell different services, all preventive security operations in the northern suburbs rely on four pillars: visibility, violence, community, and information. In the words of one professional, preventive security involves “low intensity guerilla warfare.”⁸⁸

The first pillar of preventive security is *visibility*. Rather than sitting in one location like armed response units, preventive security teams actively patrol the neighborhood to create a visible presence. The explicit goal is to make sure

that anyone considering criminal activity feels the gaze of the security officers. But visibility strategies also seek to make the neighborhood a hostile space for anyone deemed undesirable.

Vehicles marked with the logo of the security company monitor streets leading in and out of the area as well as parks, riverbeds, and other “criminogenic” locations. Based on the “broken windows” argument that minor signs of disorder invite more serious crimes, they target the homeless, the poor, “vagrants, scavengers, and recyclers,” and people who generally appear “out of place.”⁸⁹ Security teams stop and question people engaged in “suspicious” activities: sitting in parked cars, selling brooms door to door, marking gates with chalk, or piling pebbles on a sidewalk.⁹⁰ They visit construction sites to question workers, check their papers, and take their photographs. They follow vehicles, drive alongside pedestrians, and respond to reports of “suspicious” people or activities. And when they come across two or more Black men—either on foot or in a vehicle—they stop them, search their belongings, and inquire about their reasons for being in the area. If the “suspects” cannot provide sufficient justification for their presence, the security teams “escort” them out of the area.⁹¹

Offering to demonstrate the process of removal, a middle-class white resident explains, “We are having trouble with people who just sit on the verge [curb], waiting for employers to pick them up. They leave their rubbish all over the place.” Driving down the street, she points to several African men sitting on the corner. “When I pass this corner,” she tells me, “I scream at them and call the security vehicle.” She then proceeds to do just that. While dialing, she opens her window and shouts, “You are damaging my plants again. Please don’t sit on that corner.” She then instructs the call center operator: “Please remove these guys from the corner. They are littering.” When I ask whether the security officers are effective, she says, “It’s not easy. They abuse them but they’re back the next day.”⁹²

A senior security manager acknowledges that these practices are not always about security. His units are encouraged to stop and question “scrap merchants” and “dustbin men”—people who dig through rubbish bins for valuable items. “Hordes of dirty, poor people make clean people behind walls very uncomfortable—but they are not the problem,” he explains. “There are elements of class fear and class snobbery and elements of racial fear and racial snobbery. But this is not a real security issue.”⁹³ Nevertheless, private security officers—like the police—target young Black men who appear poor and unemployed.⁹⁴

Along with visibility, preventive security operations rest on a foundation of *violence*. The cornerstone of every operation is the “tactical unit,” advertised as more experienced, better trained, and more heavily armed than “armed



FIGURE 4-4. Tactical patrols and preventive security

response" teams. Security managers claim to recruit people with high-level military experience—often with 32 Battalion in Angola,⁹⁵ Koevoet in Namibia,⁹⁶ or the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Somalia. "Originally, our team was purely military," says one senior manager. "All the guys had fought, were basically mercenaries."⁹⁷ Some companies also hire Black South Africans who "know the area" and "can engage in the local languages."⁹⁸ The problem with new recruits, says a manager, is that they "just don't have experience getting shot at."⁹⁹ So the companies provide advanced training¹⁰⁰ based on urban warfare tactics¹⁰¹ in order to prepare their teams for suburban policing.

Preventive security relies on the ability of the tactical units to convey—to customers and targets alike—that they are prepared to use any means necessary to prevent crime in the neighborhoods they have been hired to protect.¹⁰¹ Intimidation is the key. Whereas armed response requires only one person in a small car or light truck, tactical units deploy two-man teams in large black trucks. The units openly display weapons, often semiautomatic rifles and shotguns. One manager admits that the only reason his vehicles display a shotgun is "because it looks good."¹⁰² Acknowledging that there is never a reason to use a shotgun in an urban environment, he explains that customers want to see "big cars with big guns. It gives them comfort."¹⁰³

Tactical units employ a range of violent methods to remove people deemed undesirable. They follow pedestrians, ask questions, take photographs, and

contact the police. If intimidation does not work, they can always resort to open threats and physical violence. Many security officers administer their own form of punishment on the spot, physically assaulting lawbreakers and those suspected of criminal intent.¹⁰⁴ Tactical units remove informal squatters from parks by burning down their shacks and harass street traders by confiscating their goods.¹⁰⁵ Pointing to a riverbed where his teams have repeatedly torn down shacks, a senior security manager explains that, "We are making sure people understand that they don't want to come to this area." He adds, with a hint of bravado, "You can see the grass growing tall there in the riverbed. The council won't do their job—so there will probably be a fire here soon."¹⁰⁶

The owner of another security company explains how his team launched a preventive security operation in a neighborhood that was experiencing high levels of car hijackings and armed robbery. "We came in hard and fast and cleaned up the streets," he says. "We used a lot of teargas and panel beating at first. It was the Wild West. We banged heads. We grabbed people and told them to move along."¹⁰⁷

Among security professionals and representatives of residents' associations, there is widespread consensus that violence is the key to preventive security. "You have to let criminals know that the vehicles will pick you up and sort you out," a security officer explains during a focus group discussion. His colleague agrees that the only way to deter crime is by "making sure criminals know that there are severe consequences." Another officer continues, "You must let them know that it will not be a peaceful arrest. You must let them know that they don't want to come back."¹⁰⁸ According to a resident leader, the key is to make sure that "it gets out on the grapevine that you don't—excuse me—you don't fuck with this area."¹⁰⁹ Another security officer adds, with the colonial arrogance of a former mercenary, "Africa is ruled by fear. Therefore, you must show your superiority. You must instill fear so that they are scared to come back."¹¹⁰

Tactical patrols challenge—and often exceed—the limits of legality. Under South African law, private security personnel have the same rights as private civilians. They can apprehend someone that they suspect either just committed a serious offense or is about to commit a serious offense. They are legally allowed to use the minimum force necessary to detain a suspect, except in cases of self-defense. And they have no legal powers to arrest, stop and search, or otherwise harass people they consider undesirable.¹¹¹ "The only way we can stop and search people is if we have a reasonable suspicion that they just committed a crime *or if they consent to being searched*," explains a senior security manager (emphasis added).¹¹² This "consent" clause provides the leeway necessary for preventive security operations. When a large truck rolls up and two

men with big guns begin asking questions, people often "consent" to being searched. "The things we do are 'technically' not legal," explains a high-level security manager. "We do it, but the fact of the matter is that it is not legal."¹¹³

Just as some residents refuse to fortify their homes, a few RAs reject companies that market themselves as overly aggressive.¹¹⁴ But aggressive approaches to preventive security are expanding rapidly, and violence is part of the allure. The head of an RA expresses excitement that his security teams is comprised of "street fighters" with experience "fighting in the trenches." The leader of another boasts that the head of his security company is willing to go "into the deepest, darkest places"—presumably meaning Alexandra. Like the security professional quoted above, he insists that, "This is Africa. It's a tough, hard place so you need to fight fire with fire."¹¹⁵

The third pillar of preventive security is an *active community*. Security professionals insist that the entire project depends on residents remaining vigilant and reporting "suspicious" activity. Security officers and RAs urge residents to become active, responsible partners by attending meetings, contributing financially, remaining alert, and reporting unusual people or activities. They express two concerns about complacency. First, they say, successful security schemes can generate apathy. People must be reminded that crime is a constant danger. Second, some worry that not enough residents have embraced the collective approach to security.¹¹⁶ Too many people, they say, hold onto the individualistic belief that protection simply means having a house with more fortifications than the rest of the block.¹¹⁷ Because collective security arrangements depend on voluntary contributions, RAs and security companies must convince residents of the added value of collective security.¹¹⁸

Security companies and residents' associations engage in constant educational activities to promote vigilance and collective responsibility. They send SMS alerts and e-mails to residents with information about crimes in the area, suspicious vehicles, and successful arrests. Each RA holds a weekly meeting where security officers provide details about recent incidents, emerging threats, and strategies for responding to crime. Officials provide residents with guidelines for identifying suspicious activity and plead with them to report anything or anyone out of the ordinary.¹¹⁹

While encouraging the community to claim ownership over neighborhood space, preventive security operations also activate the boundaries of "community." Demanding attention to who belongs and who does not requires a particular focus on people whose membership in the "community" is most tenuous: working-class Black men and women employed in the neighborhood as

cooks, nannies, maids, and gardeners. Most residents' associations have auxiliary "Domestic Watch" programs that attempt to enlist these workers into the security apparatus. Residents pay a small fee to send their domestic workers to monthly meetings where they receive training in responsible citizenship and lessons about how to record information about suspicious people, vehicles, parcels, and activities.¹²⁰

Domestic Watch programs navigate the workers' complex position in the "community." Seeking to recruit informants, they emphasize that the workers are part of the community and are threatened by crime just like their employers. In fact, they point out, domestic workers are particularly vulnerable because they are often the only people in the house. At the same time, the programs acknowledge that these workers are often suspected of facilitating criminal activity. They insist that the best way to demonstrate loyalty is by providing information to the security officers.¹²¹ Nevertheless, residents' associations do not completely accept domestic workers as members of the community. Many residents worry that Domestic Watch programs provide workers with information that will fall into the hands of criminals and undermine the security of the "community."¹²² As activated by preventive security initiatives, therefore, the community is bounded but has dangerous working-class Black pores.

The final pillar of preventive security is *information*. Each security company operates a command center that processes calls from residents and dispatches tactical units to follow up on reports of suspicious activity. They also keep extensive databases of information collected from residents, patrols, suspects, victims, and the police. Some security managers believe that knowledge is the key to power and that the information they collect will allow them to recognize and disrupt patterns of criminal activity.¹²³ They dream of building a database that includes the names, vehicles, license plates, and photographs of every criminal as well as every homeless person, construction worker, domestic worker, security guard, and potential suspect who has ever been investigated. For instance, when a suspicious vehicle is reported, they hope to scan the database to determine where the vehicle has been seen before, whether it is suspected of involvement in previous incidents, and whether officers have questioned or identified any previous passengers.¹²⁴ Other security professionals see this as "noise" that distracts from real security work grounded in the presence of physical force. A database might attract clients, they argue, but it is more important to spend limited resources deploying security officers in the streets.¹²⁵

Some companies use video surveillance in open neighborhoods as well.

The leader of a residents' association explained that he hopes to one day have cameras at every entrance and exit to the neighborhood—all forty-seven entrances and exits.¹²⁶ Advocates of video surveillance argue that cameras help eliminate human error, facilitate simple tasks like recording license plates, and serve as a deterrent.¹²⁷ They celebrate advances in technology including license plate recognition, facial recognition, and thermal imaging capabilities as well as high-speed data transfer and processing.¹²⁸ As labor costs continue to rise, they suggest, security managers will need to explore alternatives to the labor market.¹²⁹ For practitioners who prioritize physical force, video surveillance is another distraction. They argue that cameras are expensive and that someone in a control room has to pay attention to a bank of cameras monitoring dozens of sites rather than focusing on their immediate surroundings.¹³⁰ Nevertheless, security professionals expect that South Africans will adopt new advances—including unmanned drones—as they become affordable.¹³¹ In fact, a South African company recently began marketing drone technology for crowd control to help in “preventing another Marikana.”¹³²

To enhance their knowledge/power, preventive security companies operate investigative units that gather information on criminal activities and follow up on incidents. Investigators examine surveillance footage to determine whether a robbery victim was followed home from a shopping mall. They conduct polygraph tests with domestic workers to determine whether a home invasion was an inside job.¹³³ Several security managers claim to have undercover units and networks of paid informants in townships such as Alexandra. One company pays for information that leads to an arrest; another offers rewards for information after a crime has been committed; and still another claims to employ people to hang out on street corners, liquor stores, and local taverns to collect information.¹³⁴

After apprehending a person suspected of committing a crime, some tactical officers like to interrogate the person to gain information about their accomplices, the location of their weapons, and their method of identifying a target. “Once the police get there, it causes confusion,” claims a security officer. “So it is best if we can work the guy for a while before the cops get there.” His colleague adds, “To get them to chat, we drag them around the corner and hope it takes the police two hours to arrive.”¹³⁵ Another officer smiles and explains that he likes to be the good cop. “People talk if you talk nicely to them,” he explains. “I’m the nice cop. I understand where they are coming from. Some guys get angry and emotional—their egos get in the way. I’m not angry at them, so they talk to me. Or else they’ll have to go talk to the big guy in the other room.”¹³⁶

Business

Privatized approaches to influx control that mobilize visibility, violence, community, and information are extremely expensive. These initiatives remain, after all, profit-driven business. In closed neighborhoods, each household pays R300–500 per month (\$36–60). In neighborhoods without gates, the monthly fee ranges from R450–1,200 per month (\$54–144).¹³⁷ On top of the monthly fees, the residents are expected to purchase vehicles, uniforms, and equipment for the tactical units. Before a collective security initiative can even begin, therefore, an RA has to collect an extraordinary amount of money from residents.¹³⁸

Because RAs are voluntary associations, however, not all residents contribute to the collective security initiative. Most RAs report contributions from 30 to 60 percent of residents, leading to widespread complaints about “free riders” who benefit from the security initiative without contributing.¹³⁹ To address this issue, RAs in the northern suburbs lobbied the city of Johannesburg to allow the formation of residential City Improvement Districts (CIDs). In South Africa, CIDs are private organizations authorized by the state to impose compulsory levies on all property owners in an area and to use the money to supplement municipal services.¹⁴⁰ In 2009, the city of Johannesburg prevented the formation of CIDs in the northern suburbs due to concerns about further fortification.¹⁴¹ A city official insisted, “We don’t want [a residential CID] to be nothing more than a high-security neighbourhood or to promote a paramilitary approach to controlling public spaces.”¹⁴² Without the ability to impose compulsory levies, many middle-class neighborhoods without gates determined that preventive security was prohibitively expensive—leaving only the wealthiest suburbs to pursue the latest developments in securitization.

From the corporate perspective, however, preventive security is not as profitable as armed response.¹⁴³ Because of collective bargaining, a security manager explains, the RAs are “extracting value” from security companies by demanding more officers, more training, and more advanced technology.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, he claims, companies must respond to increasingly outrageous demands: “We’ve got ninjas. We can go over walls and through electric fences. We can make sure your Rottweiler won’t hurt us. But why should we go over walls or electric fences? We provide it because the customers demand it.”¹⁴⁵ To maintain their revenue stream, security companies often call on RAs to help enroll additional armed response clients. Some security companies even claim to offer preventive security services merely to retain their armed response clients.¹⁴⁶

One of the fastest growing preventive security programs in Johannesburg is

Community Active Patrol (CAP). CAP began in 2006 as a community-driven project in Glenhazel—a wealthy neighborhood in northeastern Johannesburg. Since that time, CAP has grown to include thirty-four neighborhoods and roughly 150,000 residents. A CAP manager explains that this expansion is grounded in two related processes. First, success at reducing crime in CAP neighborhoods attracts the attention of neighboring communities. Second, the displacement of crime from CAP neighborhood makes neighboring communities increasingly vulnerable and deepens the attraction of CAP.¹⁴⁷

The core of the CAP system is a triangular relationship between a residents' association, a security company, and the CAP Incident Command and Control Center (ICCC). Residents' associations that join CAP sign a contract with the ICCC and select a security provider from three companies approved by the ICCC. The goal, according to a CAP official, is to ensure that security companies remain accountable to communities. "Security companies in South Africa are businesses," he points out. "They're out to make money, not to fight crime. We had to change the paradigm."¹⁴⁸ The three CAP security companies—Cortac, Quemic, and 7-Arrows—are similar operations. Each is owned and managed by people with extensive military backgrounds in South Africa as well as places like Israel, Italy, Canada, and the United States.¹⁴⁹

More than any other preventive security operation, CAP prioritizes the ICCC database. "Information is power," says a CAP manager. "Every different area had information being compartmentalized and going to different security companies. All we needed to do was monopolize the information."¹⁵⁰ The ICCC takes calls from residents in every CAP neighborhood and functions as a central repository for all information gathered by its security companies. The expansion of CAP throughout the northern suburbs has increased its knowledge/power. "If one day we could monopolize Joburg, all of that information coming in would be so powerful that we would be able to start to actually target the criminal elements where they're staying."¹⁵¹ The endgame, it seems, is a privatized monopoly on policing.

Although CAP has established itself as the most ambitious preventive security initiative in Johannesburg, other companies market similar initiatives. Dismissing CAP claims to prioritize community over profit, companies like CSS and 24/7 suggest that CAP simply employs a different business model. Rather than hiring the ICCC to supervise outsourced security contractors, RAs can sign contracts directly with these companies. Just like CAP, they operate independent control centers, maintain databases, and deploy "tactical units" to police public space. Yet each company offers slightly different services to claim a niche in the market. For instance, CSS promotes the use of surveillance

cameras, which CAP rejects. And 24/7 offers a cobranding strategy that uses vehicles and billboards to advertise not only the security company but also the RA itself. Even ADT has reluctantly entered the market for preventive security services.

In short, collective security generated a new market and private security companies have responded. But the new market has merely enhanced the racialized class dynamics of securitization. In the words of a security professional, "Everything boils down to economics—it always comes back to that. To not be dragged into [crime] in the first place depends on the economic ability of each household. You are far less exposed if you pay more."¹⁵² South African criminologist Mark Shaw describes private security companies as the "guardians of social divisions, between the wealthy and middle class on the one hand and the poor on the other, and so, at least for the moment, between white and black."¹⁵³

THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECURITY COORDINATION

The fortification of the northern suburbs, the expansion of the private security industry, and the growing role of residents' associations have dramatically reconfigured the relationship between public and private security forces in postapartheid Johannesburg. Despite similar missions and mechanisms for coordination, the emerging security formations are marked by contestations over jurisdiction and power. Privatized security initiatives fragment the space of urban governance while private security companies challenge the state's claim to a monopoly of violence. These tensions highlight the instability of the emerging security regimes.

The policies of the South African government have contributed to the rise of the private security industry and the fortification of affluent neighborhoods. Government policies have exacerbated inequality and racialized poverty, while also establishing the political and legal framework to promote privatization. And despite tensions over road closures and CIDs, the city of Johannesburg has encouraged residents' associations to play an active role in local governance. Moreover, police and local officials have endorsed—sometimes only tacitly—the violence that private security officers use to confront unwanted visitors in "their" neighborhoods. Rather than an illicit racket, therefore, the private security industry is quite literally a "legalized" mafia.

Like private security companies, the police in postapartheid South Africa are deployed to protect private property and maintain public order.¹⁵⁴ This

broad correspondence has facilitated the coordination of private and public security forces. Indeed, private security professionals like to point out that they operate in close partnership with the police—sharing information and working within the limits of the law.¹⁵⁵

Several formal mechanisms exist for coordination between private security companies, residents' associations, and the SAPS. First, every police district holds a weekly meeting with private security companies in the area. Led by the police commander, the meetings provide an opportunity for police and private security companies to share information, discuss crime patterns, and build rapport. Yet the success of these meetings is highly contingent on not only the strength of individual relationships but also the willingness of private security companies to participate.¹⁵⁶ Some companies—especially those with the most aggressive reputations—often refuse to attend meetings or share information. This generates concerns from the police about private security “vigilantism.”¹⁵⁷

Community Police Forums (CPF's) provide another coordination mechanism. CPF's are official bodies that promote partnerships between the police and residents in each precinct. Some CPF's raise money from residents to buy equipment or sponsor training courses for the police. Others train SAPS managers to adopt a “business-like” approach to budgeting, personnel, and vehicles.¹⁵⁸ In addition, CPF's are supposed to enable residents to hold the police accountable.¹⁵⁹ Again, the success of each CPF is highly contingent and depends largely on the affluence of the precinct. “Ours is now virtually nonexistent. It is a bit of a waste of time. No one contributes,” explains the head of a residents' association.¹⁶⁰

Joint operations are a third form of coordination. The SAPS often enlist private security forces to assist with evictions, water and electricity cutoffs, and the repression of strikes and demonstrations. During the 2012 Marikana strike, for instance, over five hundred private security guards provided logistical support, surveillance equipment, and information on the day that the police massacred workers.¹⁶¹ In Johannesburg, the SAPS solicit officers and weapons from private companies for operations against criminal syndicates. “Occasionally when the police conduct raids in Alex, they ask our security company to help them go in,” explains the leader of a residents' association. “Alex is not a friendly place for the police. They need a lot of help, so the security company will give them six or eight or ten tactical officers to go in and help them raid a place.”¹⁶² The police run the operations, even when they are based on intelligence collected by private security companies.¹⁶³

The SAPS has recently emulated the privatized approach to preventive

security by reviving a long-dormant “sector policing” strategy.¹⁶⁴ The SAPS now dedicates two vehicles to each police sector, with four to eight sectors in each precinct. Officers deployed to a specific sector are expected to become familiar with the area, the residents, and the private security officers. Residents and security officers are encouraged to communicate directly with the officers. While residents and police express hope about sector policing, they acknowledge that private security companies operate far more vehicles than the police in most suburban neighborhoods. One sector within the Bramley police precinct, for instance, includes four suburbs: Illovo, Sandhurst, Parkmore, and Hyde Park. While the police dedicate two vehicles to the entire sector, private security companies deploy two to three tactical units and multiple armed response teams in each suburb.¹⁶⁵

A network of private and public security forces polices each neighborhood: a dedicated police vehicle, tactical units from the preventive security initiative, and armed response units from numerous companies providing services to individual households. According to a SAPS commander, the extensive presence of private security forces in the northern suburbs allows the police to direct their attention and resources to other areas.¹⁶⁶ This has created a territorial dynamic to policing, in which private security forces take the lead in policing the northern suburbs while the SAPS maintain a heavier presence in the inner city and townships such as Alexandra.

Despite coordination and a geographic division of duties, the emerging security formations are fraught with tensions and contradictions. Many security professionals view the SAPS as corrupt, uncommitted, and incompetent. “Only half of the police managers are dedicated,” claims a private security professional. “The other half don't give a shit.”¹⁶⁷ Another claims that SAPS officers have a policy of “catch and release” and regularly “lose” case files. In the words of one private security officer, “The bobby on the beat is really a bum on a seat.”¹⁶⁸ More tempered critics explain that the police are merely overstretched and understaffed.¹⁶⁹ Regardless of the tone, of course, critiques of the police are good for business.

Private security companies are aggressively expanding into fields previously reserved for the police. Private companies now police public space, investigate criminal activities, and raid criminal syndicates. In 2015 and 2016, the University of Johannesburg and the University of the Witwatersrand hired private security companies to disperse protests by students and workers. And security officers assert powers beyond the law by searching pedestrians, stopping vehicles, interrogating suspects, and administering punishments. Security industry representatives talk about taking over aspects of municipal policing or

even "monopolizing" policing in Johannesburg.¹⁷⁰ More immediately, industry representatives lobby the state to empower private security officers to carry out arrests and register as police reservists.¹⁷¹ "Reservists have full policing powers and have to work a certain number of hours each month—but there are often no [SAPS] vehicles for them to ride in. If they could clock in and ride with us, we could do so much more," explains a security manager.¹⁷² A police commander, however, points out that this would create a serious conflict of interest: "We do not want a double standard where you are working for a specific client while using your SAPS badge."¹⁷³

This comment highlights a tension between the missions of the police and private security forces: the SAPS have a public mandate to serve the citizens and residents of South Africa whereas private security companies serve only their clients and shareholders. Moreover, the police are charged with combating crime while security companies profit from high crime rates.

Recognizing the market potential of services that the police provide, some private security officials see the police as competitors for market share. Yet they are also cautious about the potential for conflict with the state. "The more functions we take on, the more we'll be seen as a threat," explains a security officer.¹⁷⁴ Some local SAPS commanders feel the competition: privatized forces outnumber and outgun the police, pay higher wages and lure away talented officers, and attempt to "take over" operations under police jurisdiction.¹⁷⁵ As a SAPS officer explains, "The fear is where private security companies become a force unto themselves. They must be monitored very closely."¹⁷⁶

The state regulates the private security industry through the Private Security Industry Regulatory Agency (PSIRA). In recent years, the South African government has sought to limit foreign ownership and the presence of multinational corporations in the security industry.¹⁷⁷ Established companies welcome some regulations, particularly those that prevent "fly-by-night" companies from undercutting their business. But they resist attempts to enforce labor standards, health and safety regulations, and limits on the power of private security officers.¹⁷⁸

Rather than seamless cooperation, therefore, the privatized security regimes in postapartheid Johannesburg are marked by tension and contestation. Residents' associations and private security companies have fought to expand the governmental power of the private sector through road closures, preventive security initiatives, and demands for residential CIDs. Combined with the fortification of the suburbs, these assertions of power have decentralized and fragmented urban governance in postapartheid Johannesburg. They also highlight the instability within emerging security regimes. For now, the state

retains ultimate authority. But the possibility remains for a more fundamental challenge from the privatized armed forces of the elite.

SECURITY OFFICERS: "IT'S A SHIT JOB"

The security industry confronts its own contradictions, perhaps none more important than the fact that South African elites rely for protection on the very people they most fear: poor Black men. Under apartheid, the South African Police employed Black officers to police Black townships, and the Bantustan strategy employed Black intermediaries to police the scattered reserves. Today, in a context of widespread unemployment, the private security industry has become an important source of low-wage work. Yet the working conditions are deplorable.

Jonny Steinberg notes that most SAPS officers are "near the tail end of a frantic, unseemly dash to join the new black middle class."¹⁷⁹ Private security officers exist even closer to the precarious edge of the paid labor force. As a primary source of entry-level work for African men, private security is one of the few options for poor South Africans in search of steady employment. "When we were growing up, people regarded security guards as low, low people," explains a security officer. "But now everybody wants that job because you can survive."¹⁸⁰ Along with the 480,000 security officers who are currently employed, another 1,380,000 officers are registered and waiting for opportunities.¹⁸¹ Yet many workers explain that they would not work in security if other jobs were available.¹⁸²

Despite this demand, security jobs provide low wages and difficult, often dangerous conditions. As a security guard told me in no uncertain terms, "It's a shit job."¹⁸³ Most security guards work twelve-hour shifts in nine-day cycles: three day shifts, three night shifts, three days off.¹⁸⁴ The official pay scale is based on training level (Grade A–E), with more than 70 percent of workers making less than R1,500 per month (\$180). Officers complain that companies sign contracts with clients for Grade C guards, hire guards with Grade C training, but only pay Grade D wages. Other forms of wage theft include forced overtime without compensation, the deduction of wages for nonexistent pension funds, and the reduction of wages for sick days.¹⁸⁵ And, as a security guard explains, some companies require applicants to purchase their jobs: "If you are to get a job, you have to pay R500 (\$60) up front. That is happening everywhere."¹⁸⁶

Companies also steal unemployment funds deducted from wages by pressuring workers to resign. "If you have been working ten years or twenty years,



FIGURE 4.5. Guarding wealth and privilege in the suburbs

there's a Blue Card unemployment fund," explains a security guard. "If you resign, you get zero." Companies also pressure workers to sign acknowledgments of complaints or warnings, which can be used to fire a worker without distributing the pension fund. Workers are also reclassified as "spares" and denied regular shifts. "To be a spare is to go to the office every day and find out there is no post available for you. So you end up resigning," says a worker. "And once you resign, they are going to take away the money that the company has been paying into the provident fund."¹⁸⁷

Operations that rely on highly trained and experienced officers—such as preventive security schemes—pay much higher wages. "Our officers are very well paid," explains a security manager. They are also "rewarded for proactive behavior" with bonuses based on the number of people they question and rewards for acts of exceptional bravery or stops that lead to arrests.¹⁸⁸ Because these companies employ people with military experience, their officers often take contracts with private military companies operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Somalia. This demonstrates the overlap between the work of private security and private military companies protecting the powerful in the early twenty-first century.

Yet most security officers report onerous working conditions.¹⁸⁹ The jobs themselves are tedious and dangerous. Officers stand outside on hot summer days and cold winter nights, guarding a building or lifting a boom gate. Some

wealthy residents understand. "It is the most thankless, most horrible job that anybody could wish to do," explains a resident leader. "You stand there for twelve hours opening and closing a boom. You can try to make it interesting. You can threaten them. You can do a hell of a lot of things, but at the end of the day, it stays a boring job."¹⁹⁰ The most privileged guards have a hut, a chair, and a teapot—but many are denied even these basic amenities. And they are expected to confront armed criminals with little backup or support. As a security officer explains, "When you arrive, you are greeted by the bullet. Some clients say we must jump the wall, where we are greeted with electric wires and dogs as well."¹⁹¹

Despite their sacrifices, workers feel disrespected by clients and bosses. Guards describe being reprimanded for requesting a cup of coffee, reported for taking a bathroom break, and accused of sleeping on the job whenever they sit down.¹⁹² During a focus group discussion, security guards shared many stories, such as the following: "Sometimes the client gives you an instruction, like: 'Don't open the gate for anybody.' In the future, maybe you refuse to open the gate when his friend comes. The friend calls the client and the client calls the office and the office harasses you: 'Why did you refuse to open the gate?' Maybe the person comes back two days later and you open the gate. Then they will accuse you, 'Why did you open the gate?' You do this, you are wrong. You do that, you are wrong."¹⁹³

Security guards also describe racism by clients and bosses. First of all, say security guards, race matters in hiring and promotions. "A white guy like you," a guard tells me, "who never did security work before, won't just start at the beginning where everybody starts. Because of your skin, you will start in the office—even though you don't know anything about security. I've been working security for seven years and you don't know anything, but you are going to manage me."¹⁹⁴

Moreover, security jobs require Black workers to adopt the racialized assumptions of the clients and companies. "The thing with the clients," explains one guard, "because we are living in South Africa, Black persons are always suspect."¹⁹⁵ Security officers learn to consider race when looking for suspicious activities. A control room operator explains that the training is not necessarily explicit. "They won't say directly that you should focus on Black people. But it is clear from the way they work. If a Black person passes and you don't send a car to investigate, then you are in big trouble. But if a white man passes, the bosses will check the footage and go, 'nah.'"¹⁹⁶

Finally, security officers are among the first suspects when crimes occur on their watch—along with gardeners, domestic workers, and construction

crews. "If the guard is working there, he is the first suspect," explains a security officer.¹⁹⁷ Stationary guards are accused of allowing perpetrators to slip past, while control room operators are suspected of delaying the response teams. Companies regularly question their guards using polygraph equipment to determine whether they conspired on an inside job.¹⁹⁸ Security managers point out that guards pose a risk because they know the clients' routines, the layout of the premises, and the location of valuable items.¹⁹⁹ After thieves followed a man home and stole his car at gunpoint, the security officer at the gate was interrogated. When the supervisor accused him of letting the thieves escape, he replied: "Why did the client give them his keys? Because they took out the big guns! They also showed ME the big guns. What was I supposed to do?"²⁰⁰ According to one wealthy resident, this raises a bigger question: "Why should he jeopardize his life for you if he's paid as much as a gardener?"²⁰¹

Suspicion toward security guards leads companies to develop strategies for micromanaging their employees. Security companies place GPS devices and cameras in cars to monitor their security officers. They explain that these devices promote discipline by allowing the company to monitor response times and the movement of the vehicle.²⁰² Companies also conduct regular polygraph tests—not only when employees are hired or when crimes have been committed but as a routine practice.²⁰³ Some even maintain barracks so that their officers do not return to townships and rural areas where they might come into contact with the "criminal element."²⁰⁴ While providing a tool for monitoring and disciplining the workers, barracks also become a site where security officers can hold and interrogate suspects.

Security officers recognize the cruel irony of poor Black security guards protecting the tremendous wealth of elite white South Africans. "The problem is that, because we are Black, we have grown up to have inferiority to the whites. So it doesn't surprise you to go to the suburb and find white people having all of these things," explains a security guard. "But sometimes it feels bad when I'm guarding those big houses and then come back to Alex and see all of these shacks."²⁰⁵ They also resent their low pay in a profitable industry. "I stay in a shack," explains a control room operator. "But where I'm working, we are dealing with more than R500,000 (\$60,000) every day. People come in and leave those checks in the control room. Tomorrow morning, we hand over the checks to the big bosses who will be reading R500,000 or R700,000 (\$60,000–84,000). But they give you peanuts."²⁰⁶

During a strike by private security guards in 2006, a striking worker shared similar sentiments: "We guard billions but we are paid peanuts."²⁰⁷ The controversial strike lasted three full months and received support from sixteen

unions. Workers achieved 9.25 percent raises and a shift in the pay grade system, but almost sixty workers were killed in violent confrontations between striking workers, replacement workers, and the police.²⁰⁸ There were further strike actions in 2012 and 2013.²⁰⁹ As he was leaving our focus group discussion, a security guard stopped to make sure I understand that capital is produced by labor: "They must learn to respect the security guard because the guard is the money maker. They can't earn the money without the security guard."²¹⁰

The reliance on low-wage Black labor is part of a broader paradox of post-apartheid inequality and (in)security. Although increasingly disposable, the Black poor in townships like Alexandra remain precariously connected to the wage labor market. Widespread unemployment ensures the availability of a low-wage workforce to serve the elite. At the same time, disposability contributes to the symbolic value of the Black poor as dangerous and threatening specters of insecurity. The profits of the private security industry depend on both the specter and the labor of the Black working class. But with low wages and dangerous working conditions, the labor force is not content. Nor does it escape the workers that they are asked to protect the wealth of the elite by targeting other poor Black men. Although unionization remains uneven, the 2006 strike demonstrates the potential for an organized labor force to disrupt regimes of securitization.

CONCLUSION

The privatization of policing and the fortification of white space are integral to understanding the broader South African transition. Democratization sowed doubt among the white elite about the willingness and ability of the new government to ensure their security. At the same time, the new government promoted privatization as part of a broader neoliberal project that intensified inequality, exacerbated racialized poverty, and produced new sources of race and class anxiety. Despite formal equality and a color-blind ideology, the emergence of privatized forms of influx control demonstrates the limits of decolonization and the continued significance of racism in postapartheid South Africa.

The northern suburbs of Johannesburg have become laboratories of securitization. From the fortification of private property to the emergence of collective security initiatives, the private sector has driven the development of advanced strategies for protecting the wealthy and policing the Black poor. Road closures marked the growing role of residents' associations, while preventive security regimes in neighborhoods without gates represent the latest advances

in suburban fortification. Wealthy residents and private security professionals celebrate the success of privatized securitization.²¹¹ Along with statistics that show a decrease in crime, they also point to more experiential criteria such as middle-class residents taking walks after dinner.

Yet these security regimes are highly unstable. The relationship between the police and private security companies is rife with tensions. And the security regimes depend on the labor of the same populations that they target: poor Black South Africans. Preventive security regimes generate other destabilizing processes as well, such as escalation and displacement.

Wealthy residents and security professionals fear that fortification is leading to an escalation of violence.²¹² Just like the security forces, criminal networks have acquired more powerful weapons, more advanced technology, and more ruthless modes of operation. Newspapers and security officers increasingly tell stories of shootouts on public streets with high-caliber machine guns. As the head of a residents' association explains, "One concern is that if you get a bunch of vigilantes going around beating up Blacks, you suddenly have Blacks coming in with AK-47s."²¹³

In addition, securitization is built on a strategy of displacement. Displacing crime to areas that have not yet purchased coverage provides security companies with a profitable accumulation strategy. But the strategy displaces more than just crime—it displaces the underlying crisis as well. Whereas the ANC's early interest in crime prevention was meant to address the social roots of crime, fortification merely relocates the crisis. By concentrating crime in areas that cannot afford the most advanced technologies of fortification and the most aggressive forms of preventive security, this temporary fix ultimately intensifies the underlying causes of crime: poverty, racism, violence, and repression. "If I had a bulletproof car," says a wealthy white resident, "I'd drive to Alex for the day and stick out my tongue and laugh at them while they shoot at the car."²¹⁴ Adding insult to the mix is sure to deepen the crisis.

While wealthy South Africans fortify their *laagers*, the ANC government confronts popular frustrations about growing inequality and racialized poverty. The "unfinished revolution" has generated township protests, land occupations, broad-based social movements, crippling labor actions, and a resurgent student movement.²¹⁵ Along with demands for access to jobs, houses, education, and free basic services, South Africans are increasingly calling for redistribution and decolonization. While deploying the police and private security forces to suppress these struggles, the ANC government also seeks to articulate popular demands to its own hegemonic project.²¹⁶ The future of South Africa will be determined in the cauldron of these struggles.

Before returning to these struggles in the conclusion, I will analyze securitization in post-Oslo Palestine/Israel. As in South Africa, a sophisticated security network has been built to contain the struggles of the Palestinian poor. Rather than "Black crime," securitization in Palestine/Israel is informed by a racialized discourse of "Muslim terrorism." And rather than private-sector forces, the most advanced security formation in Palestine/Israel is based on an imperial network of state-based security forces. Although this may appear to contradict the dominant trend in contemporary neoliberal restructuring, it actually demonstrates an equally important trend. Along with private security forces, neoliberalization has produced a dramatic increase in state security forces: police, prisons, military, and intelligence. Employing racialized strategies that target the Palestinian poor while relying on the labor of the very same population, the security network in Palestine/Israel is at least as unstable as the privatized regimes in South Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

203. Field notes, October 2012.
204. Yaser 2015.
205. Focus group discussion with Palestinian farmers in Al-Khader village, September 2012.
206. Interview with resident of Husan village, September 2012.
207. Interview with a community organizer, September 2012.
208. Amiry 2010.
209. Focus group discussion with undocumented workers, September 2012.
210. Focus group discussion with undocumented workers, September 2012. For a similar dynamic along the US-Mexico border, see Rosas 2006.
211. Interview with a community organizer in Bethlehem, September 2012.
212. Field notes, September 2012.
213. Field notes, September 2012.
214. Al-Haq 2006.
215. Interview with organizer for a Palestinian farmers' union, October 2012.
216. Bimkom 2008; B'Tselem 2010.
217. Hass 2012.
218. Algazi 2009; Blau 2012.
219. Several 2011; Blau and Hasson 2016.
220. Blau 2012.
221. Blau 2012.
222. Hasson 2010.
223. Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem 2012; B'Tselem 2013.
224. Interview with community leader in Al-Khader village, September 2012.
225. Interview with a resident of Al-Khader village, September 2013; presentation by a Palestinian farmer from Nahhalin village, October 2012.
226. Field notes, September 2012. See also Ma'an News 2012.
227. Bimkom 2008; Hass 2012.
228. Focus group discussion with farmers from Al-Khader village, September 2012.
229. For more on settlement construction and capital accumulation, see Algazi 2009.
230. Interview with a refugee rights organizer in Bethlehem, September 2012.
231. Honig-Parnass and Haddad 2007.
232. Qumsiyeh 2011.
233. For more on fatalities, see the B'Tselem "Fatalities before Operation Cast Lead" webpage: <http://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event>.
234. For details, see reports by Shirabe Yamada: <http://oznik.com/news/020307.html> #Shirabe and <http://oznik.com/shirabe/020312.html>.
235. Medalia 2007.
236. Raheb 2004.
237. Barghouti 2011.
238. Field notes, September 2012.
239. Field notes, September 2012.
240. Presentation by a Palestinian farmer from Nahhalin village, October 2012.
241. Interviews with Palestinian youth activists, September 2013.

242. Field notes, September 2012.
 243. Khaub 2012.
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1. Orford 2014.
 2. Pistorius 2012.
 3. Wiener and Bateman 2014.
 4. Germaner 2014.
 5. Quoted in Scrino 2014.
 6. In July 2016, a judge sentenced Pistorius to six years in prison for murder. At the time this book went to press, prosecutors were appealing the sentence as too lenient.
 7. Fanon 1967 [1952]; Hall et al. 2013 [1978].
 8. See Hugo (1988) for survey research on anxieties about the future in late apartheid South Africa.
 9. Greenberg 2004; Southall 2007; Von Holdt 2013.
 10. Mbembe 2015.
 11. Field notes from the meeting of a residents' association, June 2012.
 12. Segal, Pelo, and Rampa 2001; Shaw 2002; Steinberg 2004. For historical background, see Van Onselen 1984.
 13. Desai 2002; Ngwane 2003; McKinley and Naidoo 2004; Shivambu 2014; Pillay 2015.
 14. Altbeker 2007; Herrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby 2010; South African Police Service 2013.
 15. Steinberg 1999; Shaw 2002; Dirsuweit 2002; Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002.
 16. South African Police Service 2013. See Burger, Gould, and Newham (2010) for a critical analysis of SAPS crime statistics.
 17. Statistics South Africa 2012.
 18. Conaroff and Conaroff 2006.
 19. Mistry 2004; Louw 2006; Harris and Radaelli 2007; Burger, Gould, and Newham 2010; Statistics South Africa 2012; Govender 2013.
 20. Shaw and Louw 1998; Steinberg 1999; Shaw 2002; Dirsuweit 2002; Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002; Lemanski 2004; Statistics South Africa 2012.
 21. Field notes, June 2012.
 22. Interview with the chair of a residents' association, June 2012.
 23. Seekings 1995; Steinberg 2001b; Dirsuweit 2002; Lemanski 2004; Samara 2011; Hudson 2012; Henkemen 2013.
 24. Interview with the chair of a residents' association, July 2005; interview with a member of a residents' association, July 2005. See also Statistics South Africa 2012.
 25. Fanon 1952.
 26. Shaw 2002.
 27. Shaw 2002.
 28. Laufer 2001; Shaw 2002; Singh 2008; Steinberg 2008; Samara 2011.
 29. Samara 2003; Singh 2008; Steinberg 2011.

30. Steinberg 2008; Albeker 2010.
31. Shaw 2002; Samara 2011.
32. Shaw 2002, 86.
33. Samara 2011.
34. Vally 2002; McKinley and Veriava 2005; Albeker 2010.
35. Samara 2011.
36. Alexander, Lekgowa, et al. 2013; Desai 2014.
37. Brenner 1998; Irish 1999; Laufer 2001; Schönleith 1999; Berg 2004; Lemanski 2004; Minnaar and Mistry 2004; Béné-Gbaffou 2008; Béné-Gbaffou, Didier, and Morange 2008; Murray 2008; Berg and Nouveau 2011.
38. See Clarno and Murray 2013.
39. Interview with a private security professional, June 2005; interview with a private security manager, July 2005.
40. Brenner 1998; Lipman and Harris 1999; Dirsuiweit and Wafer 2006; Murray 2011.
41. Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2014; South African Police Service 2015.
42. Irish 1999; Schönleith 1999; Shaw 2002; Taljaard 2008; Jaynes 2012.
43. Interviews with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
44. Interview with SAPS officials, June 2012.
45. Interview with the manager of a private security company, June 2005.
46. Interview with the manager of a private security company, June 2005; interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
47. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
48. Interview with an ADT representative, June 2012.
49. Mbembe 2001; Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 2011; Béné-Gbaffou, Didier, and Morange 2008.
50. Field notes from the annual general meeting of a residents' association, May 2005.
51. Carruthers 1993.
52. Czegledy 2003; Beavon 2004.
53. According to the leader of a residents' association, Black residents make up around 5 percent of the population in these neighborhoods. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
54. Ballard 2005; Lemanski and Saff 2010; Clarno 2013.
55. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
56. Clarno 2013; Anderson 2015.
57. Interview with two people involved in a residents' association, June 2012.
58. Interview with two people involved in a residents' association, June 2012.
59. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
60. Field notes from tour of northern suburbs, June 2005.
61. Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002.
62. Steinberg 2008, 167-68.
63. Field notes from IFSEC South Africa Conference, June 2012.
64. Field notes from IFSEC South Africa Conference, June 2012. For more on self-responsibility, see Singh 2008.
65. See Diphoorn 2016.
66. Interview with the manager of a private security company, June 2005; interview with the manager of a private security company, July 2005.
67. Interview with the accounts manager of a private security company, June 2012.
68. Field notes from annual general meeting of a residents' association, May 2005.
69. Landman 2006, 2008; Harrison and Mabin 2006; Dirsuiweit and Wafer 2006.
70. Landman 2002; South African Human Rights Commission 2005.
71. See Clarno and Murray 2013.
72. Interview with the manager of a security company, June 2012.
73. Interview with the treasurer of a residents' association, June 2012.
74. Interview with the president of a residents' association, June 2012.
75. Quoted in Steinberg 2008, 165.
76. Field notes from a meeting of residents' association representatives, June 2012.
77. Field notes from the annual general meeting of a residents' association, May 2005.
78. Field notes from the annual general meeting of a residents' association, May 2005.
79. Interview with the owner of a security company, June 2012; interview with the manager of a security company, June 2012.
80. Focus group discussion with private security personnel, June 2012.
81. Interview with two people active in a residents' association, June 2012.
82. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012; interview with managers of a private security company, June 2012.
83. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012; interview with representative of a residents' association, June 2012; field notes from City of Johannesburg Crime Prevention Forum Meeting, June 2012.
84. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
85. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
86. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
87. Du Plessis 2015.
88. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
89. Albeker 2010. On "broken windows," see Kelling and Wilson 1982.
90. Cook and Whowell 2011; Manala 2014.
91. Field notes from meeting of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the president of a residents' association, June 2012.
92. Field notes, June 2012.
93. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
94. Hansen 2006; Steinberg 2008; Samara 2010.
95. South African Defence Force (SADF) unit that fought alongside anticommunist rebels in Angola during the 1970s and 1980s and was later deployed to suppress uprisings in South African townships.
96. Paramilitary unit that operated alongside the South African Police (SAP) to suppress the liberation movement in Namibia during the 1980s.
97. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
98. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
99. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.

100. Interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.
101. Interviews with the manager of a private security company, June 2012; interview with the manager of a private security company, June 2012. See also Marks and Wood 2010.
102. Interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
103. Interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
104. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
105. Interview with the manager of a private security company, June 2012; interview with the manager of a private security company, June 2012.
106. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
107. Interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.
108. All three quotes from focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
109. Interview with the head of a residents' association, June 2012.
110. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
111. Hornberger 2004; Steinberg 2008; Albeker 2010; Samara 2010.
112. Interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.
113. Interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
114. Field notes from the meeting of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
115. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
116. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
117. Field notes from the meeting of a residents' association, June 2012.
118. Field notes from the meeting of a residents' association, June 2012.
119. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
120. Multiple interviews with residents and the leaders of residents' associations, June 2012; field notes from a Domestic Watch meeting, June 2012.
121. Field notes from a Domestic Watch meeting, June 2012.
122. Interview with the head of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the head of a residents' association, June 2012.
123. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
124. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
125. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
126. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
127. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
128. Field notes from IFSEC South Africa conference, June 2012.
129. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
130. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
131. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
132. Smith 2014.
133. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
134. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012; interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
135. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
136. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.

137. Field notes, June 2012.
138. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 11, 2012. These expenses are in addition to individual household armed response contracts, which cost an additional R200-400 per month (\$24-48).
139. Field notes, June 2012.
140. Berg 2004; Mirafab 2007; Murray 2011; Didier, Peyroux, and Morange 2012.
141. Interview with a former city official, August 2012. For more on the battle over CIDs in Johannesburg, see Clarno 2013.
142. City of Johannesburg 2009.
143. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
144. Interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
145. Interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
146. Interview with the accounts manager for a private security company, June 2012.
147. Interview with CAP official, June 15, 2012.
148. Interview with CAP official, June 15, 2012.
149. Interviews with directors of two of the three companies, June 2012.
150. Interview with CAP official, June 15, 2012.
151. Interview with CAP official, June 15, 2012.
152. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
153. Shaw 2002, 115.
154. McKinley and Veriava 2005; Desai 2014.
155. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012; interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
156. Field notes from meeting of the City of Johannesburg Crime Prevention Meeting, June 2012; interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
157. Interview with the chair of a Community Police Forum, June 2012.
158. Interview with the chair of a Community Police Forum, June 2012.
159. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
160. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
161. McClenaghan and Smith 2013.
162. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
163. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012; interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.
164. Dixon 2007.
165. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012; interview with a SAPS commander, June 2012.
166. Interview with SAPS commander, June 2012. See also Samara 2011.
167. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
168. Interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.
169. Focus group discussion with security professionals, June 2012.
170. Interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
171. Interview with two directors of a private security company, June 2012.
172. Interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.

173. Interview with SAPS commander, June 2012.
174. Interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.
175. Interview with a representative of the private security industry, June 2012.
176. Field notes from City of Johannesburg Crime Prevention Forum Meeting, June 2012.
177. Interview with a representative of the private security industry, June 2012.
178. Berg 2003; Singh 2008.
179. Steinberg 2008, 23.
180. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
181. Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2014.
182. Sefalafala and Webster 2013.
183. Field notes before a focus group meeting, June 2012. See Sefalafala and Webster 2013.
184. Others work six-day cycles and a few work Monday-Friday with weekends off. In interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012; focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
185. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
186. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
187. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
188. Interview with three directors of a private security company, June 2012.
189. Sefalafala and Webster 2013.
190. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
191. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
192. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
193. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
194. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
195. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
196. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
197. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
198. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
199. Interview with the director of a private security initiative, June 2012.
200. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
201. Interview with two people active in a residents' association, June 2012.
202. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
203. Interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012; interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
204. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012; interview with the director of a private security company, June 2012.
205. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
206. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
207. Quoted in Zeilig 2006.
208. Mail and Guardian 2006; Zeilig 2006.

CHAPTER FIVE

209. COSATU 2013.
210. Focus group discussion with employees of private security companies, July 2012.
211. Four interviews with the leaders of residents' associations, June 2012.
212. Three interviews with the leaders of residents' associations, June 2012.
213. Interview with the leader of a residents' association, June 2012.
214. Interview with two people active in a residents' association, June 2012.
215. Alexander 2012; Saul 2014.
216. Hart 2013.
1. Kardos 2010.
2. Rose 2008; Dayton 2009.
3. Rose 2008.
4. Palestinian Authority 2008.
5. Field notes, meeting with senior US official, September 2013.
6. Dayton 2009; Byrne 2009.
7. Dayton 2009.
8. Field notes, September 2013.
9. International Crisis Group 2010, 12.
10. Zanotti 2010; field notes from meeting with senior US official, September 2013.
11. The US empire in the post-Cold War world is marked by the military dominance of the United States, the unprecedented power of multinational corporations, the worldwide influence of international financial institutions, and the global hegemony of neoliberal economics. Yet the US empire is an insecure empire. Triumphant in the mid-1990s and assertive in the early 2000s, the ability of the United States to enforce its will and maintain order throughout the world can no longer be taken for granted. The rise of the Latin American left, the economic power of China, the aspirations of Russia, the destabilization of the European Union, and the circulation of struggles against neoliberalism and empire constitute short- and long-term challenges to the global hegemony of neoliberalism and US empire. Ecological crises, megadisasters, viral outbreaks, mass extinctions, and nuclear proliferation intensify the crisis tendencies. As Immanuel Wallerstein (2010) argues, the capitalist world system now confronts a structural crisis deeper than the rhythms of accumulation or the rise and fall of hegemons. See Harvey 2003; Johnson 2011; Steinmetz 2005; Stoler 2006; Tadiar 2004; Wallerstein 2010.
12. Shavit 2013, ix.
13. Shavit 2013, 399-401.
14. Shavit 2013, xi.
15. Shavit 2013, 131.
16. Elon 1983 [1971]; Laqueur 2003.
17. Hazony 2000.
18. Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015.
19. Schlaim 2001; Khalidi 2006; Weizman 2007; Collins 2012.
20. Grunberg and Shafir 2000; Shalev 2000; Nitzan and Bichler 2002; Ram 2008.